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The thesis considers the problem of climate change and identifies that the use of 
fossil fuels to generate energy since the Industrial Revolution has been a significant 
factor fuelling the emission of greenhouse gases and the consequent increase in 
global temperatures. Due to continuing economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions 
show no signs of abating. The thesis argues that promoting renewable energy would 
contribute to displacing fossil fuel-generated energy and a consequent decrease in 
greenhouse gas emissions or, at least, the rate at which such emissions are 
increasing. However, a significant barrier to the uptake of renewable energy is that it 
generally has higher initial costs than conventional fossil fuel-generated energy. In 
recognition of this barrier, a number of market-based instruments have been 
introduced internationally to support the uptake of renewable energy. Through a 
discussion of the literature, the thesis identifies that the renewable energy feed-in 
tariff has thus far been the most effective instrument in promoting renewable energy. 
It considers international examples of the feed-in tariff with a focus on Germany, 
which is largely considered to have had the most success with the feed-in tariff. In 
South Africa, which has a coal-based economy, renewable energy has only started 
to gain importance relatively recently. The thesis traces the development of 
renewable energy policy in South Africa through a consideration of the relevant 
legislation and policy documents as well as the market-based instruments that have 
been introduced to promote renewable energy. Even though the South African 
government has chosen to implement renewables tendering in respect of specific 
quantities of renewable energy, the thesis – in light of the numerous advantages of 
the feed-in tariff and its effectiveness internationally – argues in favour of a feed-in 
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1.1   Background information and problem statement 
 
Global climate change has been recognised as ‘unequivocal’.1 Many of the changes 
observed, including warming of the atmosphere and ocean, diminished amounts of 
snow and ice, rising sea levels and increased concentrations of greenhouse gas 
emissions, ‘are unprecedented over decades to millennia’.2 The rising temperatures 
are due to a the drastic increase in global levels of greenhouse gas emissions since 
1750 due to ‘human activities’3 and have resulted in an increase in global 
temperatures of more than half a degree Celsius since before the Industrial 
Revolution.4 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) levels and, consequently, global temperatures remain 
on the increase, which has led to worldwide consensus that GHG emission levels 
must be stabilised. This consensus is evidenced in the adoption of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change5 (UNFCCC), which has as its 
ultimate objective the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations [so as to] ... 
                                                          
1
 L Alexander, S Allen, NL Bindoff, FM Bréon, J Church, U Cubasch, S Emori, P Forster, P 
Friedlingstein, N Gillett, J Gregory, D Hartmann, E Jansen, B Kirtman, R Knutti, K Kumar 
Kanikicharla, P Lemke, J Marotzke, V Masson-Delmotte, G Meehl, I Mokhov, S Piao, GK Plattner, Q 
Dahe, V Ramaswamy, D Randall, M Rhein, M Rojas, C Sabine, D Shindell, TF Stocker, L Talley, D 
Vaughan, SP Xie ‘Summary for Policymakers’ Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 
(Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report) available at 




 R Alley, T Berntsen, NL Bindoff, Z Chen, A Chidthaisong, P Friedlingstein, J Gregory, G Hegerl, M 
Heimann, B Hewitson, B Hoskins, Fortunat Joos, Jean Jouzel, Vladimir Kattsov, Ulrike Lohmann, 
Martin Manning, Taroh Matsuno, Mario Molina, N Nicholls, J Overpeck, D Qin, G Raga, V 
Ramaswamy, J Ren, M Rusticucci, S Solomon, R Somerville, TF Stocker, P Stott, RJ Stouffer, P 
Whetton, RA Wood, D Wratt ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in B Metz, OR Davidson, PR Bosch and LA 
Meyer (eds) Climate Change 2007: Mitigation (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 2. 
4
 ‘Executive Summary’ Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change 2006 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_10_06_exec_sum.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2012] 
iii. 
5
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) 31 ILM 849 (‘UNFCCC’). 
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prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.6 The Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC7 was subsequently adopted and came into effect in 2005. 
The Kyoto Protocol gives effect to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and 
required that the (developed country) parties included in Annex I to the UNFCCC 
reduce their overall emissions of specific GHG emissions by five per cent below 
1990 levels between 2008 and 20128 (the first commitment period). In 2011, the 
parties agreed to a second commitment period, which began at the start of 2013. No 
overall emission reduction target for the second commitment period has been 
agreed.9  
The primary GHG contributing to climate change is carbon dioxide, which has 
been identified as ‘the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas’10 and is 
produced primarily through the combustion of fossil fuels in order to generate 
energy.  
The GHG emissions of developing countries are relatively low compared to 
developed countries due to the fact that they have yet to reach their social and 
development goals.11 However, this situation is changing as developing countries 
such as China, India and South Africa rapidly industrialise and consume ever-
increasing amounts of energy.  
South Africa generates most of its energy from coal12 and thus has a very 
carbon-intensive economy. South Africa is ranked in the top 20 GHG emitters in the 
world (in terms of absolute emissions).13 South Africa is also one of the most energy-
intensive economies in the world14 and consumes about half of the electricity 
                                                          
6
 Ibid, Article 2. 
7
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998) 37 ILM 22 
(‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
8
 Ibid, Article 3(1). 
9
 This is discussed further in Chapter 2 below. 
10
 Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n3) 2. 
11
 UNFCCC (n5), Preamble. 
12
 See International Energy Agency Share of total primary energy supply in 2009 available at 
http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/ZATPESPI.pdf [accessed 23 July 2012]. 
13
 This is based on an analysis of the latest energy indicators of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). See IEA Share of total primary energy supply in 2009 (n12). 
14
 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism A National Climate Change Response Strategy 
for South Africa (September 2004) available at 




produced in Africa.15 Due to the fact that the energy sector accounts for 79 per cent 
of South Africa’s total GHG emissions,16 it is clear that the energy sector holds the 
greatest potential for the reduction of GHGs.  
While reducing the use of fossil fuels to generate energy (internationally and in 
South Africa) would reduce GHG levels, it will not be possible to simply curtail 
energy usage. Furthermore, as developing countries attempt to attain higher levels 
of socio-economic development and increase their energy generation and 
consumption, their GHG emissions are rising rapidly. This can be seen in the fact 
that China has recently overtaken the United States of America as the world’s largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases.17  
Energy demand is also increasing in South Africa. For instance, the South 
African government plans to increase electricity capacity by 45 637 megawatts (MW) 
to reach a total of 89 532 MW in 2030 in terms of the Integrated Resource Plan for 
Electricity 2010-203018 (IRP 2010-2030). 
It is therefore necessary that reliance be placed on other sources of energy, 
such as renewable energy. As discussed in Chapter 3, South Africa has significant 
potential for wind and solar energy. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 3 nuclear 
energy is not considered to be a renewable source of energy. 
There are a number of benefits associated with renewable energy, including that 
it could provide a sustainable source of energy and increase security of supply 
(discussed further in Chapter 3). A transition to energy produced from renewable 
                                                          
15
 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Investor Guide: South Africa (2003) available at http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o71852 [accessed 
29 April 2008] 11. 
16
 Department of Environmental Affairs South Africa’s Second National Communication under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2011 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/zafnc02.pdf [accessed 24 November 2011] 181. 
17
 See International Energy Agency Key World Energy Statistics 2010 available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2010/key_stats_2010.pdf [accessed 2 November 2010]. 
18
 See Department of Energy Electricity Regulation Act No. 4 of 2006: Electricity Regulations on the 
Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030 GNR. 400 in Government Gazette No. 34263 dated 6 May 
2011, 17. It should be noted that an Update to the IRP 2010-2030 has recently been published, and is 
discussed further in Chapter 6. However, since the IRP 2010-2030 ‘remains the official government 




sources would also assist in addressing the problem of climate change,19 due to the 
fact that far lower levels of GHG emissions are associated with energy generated 
from renewable sources than energy generated from fossil fuels.  
However, there are also barriers to renewable energy, a significant one being the 
higher initial costs associated with it. While the generation of electricity from 
conventional (fossil fuel) sources such as coal may be ‘cheaper’, the lower costs do 
not take account of the external impacts of such energy sources on the environment 
and on society, including climate change.20 As discussed in Chapter 4, the exclusion 
of such costs from energy prices leads to resources not being allocated efficiently 
and a consequent market failure.21 Significantly, it has been recognised that climate 
change is ‘the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen’.22  
It has been recognised that market-based instruments (MBIs) can address this 
market failure by including environmental and social costs in the market prices of 
goods and services so that external costs are internalised, which is necessary ‘for 
the optimal allocation of resources’.23 A number of MBIs have been introduced 
internationally to promote renewable energy, including the feed-in tariff, the 
renewable obligation and renewables tendering. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
feed-in tariff has been the most effective in promoting renewable energy worldwide. 
                                                          
19
 See for instance S Singer (editor in chief) The Energy Report: 100% Renewable Energy by 2050 
(WWF International, Ecofys and OMA) available at 
assets.panda.org/downloads/the_energy_report_lowres_111110.pdf [accessed 9 March 2011] 11.  
20
 See R Spalding-Fecher and DK Matibe ‘Electricity and externalities in South Africa’ 2003 (31) 
Energy Policy 721-734, 722, which refers to the South African context. 
21
 See AD Owen ‘Renewable Energy: Externality costs as market barriers’ 2006 (34) Energy Policy 
632-642, 633-634 and JN Blignaut and NA King ‘The Externality Cost of Coal Combustion in South 
Africa’ (paper presented at the first annual conference of the Forum for Economics and Environment) 
2002, Cape Town available at 
http://www.elaw.org/system/files/Economic%20costs%20of%20coal%20combustion%20in%20RSA.p
df [accessed 6 June 2011]. 
22
 Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (n4) i.  
23
 K Brick and M Visser ‘Green Certificate Trading’ 2009 Energy Research Centre, University of Cape 
Town available at http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/09Brick-
Visser_Green_certificate_trading.pdf [accessed 7 July 2011] 2. See also National Treasury: Tax 
Policy Chief Directorate Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments 
to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (April 2006) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Draft%20Environmental%20Fiscal%20Reform%20P
olicy%20Paper%206%20April%202006.pdf [accessed 10 May 2009] 22. 
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The South African government did not place much emphasis on renewable 
energy until the end of the last decade.24 However, more recently renewable energy 
has gained increased prominence and the promotion of renewable energy has been 
identified by government as a component in its strategy to reduce the country’s GHG 
emissions and move to a low-carbon society.25 In terms of the IRP 2010-2030 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E) will account for 21 per 
cent of total electricity capacity26 and 9 per cent of total electricity supply by 2030.27  
South Africa’s environmental regulatory framework consists primarily of 
traditional command-and-control instruments. However, government has started to 
consider the inclusion of MBIs, which was evidenced by the publication of the Draft 
Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa in 2006.28 
Several MBIs have been implemented subsequently, including some that are 
specifically intended to promote renewable energy, such as a rebate for solar water 
heaters,29 a levy on electricity generated from non-renewable sources,30 as well as 
the renewable energy feed-in tariff,31 which was introduced in 2009 but replaced by a 
tendering programme for renewable energy, the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP),32 in 2011. In addition, 
government is considering the introduction of further MBIs including a carbon tax and 
emissions trading.33 These are all considered in Chapter 7.  
The issues outlined above are considered in the following chapters (as set out in 
more detail in the chapter overview) and conclusions are drawn in the final chapter. 
                                                          
24
 For instance, the Department of Energy established a target of ‘10 000 GWh [gigawatt hours] ... 
renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 2013’, which amounted to only four per 
cent of projected energy demand in 2013. Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the 
Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa GNR 513 in Government Gazette No. 
26169 dated 14 May 2004, 25. 
25
 See Department of Environmental Affairs National Climate Change Response Green Paper 2010 
GN 1083 in Government Gazette No. 33801 dated 28 November 2010, especially from 14-18. 
26
 IRP 2010-2030 (n18) Table 4, 17. 
27
 Ibid, Figure 3, 18. See also Figure 5 at 30. The distinction between electricity capacity and 
electricity supply is explained in Chapter 3. 
28
 MBI Policy Paper (n23). 
29
 Discussed at 7.4.2.1. 
30
 Discussed at 7.4.2.4. 
31
 Discussed at 7.3. 
32
 Discussed at 7.4.1.1. 
33




1.2   Research objectives 
The research will (a) describe and discuss the primary market-based instruments 
that have been implemented internationally to promote renewable energy in order to 
identify which have been the most effective in promoting renewable energy; and (b) 
in light of these findings, discuss the legislative and policy developments that would 
be necessary for the successful implementation of such instruments in South Africa. 
 
1.3   Research methodology 
The primary mode of research has been by desktop study. Reference has been 
made to policy papers and authoritative studies on climate change and renewable 
energy, which have been obtained from internet sources including government 
websites and the websites of research institutes, such as the University of Cape 
Town’s Energy Research Centre. Reference is also made to academic articles, 
books and chapters in books, which have been sourced from journal databases, the 
University of Cape Town’s library as well as through internet searches. Legislation, 
regulations and policy documents, accessed via legal databases such as Sabinet 
and Jutastat, are analysed. Where reference is made to the policies of other 
jurisdictions, information on such jurisdictions has been sourced primarily from 
government websites. Use has also been made of media articles, either in hard-copy 
or online, where these provide the most up-to-date information. 
This research reflects the law and policy developments up to and including 30 
September 2013, except in certain circumstances where more recent policy 
developments or the publication of further reports or academic articles appeared 




1.4   Chapter overview  
Chapter 2 sets out in more detail the problem of climate change including from the 
international perspective as well as the impacts of climate change in South Africa.  It 
also highlights the link between climate change and energy generation.  
Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of energy generally as well as 
renewable energy in particular, including with regard to the benefits of, and barriers 
to, renewable energy. The chapter also considers South Africa’s energy profile, 
barriers to renewable energy and the potential for renewable energy in South Africa. 
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of market-based instruments and sets out the 
rationale for their implementation. It briefly outlines a number of MBIs that have been 
implemented internationally to promote the uptake of renewable energy and 
considers their effectiveness in this regard. 
Due to the recognition, in Chapter 4, that the renewable energy feed-in tariff has 
been the most successful instrument in promoting renewable energy worldwide, 
Chapter 5 considers the implementation of the feed-in tariff internationally. As 
expanded on in Chapters 4 and 5, the German feed-in tariff is considered as a ‘best 
practice’ example. Chapter 5 also discusses the feed-in tariffs that have been 
implemented in Spain, India and China, with the object of identifying the elements 
that should be included in any future FIT policy in South Africa. 
Chapter 6 sets out the legislation and polices in South Africa that are relevant to 
climate change and renewable energy, including the White Paper on the Energy 
Policy of the Republic of South Africa,34 the White Paper on the Renewable Energy 
Policy of the Republic of South Africa,35 the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: 
Strategic Options for South Africa36 and the Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 
2010-2030.37  
Thereafter Chapter 7 describes the MBIs that have been introduced in South 
Africa to promote renewable energy, including the rebate for solar water heaters, the 
                                                          
34
 GN 3007 in Government Gazette No. 19606 dated 17 December 1998. 
35
 GNR 513 in Government Gazette No. 26169 dated 14 May 2004. 
36
 Scenario Building Team Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for South Africa 
(Technical Summary, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism) 2007. 
37
 IRP 2010-2030 (n18). 
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levy on electricity produced from non-renewable sources and the REIPPPP. Even 
though it has been replaced by the REIPPPP, Chapter 7 also describes the former 
renewable energy feed-in tariff. 
Based on the experiences of the jurisdictions considered in Chapter 5, Chapter 8 
considers the implementation of a FIT policy in South Africa; and identifies and 
examines the elements of a feed-in tariff framework in the South African context.  






2.1   Introduction 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, 
occur naturally in the Earth’s atmosphere and play an important role. GHGs have a 
heat-trapping effect and are thus responsible for warming of the global surface air 
temperature. Without this natural ‘greenhouse effect’ the average air temperature 
would be well below freezing.2  
However, the Industrial Revolution saw a drastic increase in energy demand, 
which was met primarily by coal3 and which resulted in an associated increase in 
GHG emissions, especially carbon dioxide. The increased levels of GHGs have 
resulted in an increase in average global temperatures. This is referred to as ‘climate 
change’, which has been described as  
‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that 
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’.4  
Warming of the climate system, or climate change, has been recognised as 
‘unequivocal’5 and it is estimated that from 1850-1900 to 2003-2012 temperatures 
                                                          
1
 Parts of this chapter draw on the author’s minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of her LLM 
degree: L du Toit ‘Towards an Effective Climate Change Regime in South Africa: Policy and Legal 
Developments’ 2010 (Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town) available at 
http://uctscholar.uct.ac.za/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=10493&local_base=GEN01.  
2
 JP Holdren and KR Smith ‘Energy, the Environment, and Health’ in United Nations Development 
Programme, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and World Energy Council 
2000 World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability, 86. See also G 
Alexander and G Boyle ‘Introducing Renewable Energy’ in G Boyle (ed) Renewable Energy: Power 
for a Sustainable Future (2ed) 2004, 10. 
3
 See for example H Winkler (ed) Energy Policies for Sustainable Development in South Africa: 
Options for the Future 2006 (Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town) 1-2. 
4
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) 31 ILM 849, Article 1(2). 
5
 R Alley, T Berntsen, NL Bindoff, Z Chen, A Chidthaisong, P Friedlingstein, J Gregory, G Hegerl, M 
Heimann, B Hewitson, B Hoskins, Fortunat Joos, Jean Jouzel, Vladimir Kattsov, Ulrike Lohmann, 
Martin Manning, Taroh Matsuno, Mario Molina, N Nicholls, J Overpeck, D Qin, G Raga, V 
Ramaswamy, J Ren, M Rusticucci, S Solomon, R Somerville, TF Stocker, P Stott, RJ Stouffer, P 
Whetton, RA Wood, D Wratt ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in B Metz, OR Davidson, PR Bosch and LA 
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increased by 0.78 degrees Celsius (°C).6 This has already had impacts on the 
environment and on human well-being. Direct observations of climate change 
include increased global average air and ocean temperatures, rising sea levels, 
melting of snow and ice (including the ice sheets of Antarctica and Greenland), 
widespread changes in amounts of precipitation, extreme weather events and 
extreme temperatures.7   
Furthermore, severe impacts are projected to take place in the future and are 
anticipated to become more severe the warmer the world becomes. Indeed, an 
increase of two to three degrees Celsius could have numerous dire consequences 
including the reduction of water supplies, decreased crop yields and the possible 
extinction of 15-40 per cent of species.8 And increases of five to six degrees Celsius 
will ‘take us into territory unknown to human experience and involve radical changes 
in the world around us’.9 Importantly, it is the poorest and most vulnerable countries 
that will suffer the most, largely because they do not have resources sufficient to 
deal effectively with the adverse effects of climate change such as droughts and 
flooding.10 These are also the countries that have contributed the least to climate 
change.11 
Developed countries are recognised as being responsible for the majority of 
greenhouse gases emitted since the Industrial Revolution.12 Under international 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Meyer (eds) Climate Change 2007: Mitigation (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 5 and L Alexander, S Allen, 
NL Bindoff, FM Bréon, J Church, U Cubasch, S Emori, P Forster, P Friedlingstein, N Gillett, J 
Gregory, D Hartmann, E Jansen, B Kirtman, R Knutti, K Kumar Kanikicharla, P Lemke, J Marotzke, V 
Masson-Delmotte, G Meehl, I Mokhov, S Piao, GK Plattner, Q Dahe, V Ramaswamy, D Randall, M 
Rhein, M Rojas, C Sabine, D Shindell, TF Stocker, L Talley, D Vaughan, SP Xie ‘Summary for 
Policymakers’ Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fifth Assessment Report) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/#.UnfApBAw81c 
[accessed 27 September 2013] 3. 
6
 Alexander et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR5) (n5) 3. 
7
 Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n5) 5-9. 
8
 ‘Executive Summary’ Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change 2006 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_10_06_exec_sum.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2012] 
vi.  
9
 Ibid, ix. 
10
 Ibid, vii and xxii. 
11
 J Dugard, AL St. Clair and S Gloppen ‘Introduction’ in J Dugard, AL St. Clair and S Gloppen (eds) 
Climate Talk: Rights, Poverty and Justice 2013, 2. 
12
 International Energy Agency CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights 2011 available at 
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf [accessed 11 October 2012] 27. 
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pressure developed countries have sought to decrease their GHG emissions,13 with 
the result that in 2009 the carbon emissions of developed countries were 6 per cent 
lower than in 1990. On the other hand, the carbon emissions of developing countries 
(especially India and China) have been increasing rapidly as these countries 
develop. In 2009 the carbon emissions of developing countries were 132 per cent 
higher than in 1990.14 
While developed countries are historically responsible for the majority of 
emissions, climate change and its adverse affects have been recognised as a 
‘common concern of humankind’.15 This is because the impacts of climate change 
are transboundary and will not just be felt by developed countries. It is thus 
imperative that developing countries, including South Africa, also take action to 
respond to climate change.  
There is a close relation between climate change and energy generation, which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The next section discusses the physical basis of 
climate change with reference to the Fourth Assessment Report and Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (in 2.2.1). 
The following section deals briefly with the ‘economics of climate change’ with 
reference to the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (in 2.2.2). This 
chapter goes on to consider international policy responses to climate change (in 






                                                          
13
 As carbon dioxide is the most prevalent greenhouse gas, the terms ‘greenhouse gas emissions’, 
‘carbon emissions’ and ‘carbon dioxide emissions’ are used interchangeably. 
14
 IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (n12) 27.  
15
 UNFCCC (n4) Preamble.   
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2.2   The international context 
 
2.2.1  The physical basis of climate change 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)16 published its Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007. The IPCC’s Assessment Reports are 
authoritative and are regarded as ‘the definitive source of information on climate 
change’.17 The IPCC is busy preparing the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), and a 
summary for policymakers for the first part of the AR5 (The Physical Science Basis) 
was recently approved and published.18 The information below is based as far as 
possible on the latest report published under the AR5 and is supplemented by 
information from the AR4 . 
The AR5 reports that carbon dioxide levels have increased from about 280 parts 
per million (ppm) (in the atmosphere) since pre-industrial times to about 391 ppm in 
2011, which is ‘unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years’.19 Furthermore, 
carbon dioxide ‘concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, 
primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change 
emissions’.20 
                                                          
16
 The IPCC is an intergovernmental, scientific body on climate change that was established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organisation; and is 
responsible for reviewing the latest ‘scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced 
worldwide’ relating to climate change with the object of presenting the public with a clear 
understanding of ‘the current state of climate change’, including through its Assessment Reports. See 
IPCC Organization available at http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm.  
17
 P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell International Law and the Environment (3ed) 2009, 337. Indeed, 
the work of the IPCC is implicitly approved of, and relied upon, in the Kyoto Protocol. See for instance 
article 3(4) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1998) 37 ILM 22. It should be noted that the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (n8) 
also deals with the physical basis and impacts of climate change. 
18
 Alexander et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR5) (n5). 
19
 Ibid, 7. See also Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n5) 2. 
20
 Alexander et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR5) (n5) SPM-7. Electricity (and heat) generation is 
directly linked to the generation of CO2 emissions; and in 2009 the global electricity and heat 
generation sector was responsible for 41 per cent of global CO2 emissions, due to its heavy reliance 
on coal. See IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (n12) 9. See also Department of Minerals and 
Energy, Eskom and Energy Research Institute (University of Cape Town) Energy Outlook for South 
Africa: 2000 2002 available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=124706 [accessed 
13 November 2010] which notes that coal is ‘the most polluting source of energy for electricity 
generation’ (at xiii). 
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While other GHGs including methane and nitrous oxide have also increased 
since pre-industrial times, carbon dioxide has increased the most and currently 
accounts for 64 per cent of global GHG emissions.21 The increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions over the last 10 000 years is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The inset panel 
shows carbon dioxide levels since 1750.  
 
Figure 2.1  Carbon dioxide levels over the last 10 000 years and since 
  1750 (inset panel)22 
 
Figure 2.1 clearly show that carbon dioxide levels were relatively stable for the 
approximately 10 000 years prior to 1750 and that they have spiked drastically since 
1750. 
As mentioned above, it is estimated that from 1850-1900 to 2003-2012 
temperatures have increased by 0.78 degrees Celsius (°C).23 The AR5 states that it 
                                                          
21
 World Meteorological Organization and Global Atmosphere Watch WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin: 
The State of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global Observations through 2010 (No. 
7, 21 November 2011) available at 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/gaw/ghg/documents/GHGbulletin_7_en.pdf [accessed 25 
November 2011].  
22
 Figure 2.1 was obtained from Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n5) 3. 
23
 Alexander et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR5) (n5) SPM-3. 
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is ‘extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century’.24    
Further increases in GHG levels would lead to further warming and induce 
further impacts that would ‘very likely’ be more severe than those already 
observed.25 It is thus crucial that GHG emissions be stabilised. Stabilising GHG 
emissions requires that such emissions peak and thereafter decline. The lower the 
stabilisation level that is desired, the earlier this peak and decline should occur.26  
The concern internationally has been to ensure that the global temperature 
increase does not exceed two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (the 2°C 
target),27 and the AR4 considers different stabilisation levels in relation to this target. 
Stabilising GHG emissions at 450ppm carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)
28 would 
make it ‘likely’ to ‘very likely’ that the global temperature increase will not exceed 
                                                          
24
 Ibid, SPM-12. ‘Extremely likely’ indicates a certainty level of 95-100%. Alexander et al ‘Summary for 
Policymakers’ (AR5) SPM-2. 
25
 Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n5) 13. Very likely’ indicates a chance that is greater 
than 90 per cent. At 4, footnote 6. 
26
 Ibid, 15. 
27
 See for example GA Meehl, TF Stocker, WD Collins, P Friedlingstein, AT Gaye, JM Gregory, A 
Kitoh, R Knutti, JM Murphy, A Noda, SCB Raper, IG Watterson, AJ Weaver and ZC Zhao ‘Global 
Climate Projections’ in S Solomon, D Qin, M Manning, Z Chen, M Marquis, KB Averyt, M Tignor and 
HL Miller (eds) Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change); BS Fisher, N 
Nakicenovic, K Alfsen, J Corfee Morlot, F de la Chesnaye, J Hourcade, K Jiang, M Kainuma, E La 
Rovere, A Matysek, A Rana, K Riahi, R Richels, S Rose, D van Vuuren, R Warren ‘Issues related to 
mitigation in the long-term context’ in B Metz, OR Davidson, PR Bosch, R Dave, LA Meyer (eds) 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change); and Stern Review: The Economics of Climate 
Change (n8) xvii. This 2°C target has been largely accepted by the international community. See for 
example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘Copenhagen Accord’ 
(Decision 2/CP.15) available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4 
[last accessed 20 September 2012] and subsequent decisions of the Conference of the Parties under 
the UNFCCC; as well as M Den Elzen and N Höhne ‘Sharing the Reduction Effort to Limit Global 
Warming to 2°C’ 2010 (10) Climate Policy 247-260 and M Meinshausen, N Meinshausen, W Hare, 
SCB Raper, K Frieler, R Knutti, DJ Frame and MR Allen ‘Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets for 
Limiting Global Warming to 2°C’ 2009 (458) Nature 1158-1162. However, more recently attention has 
been paid to increasing the ambition level to ensure that the global temperature increase does not 
exceed 1.5°C. See for example the latest decisions of the COP under the UNFCCC, some of which 
are discussed in 2.2.3 below. 
28
 It should be noted that different greenhouse gases have different potentials to warm the climate, or 
global warming potentials (GWPs). For example, methane has a higher potential to warm the climate 
than CO2 and thus has a higher GWP. The other greenhouse gases may be converted to their ‘carbon 
dioxide equivalent’, or CO2e, by multiplying the relevant quantity of emissions of that greenhouse gas 
by its GWP. See US Environmental Protection Agency ‘CO2 Equivalent’ Glossary of Climate Change 




2°C.29 Stabilising emissions at 450ppm CO2e will require developed countries to 
reduce their emissions by 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and to reduce 
their emissions by 80 to 95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050.30 Mitigation efforts 
(i.e. efforts to reduce GHG emissions) over the next twenty to thirty years have 
important implications for the prospects of achieving lower stabilisation levels.31  
 
2.2.2  The economics of climate change 
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (the Stern Review) was 
prepared by Sir Nicholas Stern for the British government in 2006.32 It is described 
as the ‘most comprehensive review ever carried out on the economics of climate 
change’.33 
While the Stern Review considers that stabilising global GHG emissions at 
450ppm CO2e is unlikely to be achieved, it notes that stabilisation at 550ppm CO2e 
is still feasible even though this level ‘is already associated with significant risks’.34 
The Stern Review estimates that stabilising emissions at 500-550 ppm CO2e will 
cost about one per cent of global GDP by 2050,35 which is low in relation to the costs 
                                                          
29
 ‘Likely’ to ‘very likely’ indicates a 67 to 100 per cent chance that the global temperature increase will 
not exceed 2°C. However, stabilising emissions between 450 ppm CO2e and 550ppm CO2e would 
result in only a ‘medium likelihood’ of keeping the temperature increase to below 2°C. A ‘medium 
likelihood’ reflects a 33 to 67 per cent chance that the increase in global temperature will exceed 2°C. 
See SH Schneider, S Semenov, A Patwardhan, I Burton, CHD Magadza, M Oppenheimer, AB 
Pittock, A Rahman, JB Smith, A Suarez and F Yamin ‘Assessing key vulnerabilities and the risk from 
climate change’ in ML Parry, OF Canziani, JP Palutikof, PJ van der Linden and CE Hanson (eds) 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Figure 19.1 at 801. 
30
 On the other hand, stabilising emissions at 550ppm CO2e will require developed countries to 
reduce their emissions by 10 to 30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020; and by 40 to 90 per cent 
below 1990 levels by 2050. S Gupta, DA Tirpak, N Burger, J Gupta, N Hohne, AI Boncheva, GM 
Kanoan, C Kolstad, JA Kruger, A Michaelowa, S Murase, J Pershing, T Saijo and A Sari ‘Policies, 
Instruments and Co-operative Agreements’ in B Metz, OR Davidson, PR Bosch and LA Meyer (eds) 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Box 13.7 at 776. One of the reasons that such 
drastic emission reductions are required to stabilise GHG emissions is due to the lag in the climate 
system, and the AR5 notes that ‘[m]ost aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even 
if emissions of CO2 are stopped’. Alexander et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR5) (n5) SPM-19. 
31
 Alley et al ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (AR4) (n5) 15. 
32
 Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (n8) . 
33
 See HM Treasury http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_stern_06.htm.    
34
 Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (n8) xv. 
35
 Ibid, xiii. 
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and risks of failing to respond to climate change.36 Indeed, it projects that extreme 
weather alone could cost about 0.5 to one per cent of global GDP by 2050, which will 
increase further if global warming continues.37  
The Stern Review endorses taking early action to mitigate climate change and 
argues that mitigation ‘must be viewed as an investment, a cost incurred now and in 
the coming few decades to avoid the risks of very severe consequences in the 
future’.38 Tackling climate change does not require that the development aspirations 
of either developed or developing countries be capped.39 Indeed, transitioning to a 
low-carbon economy presents opportunities, and the Stern Review notes that 
‘[m]arkets for low-carbon energy products [could]… be worth at least $500bn per 
year by 2050’.40  On the other hand, delay in mitigating GHG emissions will result in 
more climate change as well as higher mitigation and adaptation costs.41  
 
2.2.3  Legal and policy responses to climate change  
 
2.2.3.1  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
a)  Introduction 
Concern regarding climate change at the international level culminated in the 
adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
UNFCCC) in 1992. The UNFCCC came into effect in 1994 and there are currently 
195 parties to the UNFCCC. South Africa ratified the UNFCCC in 1997.42 
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 Ibid, xvi. 
37
 Ibid, viii. 
38
 Ibid, i. 
39
 Ibid, ii. 
40
 Ibid, xvi. 
41
 Ibid, xv and xxvii. 
42
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Status of Ratification of the Convention 
available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php 
[last accessed 4 November 2013]. 
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The UNFCCC acknowledges that climate change is a ‘common concern of 
humankind’43 and has as its ultimate objective  
‘to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.[44] Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in 
a sustainable manner’.45 
The UNFCCC requires that parties to the UNFCCC take various actions, which 
are to be guided by various principles including: the principle of intergenerational 
equity, by requiring that member Parties ‘should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’,46 
thereby also giving effect to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities; as well as the precautionary principle, in requiring that ‘[w]here there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing such measures’.47 The UNFCCC also 
promotes sustainable development and ‘sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties’.48 
As noted above, energy generation and consumption has been a key contributor 
to climate change and since 1850, 70 per cent of all carbon emissions have been 
generated by North America and Europe due to ‘energy production’.49 
 
b)  Commitments 
The UNFCCC sets out the commitments of all Parties to the Convention, having 
regard to their common but differentiated responsibilities and specific priorities and 
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 UNFCCC (n4) Preamble. 
44
 ‘Climate system’ is defined as ‘the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and 
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circumstances including: the development and publication of ‘national inventories of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol’, in accordance with Article 12;50 the 
development of plans regarding measures to mitigate climate change and promote 
‘adequate adaptation’;51 the development and transfer of technologies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, including in the energy sector52 and promoting 
education, training and public awareness on climate change.53 These commitments 
are imposed on all country Parties and therefore also apply to developing country 
Parties, including South Africa.  
However, the UNFCCC makes a distinction between developed and developing 
countries and further obligations are imposed on developed country Parties.54 This 
distinction between developed and developing countries is made due to the 
recognition that developed countries are responsible for the  
‘largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases … 
[and] that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and 
that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to 
meet their social and development needs’.55 
The UNFCCC accordingly requires developed country Parties to take the lead in 
responding to climate change.56  
Of specific relevance to South Africa, the UNFCCC recognises ‘the special 
difficulties of those countries, especially developing countries, whose economies are 
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particularly dependent on fossil fuel production, use and exportation, as a 
consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions’.57 
 
c)  Miscellaneous 
The UNFCCC established the Conference of the Parties (COP),58 the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)59 and the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI)60 as well as a financial mechanism.61 The COP has been 
meeting since 1995. It has not established a body dealing specifically with energy. 
 
2.2.3.2  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
 on Climate Change 
 
a)  Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(the Kyoto Protocol) was drafted ‘in pursuit of the ultimate objective of the 
[UNFCCC]’.62 It provides more specificity regarding the mitigation of GHG emissions 
by establishing emission reduction targets. It also establishes three ‘flexible 
mechanisms’ to assist in achieving the emission reduction targets (discussed further 
below). South Africa acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 200263 and it came into effect 
on 16 February 2005.  
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b)  Commitments 
The Kyoto Protocol requires that developed country Parties64  
‘ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned 
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments inscribed in Annex B … with a view to reducing their overall 
emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012 [the first commitment period]’.65 
Different emission reduction targets were assigned to the various developed 
country Parties. Thus, by the end of 2012 the European Union was required to 
reduce its emissions by 8 per cent and Japan was required to reduce its emissions 
by 6 per cent, while Iceland was entitled to increase its emissions by 10 per cent.66 
The overall emission reduction target of 5 per cent was in stark contrast to the 
emission reduction ranges presented in the IPCC’s AR4, which requires that the 
emissions of developed countries be reduced by 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels 
by 2020 in order to stabilise emissions at 450ppm CO2e.
67  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, certain commitments apply to all country Parties, but 
while taking into account their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances’, 
including: the formulation of programmes ‘to improve the quality of local emission 
factors, activity data and/or models’;68 the development, publication and updating of 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and adapt to climate 
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change69 and the promotion of the development and transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies and processes relevant to climate change.70  
Importantly, developed country Parties are also required to implement and/or 
expand policies and measures including: enhancing energy efficiency; research on, 
and the promotion of, ‘new and renewable forms of energy’ as well as the promotion 
of fiscal incentives.71  
The Kyoto Protocol also makes provision for ‘new and additional financial 
resources’ by developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II (to 
the UNFCCC) ‘to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties 
in advancing the implementation of existing commitments’,72 as well as the provision 
of other financial resources.73  
 
c)  Flexible mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol establishes three ‘flexible mechanisms’ to assist developed 
country Parties in achieving their emission reduction commitments, namely joint 
implementation between developed country Parties,74 emissions trading75 and the 
clean development mechanism (CDM).76  
The CDM holds the most significance for South Africa as this is the only flexible 
mechanism in which developing country Parties may participate. The CDM allows 
developed country Parties to implement project activities in developing country 
Parties that result in emission reductions, which must be certified by a designated 
operational entity.77 Its purpose is twofold, namely to assist developing country 
Parties to achieve sustainable development and to contribute to the ultimate 
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objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist developed country Parties in complying with 
their emission reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.78 Very 
few CDM projects have been implemented in South Africa79 and the CDM market is 
dominated by a few developing countries, primarily China, India and Brazil. 
The creation of these flexible (or carbon trading) mechanisms has led to the 
development of a huge carbon market which, in 2011, was estimated to have a value 
of US$ 176 billion (€ 126 billion).80 This is evidence of the great reliance that 
developed countries are placing on carbon trading to achieve compliance with their 
emission reduction commitments.  
 
d)  Miscellaneous 
The COP under the UNFCCC acts as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol81 and for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol is referred to as the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP). The CMP 
began meeting in 2005. 
 
2.2.3.3  Further developments in international climate change policy  
While much can be said regarding the issues and tensions that have arisen at the 
various COPs and CMPs, only the milestones are highlighted below. As noted 
above, this research reflects the law and policy developments as at 30 September 
2013.  
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a)  Bali (2007) 
Due to the expiry of the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol at the end 
of 2012, much emphasis in the international negotiations has been placed on 
reaching agreement on action post-2012. The 13th COP (and 3rd CMP) in Bali was a 
high point in the international climate change negotiations in that it put negotiations 
back on track. Indeed, the ‘Bali Action Plan’ was adopted, which was concerned with 
urgently enhancing the implementation of the UNFCCC,82 and inter alia saw the 
establishment of the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention’ (AWG-LCA) to ensure that a decision regarding action post-2012 
would be adopted at the 15th COP in 2009.83  
 
b)  Copenhagen (2009) 
The 15th COP under the UNFCCC and 5th CMP under the Kyoto Protocol met in 
Copenhagen at the end of 2009, where negotiations on action after 2012 were to be 
concluded. The process was highly contentious and did not result in a binding 
agreement. Instead, some of the Parties drafted the ‘Copenhagen Accord’,84 which 
was merely ‘noted’ by the COP.85  
Even though agreement was reached on the provision of new and additional 
financial resources86 and the establishment of the Green Climate Fund,87  the 
Copenhagen Accord did not establish a time-frame regarding when emissions 
should peak and thereafter decline and did not contain any emission reduction 
targets. Instead, developed country Parties were required to submit emission 
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reduction targets for 202088 and developing country Parties were required to submit 
their mitigation actions to the secretariat.89 While the Copenhagen Accord made 
provision for the strengthening of the two degree target,90 it was projected that the 
pledged mitigation targets91 would result in temperature increases of more than 3°C 
by 2100.92 
 
c)  Cancun (2010) 
The 16th COP under the UNFCCC and the 6th CMP under the Kyoto Protocol met in 
Cancun, Mexico at the end of 2010. Despite low expectations, several agreements 
(the Cancun Agreements) were adopted. 
The Parties affirmed that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our 
time93 and reiterated the need to reduce the global temperature increase to two 
degrees Celsius, while also recognising the possibility of strengthening this target to 
1.5 degrees Celsius.94  
The Parties called for enhanced action on adaptation inter alia to reduce the 
vulnerability and build the resilience of developing country Parties,95 and agreed to 
establish the Cancun Adaptation Framework96 as well as an Adaptation 
Committee.97 The Parties also called for enhanced action on mitigation and urged 
developed country Parties to increase the level of their ambition to a level consistent 
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with the AR4 of the IPCC.98 The Parties agreed that developing country Parties 
should take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in order to achieve a 
deviation in emissions compared to ‘business as usual’ emissions in 2020.99 The 
Parties also agreed to establish the Green Climate Fund100 and a Technology 
Mechanism.101 
In comparison to the 15th COP (and 5th CMP) in Copenhagen, the 16th COP (and 
6th CMP) in Cancun was a positive step forward and the Cancun Agreements were 
described as a ‘significant achievement for the UN climate process’.102 While it was 
largely acknowledged that the outcome ‘was a relatively small step in combating 
climate change’,103 for example, no agreement was reached on a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, on balance the outcome was viewed 
positively and confidence was restored in the UNFCCC process.104 
 
d)  Durban (2011) 
An important outcome of the 17th COP (and 7th CMP) held in Durban, South Africa 
was the establishment of the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action’ (AWG-DP), which was tasked with ‘launch[ing] a process to 
develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force 
under the Convention applicable to all Parties’,105 to be implemented from 2020. 
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The Parties reiterated the two degree target as well as the possibility of raising 
the level of ambition to 1.5 degrees Celsius.106 Significantly, the Parties agreed on a 
second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, beginning in 2013 and ending 
either at the end of 2017, or at the end of 2020.107 Parties also agreed that further 
emission reduction targets, which would be converted into quantified emission 
limitation or reduction objectives (QELROs), would be presented and adopted at the 
eighth session of the CMP (which took place at the end of 2012)108 and which would 
apply in respect of the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
e)  Doha (2012) 
The 18th COP under the UNFCCC and 8th CMP under the Kyoto Protocol met in 
Doha, Qatar at the end of 2012. Here it was decided that the second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol will expire at the end of 2020.109 
Developed country Parties also submitted their new emission reduction targets 
for the second commitment period, which had the effect of amending the Kyoto 
Protocol.110 However, these emission reduction targets111 are still in contrast to the 
emission reductions called for by the IPCC’s AR4112 and developed country Parties 
were urged to increase the ambition of their emission reduction targets to be more in 
line with the ranges presented in the AR4.113 Developing country Parties were still 
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not required to reduce their emissions, but were invited to adopt NAMAs.114 The 
Parties also agreed that ‘a protocol, another legal agreement or an agreed outcome 
with legal force under the Convention’ will be adopted at the 21st COP under the 
UNFCCC to be held in 2015115 and will come into force in 2020. 
 
f) Discussion 
International cooperation on climate change has not been easy to achieve, perhaps 
due to its ‘intimate connection with economic growth’.116 In particular, pressure on 
(certain) developing countries to take on more responsibility is increasing,117 and 
much tension has arisen between developed and developing countries including 
China and India, which are growing rapidly and are becoming prominent players in 
the climate change arena, as reflected in Figure 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2  Current and projected energy-related carbon dioxide  
  emissions until 2030118
 
The result has been that developed countries have been unwilling to take on 
more stringent emission reduction targets unless large developing countries such as 
China, India and Brazil also take on more responsibility.119 Thus, the United States of 
America has refused to commit to reducing its emissions at all and several 
developed countries, namely Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation, have 
withdrawn from a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.  
However, developing countries have thus far resisted binding emission reduction 
targets on the basis that they should not be required to reduce their development-
related emissions, due to the historical responsibility of developed countries and due 
to the right of developing countries to develop so as to meet their social and 
development needs. 
 
g) South Africa’s position in the climate change negotiations 
In the international climate change negotiations, South Africa has aligned itself with 
the African Group as well as the Group of 77 and China (the G77 and China), made 
up of developing countries. The African Group is concerned primarily with 
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adaptation. On the other hand, South Africa is also concerned with mitigation issues 
and therefore its interests are not fully aligned with those of the African Group.120 
At the 15th COP (and 5th CMP) in Copenhagen in 2009 South Africa aligned itself 
with Brazil, India and China, forming the BASIC group.121 The BASIC countries, all 
large developing countries, have comparatively high levels of GHG emissions. The 
BASIC group, together with President Obama of the United States of America, 
played a key role in the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord, which as noted above 
was not formally adopted by the COP. It was reported that criticism was levelled at 
South Africa following the COP 15 due to concern that South Africa’s agenda would 
diverge from the agenda of the rest of the G77 and China.122 The BASIC group 
continues to play an important role in the climate change negotiations since 
Copenhagen and it holds regular meetings and has issued joint statements at 
subsequent COP and CMP meetings. 
South Africa has called for stronger action to be taken by developed country 
Parties and has argued that they must achieve the upper range of emission 
reductions indicated by the IPCC in its AR4, namely emission reductions of at least 
40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and at least 80 to 95 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2050. South Africa argues that ‘[a]t less ambitious stabilisation levels, the 
additional impacts are unacceptable to Africa’.123 South Africa has also noted that 
while attention has been focused on the mitigation actions that should be taken by 
developing countries, there has been ‘slow progress on mitigation commitments by 
developed countries’.124  
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2.3   The South African context 
 
2.3.1  Vulnerabilities and impacts 
Developing countries, particularly African countries, are likely to bear the brunt of 
climate change due to their increased vulnerability, which will exacerbate the impacts 
of climate change.125 South Africa is no exception and vulnerabilities currently 
experienced by South Africa include a high incidence of diseases such as 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, water scarcity,126 lack of access to services such as 
clean water and sanitation,127 a high incidence of informal settlements in vulnerable 
locations128 and poor storm water drainage systems in urban settlements.129  
Climate change impacts that have been observed in South Africa include 
increased surface air temperatures,130 an increase in the temperatures of the seas 
surrounding South Africa,131 sea level rise of approximately 2 millimetres per year,132 
changes in rainfall patterns,133 impacts on crop production,134 an increase in the 
intensity and frequency of storms in South Africa,135 shifts in wind patterns136 and an 
increase in the frequency of fire in the Fynbos biome.137 
Impacts projected for the future include further warming of between 1 and 3 
degrees Celsius by 2050 and warming of between 3 and 7 degrees Celsius 
thereafter.138 It has been noted that ‘[w]ith such temperature increases, life as we 
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know it will change completely’,139 and changes projected include decreased water 
availability, extreme weather events, floods and droughts, impacts on the coast and 
coastal infrastructure due to sea-level rise, and ‘[m]ass extinctions of endemic plant 
and animal species’.140 Water will play a primary role in the future as water is 
‘arguably the primary medium through which climate change impacts will be felt by 
people, the economy, and natural ecosystems’.141 
However, the adverse impacts of climate change will not affect everyone equally 
and poor people in South Africa will be hardest hit. South Africa’s Second National 
Communication under the UNFCCC notes that at least one third of the South African 
population is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change due to ‘low 
levels of endogenous resilience, adaptation, and coping skills’.142  
 
2.3.2  South Africa’s contribution to climate change 
While South Africa is very vulnerable to climate change and its adverse impacts, 
South Africa is also a comparatively significant contributor to climate change, due to 
the high levels of GHGs emitted by ‘its energy-intensive, fossil-fuel powered 
economy’.143 South Africa is ranked in the top 20 carbon emitters in the world144 and 
it has been argued that South Africa ‘straddles the “carbon divide” between industrial 
and developing economies’.145 
South Africa has a very high level of per capita emissions (emissions per person) 
compared to other developing countries. For example, South Africa has a level of 
7.27 tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita (t CO2/capita), compared to 1.41 t 
CO2/capita in India, 5.92 t CO2/capita in China and 0.28 t CO2/capita in Kenya.
146 
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This is comparable to the per capita emissions of some developed countries such as 
New Zealand with 6.87 t CO2/capita, Norway with 7.69 t CO2/capita and the United 
Kingdom with 7.06 t CO2/capita.
147 
Carbon dioxide is South Africa’s most prevalent greenhouse gas and accounted 
for 79 per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions in the country in 2000.148 This is 
because South Africa generates most of its energy from coal, which releases carbon 
dioxide when combusted.149 Indeed, coal accounts for close to 70 per cent of South 
Africa’s total primary energy supply and more than 90 per cent of electricity 
generation.150  
The energy sector is the largest generator of GHG emissions and accounts for 
79 per cent of South Africa’s total GHG emissions.151 Significantly Eskom is by far 
the largest emitter of carbon emissions in South Africa152 and is reported to be the 
second highest carbon dioxide producing company in the world.153 There is thus a 
strong link between energy generation and the country’s carbon emissions. This 
represents an opportunity to use alternative energy sources, including renewable 
energy, to reduce carbon emissions. These issues are considered more fully in 
Chapter 3. 
Apart from producing GHG emissions, generating electricity from coal results in 
air pollution in the area of the power station, as well as respiratory disease around 
the area of opencast coal mines due to dust.154 Coal-fired power stations also 
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release sulphur emissions which may cause acidic deposition, which may have 
several negative impacts including affecting human health, corroding materials, 
reducing crop yields and causing ‘eutrophication in fresh water bodies’.155 In this 
regard, it is significant that the Highveld Priority Area, which was declared under the 
National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act in 2007,156 occupies roughly 
the same geographical area as the area where most of Eskom’s coal-fired power 
plants are located.157 
Furthermore, coal and biomass are used in many low-income households as an 
energy source. This has severe impacts on human health and respiratory disease is 
the ‘second highest cause of infant mortality’ in South Africa.158 
Mining may also have significant impacts on South Africa’s already scarce water 
resources. For example, Gauteng’s water supply currently faces severe threats from 
acid mine drainage (AMD) and the Minister of Water Affairs has declared the 
implementation of immediate and short-term interventions in the Witwatersrand 
Goldfields as an emergency government waterworks in terms of the National Water 
Act.159  
There is thus a clear need to move to a cleaner energy supply, including through 
the generation of energy from renewable sources. Aside from environmental and 
health reasons, there are also policy reasons. For example, failing to move away 
from coal-generated energy may result in the situation that, when a carbon price 
emerges from international climate change negotiations and developed countries 
accordingly move away from carbon-intensive products, South Africa ‘will end up 
with stranded assets in the form of dirty coal-burning generators’.160  
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Government has recognised the importance of actions in the energy sector to 
mitigate carbon emissions and in the short-term has identified increased investment 
in renewable energy as one of the most promising mitigation options.161 The 
promotion of renewable energy, inter alia as a response to climate change, is 
considered more fully in Chapter 3.  
Government’s policy responses to climate change are first briefly outlined. 
 
2.3.3  Policy responses to climate change 
The Department of Environmental Affairs is the lead government department with 
regard to climate change and the Department of Energy is the lead government 
department with regard to energy policy. Government has acknowledged the severity 
of climate change and has ratified both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.  
While acknowledging that mitigating GHG emissions in South Africa will be 
costly and that this could significantly impact on trade and South Africa’s 
economy,162 government has also recognised that 
‘there will be significant short and long-term social and economic benefits, 
including improved international competitiveness that will result from a transition 
to a low-carbon economy. Furthermore … these costs will be far less than the 
costs of delay and inaction’.163 
Taking action by reducing GHG emissions is also consistent with South Africa’s 
obligation as a ‘responsible global citizen’.164 Government also considers that failing 
to respond to climate change would undermine the progress made in meeting South 
Africa’s development goals as well as the Millennium Development Goals.165 
Importantly, government has explicitly accepted the findings of the IPCC and 
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supports the view that global temperature increases must not exceed two degrees 
Celsius.166 
Government has accordingly published various policy documents on climate 
change including the Initial National Communication under the UNFCCC167 (2000), 
the National Climate Change Response Strategy168 (2004), the Long Term Mitigation 
Scenarios document169 (2007), the National Climate Change Response White 
Paper170 (2011) and the Second National Communication under the UNFCCC171 
(2011). These are all discussed in Chapter 6.  
Furthermore, at the 15th COP under the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, 
President Zuma committed to reducing emissions in South Africa by 34 per cent 
below ‘business as usual’ levels by 2020 and by 42 per cent below ‘business as 
usual’ levels by 2025, subject to the receipt of support from developed countries.172 
These targets will require considerable changes to energy supply and demand over 
the next 20 years.173  
As noted above, there is a strong link between energy generation and carbon 
emissions in South Africa. In this regard, a number of policy documents regarding 
energy have been published by Government, including the White Paper on the 
Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa174 (1998), the White Paper on the 
Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa175 (2004) and the 
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Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2010-2030176 (2011), which sees an 
increased role for renewable energy in the future. These are also discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
2.4   Concluding remarks 
This chapter has considered the scientific basis of climate change, as well as the 
physical impacts that have already occurred due to climate change at the 
international level and those that are projected for the future. This chapter has also 
dealt briefly with the economics of climate change and has highlighted the urgent 
need to mitigate GHG emissions. The international community has responded inter 
alia through the approval of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
At the domestic level, climate change poses considerable risks to South Africa 
due to South Africa’s status as a developing country and its specific vulnerabilities. 
While South Africa is not currently obliged to reduce its emissions in terms of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, government has recognised the threats posed by 
climate change and has undertaken to reduce GHG emissions, subject to the receipt 
of support from developed countries.177 
Due to the close link between climate change and energy generation, Chapter 3 
deals with energy in more detail and, in particular, considers the benefits of 
promoting renewable energy as well as the barriers faced by renewable energy. 
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Energy and renewable energy  
 
3.1   Introduction 
Energy plays a crucial role in human life and development. Indeed,  
‘[t]he accomplishments of civilisation have largely been achieved through the 
increasingly efficient and extensive harnessing of various forms of energy to 
extend human capabilities and ingenuity. Energy is similarly indispensable for 
continued human development and economic growth. Providing adequate, 
affordable energy is essential for eradicating poverty, improving human welfare, 
and raising living standards world-wide’.1 
Renewable energy is recognised as having the potential to be ‘a major 
contributor in protecting our climate, nature, and the environment as well as 
providing a wide range of environmental, economic and social benefits that will 
contribute towards long term global sustainability’.2 
This chapter first considers the international energy context and sets out the 
global energy and electricity profiles. It goes on to deal with renewable energy and 
inter alia sets out sources of renewable energy, the benefits of renewable energy as 
well as the barriers to renewable energy. It then considers the national context and 
discusses the history of South Africa’s energy sector, South Africa’s energy supply, 
as well as the barriers to renewable energy and the potential for renewable energy in 
South Africa. The chapter also highlights some considerations regarding the creation 
of an enabling environment for renewable energy in South Africa. 
It should be noted that the term renewable energy is used to refer to all energy 
generated from renewable energy sources, including energy generated from wood or 
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other biomass in households for cooking and warmth. Electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources (or RES-E) is used to refer specifically to energy that has 
been generated from renewable energy sources and that has actually been 
converted into electricity and fed into a country’s national electricity grid. The term 
renewable energy therefore encompasses RES-E. While this research is concerned 
more narrowly with RES-E, since RES-E is encompassed by the overarching 
category of renewable energy, renewable energy is also discussed generally to 
some extent. 
 
3.2   The international context 
 
3.2.1  Energy 
While access to energy is not by itself sufficient for development, lack of access to 
energy can severely hamper development.3 Indeed, it has been argued that ‘[n]o 
country has been able to raise per capita incomes from low levels without increasing 
its use of commercial energy’.4  
In 2011 the world’s energy supply was made up of 31.5 per cent of oil, 28.8 per 
cent of coal or peat, 21.3 per cent of gas, 5.1 per cent of nuclear energy, 10 per cent 
of biomass (biofuels and waste) and 2.3 per cent of hydropower,5 which is 
represented in Figure 3.1. Most of the biomass contribution is traditional biomass 
that is used for cooking and heating in developing countries.6  
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Figure 3.1  Shares of energy sources in total global primary energy 
supply7 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the majority of the world’s energy is generated from fossil 
fuels. As discussed in Chapter 2, energy generated through the combustion of fossil 
fuels is associated with a number of adverse environmental impacts including the 
emission of carbon dioxide, lead, sulphur and particulate matter into the 
atmosphere.8 Furthermore, the indoor combustion of fossil fuels for energy is 
associated with increased sickness, including acute respiratory infection, chronic 
respiratory disease, tuberculosis, lung cancer, cardiovascular disease and adverse 
pregnancy outcomes.9                  
It is widely acknowledged that in improving energy access ‘electrification is 
key’,10 and it has been argued that increased access to electricity and modern fuels 
can contribute to an enhanced quality of life.11 Access to convenient and affordable 
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energy (such as electricity as opposed to firewood) can also ‘contribute to a 
household’s productivity and income-generating potential, [and therefore] its 
availability can become a lever for breaking out of a cycle of poverty’.12    
In 2011, the global electricity supply was made up of 41.3 per cent of coal or 
peat, 21.9 per cent of natural gas, 15.8 per cent of hydro, 11.7 per cent of nuclear, 
4.8 per cent of oil, with other sources including geothermal, solar, wind, biofuels and 
waste together contributing 4.5 per cent.13 This is represented in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2  Shares of energy sources in total global electricity supply14 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that fossil fuels also dominate the global electricity supply. It is 
also clear that while the traditional use of biomass is a relatively significant source of 
energy globally, the conversion of renewable energy sources into electricity (i.e. 
RES-E) remains very low.  
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It should be noted that there is a distinction between the installed energy or 
electricity capacity and supply of a country. The installed energy capacity represents 
the maximum amount of energy that could be generated from a specific technology 
and is expressed in kilowatts (kW), megawatts (MW), gigawatts (GW) or terawatts 
(TW). However, different energy technologies have different efficiencies and thus the 
actual energy that is generated or supplied from the various technologies differs from 
the capacity of a specific technology. Reference to a country’s energy or electricity 
supply refers to the actual energy or electricity that has been generated and is 
expressed as kilowatt hour (kWh), megawatt hour (MWh), gigawatt hour (GWh) or 
terawatt hour (TWh).15  
For example, South Africa has about 44.5 GW of installed capacity. As there are 
8760 hours in a year, if South Africa’s electricity facilities were capable of operating 
at 100 per cent capacity this would result in about 389 820 GWh, or 389.82 TWh 
(44.5 GW x 8760 hours) of electricity being produced per year. However, in 2010 
South Africa generated only 260 TWh,16 due to the fact that South Africa’s energy 
facilities do not operate at 100 per cent capacity.  
There is no binding convention that deals with energy or renewable energy. The 
Energy Charter Treaty,17 which was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998, 
‘provides a multilateral framework for energy cooperation’.18 With regard to 
renewable energy specifically, it calls upon Parties inter alia to ‘have particular 
regard to Energy Efficiency, [and] to developing and using renewable energy 
sources’,19 in the context of promoting sustainable development and minimising 
adverse Environmental Impacts.20 However, it has only been ratified by 52 countries 
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and therefore does not provide an internationally binding agreement for the 
regulation of energy or renewable energy. In this regard it has been argued that 
‘[s]ince energy choices are closely associated with the sovereignty of states, they are 
reluctant to relinquish control in this area to international organisations’.21 South 
Africa has not signed the Energy Charter Treaty. 
In 2012 the United Nations Secretary-General launched the Sustainable Energy 
for All initiative. This initiative is concerned with ensuring universal access to modern 
energy services, improving energy efficiency and doubling the share of renewable 
energy by 2030.22 However, this is a voluntary initiative and only about 80 
governments of developing countries, including South Africa, have joined the 
initiative.23 
 
3.2.2  Renewable energy  
 
3.2.2.1  Sources of renewable energy  
Renewable energy refers to energy that is derived from renewable, non-depletable 
energy sources and includes biomass energy, wind energy, solar energy, 
hydropower, marine energy and geothermal energy,24 all of which are described 
below. 
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a)  Biomass 
Biomass energy refers to energy generated from all organic matter that comes from 
plants, trees and crops, organic waste streams, agricultural residues as well as crops 
that are specifically grown to produce energy.25 Even though combustion is involved, 
biomass produces lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than fossil fuels.26 
Landfill gas (or methane) is also included under biomass, and is produced when the 
organic components of landfill waste decompose.27 
The traditional use of biomass is the largest source of renewable energy 
worldwide, especially in developing countries, where firewood is relied on 
predominantly for cooking and heating.28 Biomass can only be considered 
‘renewable’ if the organic matter used, such as plant matter, is actually replanted. If 
biomass is not produced sustainably ‘its environmental and social impacts can be 
devastating’.29  
Biomass has been controversial especially with regard to energy derived from 
food crops, for example, producing ethanol from sugar cane (as in Brazil), because it 
requires a significant amount of land and may compete with food production. 
Biomass energy has other potentially adverse impacts, including impacts on 
biodiversity, increased water use and impacts on groundwater and soil quality, inter 
alia due to the use of pesticides and fertilisers.30 
An advantage of biomass is that it is not an intermittent energy source as its 
output can be controlled.31 This means that if more energy or electricity is required, 
more biomass could be combusted to produce more power. 
 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, 222. 
26
 S Singer (editor in chief) The Energy Report: 100% Renewable Energy by 2050 (WWF 
International, Ecofys and OMA) available at 
assets.panda.org/downloads/the_energy_report_lowres_111110.pdf [accessed 9 March 2011] 40. 
27
 D Banks and J Schäffler The Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy in South Africa 2006 
(draft update report) (prepared for Sustainable Energy & Climate Change Project and Earthlife Africa) 
available at http://www.nano.co.za/PotentialContributionOfRenewableEnergyInSAFeb06.pdf 
[accessed 18 January 2012] viii. 
28
 Turkenburg ‘Renewable Energy Technologies’ (n24) 222. 
29
 Singer The Energy Report (n26) 40. 
30
 Turkenburg ‘Renewable Energy Technologies’ (n24) 225-226. 
31
 IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (n6) Box 
SPM.1 at 4. 
44 
 
b)  Wind energy 
Wind energy is generated by harnessing the energy of moving air.32 It is the largest 
‘new’ renewable energy source and accounts for 0.2 per cent of energy supply 
worldwide.33 Wind energy is growing rapidly, including in developing countries such 
as China and India.34  
The technical potential of wind energy is considerable and (in 2000) was 
estimated to be 20 000 to 50 000 TWh per year.35 This is significant if one considers 
that total (global) electricity generation in 2011 was 22 126 TWh.36 The costs of wind 
energy have decreased substantially, and in some cases are even lower than the 
costs of coal-generated electricity (as reflected in Table 3.2 further below). 
However, there are various negative aspects associated with wind energy 
including noise, visual impacts and impacts on bird life.37 Yet impacts on bird life are 
reported to be small if turbines are located appropriately. In addition, acoustic 
devices could prevent birds from flying into the rotor blades.38 Studies have also 
shown that it is rare for birds to collide with wind turbines (even when migrating in 
large numbers).39 Indeed, it has been reported that significantly more birds are killed 
by other factors such as collisions with vehicles and building structures and by 
household cats.40 
It is reported that noise and visual impacts are the most problematic41 and there 
has been a ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) attitude towards wind energy. However, it 
has been argued that the noise emitted by wind turbines is lower than ‘home noise’ 
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or ‘office noise’.42 An alternative would be to site wind turbines offshore. 
Furthermore, if wind turbines are located on farmlands, most of the land can still be 
used for agriculture.43  
Another problem cited with regard to wind energy is that it is an intermittent 
source of energy, i.e. when there is no wind it will not be possible to generate any 
energy and alternative (non-intermittent) sources would be required to operate in 
conjunction. However, it would be possible to transform the energy into ‘baseload 
power supply if combined with energy storage’.44 Baseload power refers to the 
minimum amount of energy required by collective consumers in a 24-hour period.45 
Baseload plants should be able to operate continuously and ‘produce energy at a 
constant rate’.46 
 
c)  Solar energy 
Two important types of solar energy are solar photovoltaic energy (or solar PV) and 
concentrated solar power (or CSP). 
Solar PV energy is generated through the direct conversion of sunlight into 
electricity through the use of solar cells.47 Large areas of land are needed in order to 
capture the solar energy that is sufficient to meet energy needs.48 The manufacture 
of silicon PV cells is not associated with significant environmental impacts since the 
main material of most PV cells is silicon, which ‘is not intrinsically harmful’. However, 
small quanitities of toxic chemicals are used to manufacture some PV components.49 
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No waste products or GHG emissions are produced during the actual operation of 
solar panels.50  
With respect to CSP (which is also known as solar thermal energy), solar 
radiation is captured and concentrated by a collector or concentrator, which is 
delivered to a receiver, which absorbs the concentrated sunlight and transfers the 
heat energy to a fluid. The fluid is then transported from the receiver to a power 
conversion system.51 Within CSP there is a distinction between parabolic trough 
systems, power towers and parabolic dish systems.52 CSP also requires a significant 
amount of land area per megawatt of capacity.53 It is also possible to store energy for 
later use.54 
The potential for solar energy is enormous, and it is estimated that the total 
power theoretically available from solar PV alone exceeds total energy consumption 
by approximately 1 500 times.55 Like wind energy, solar energy is an intermittent 
energy source and this is a reason for resistance to this renewable energy 
technology (RET). However, as noted above, there is the potential for storage with 
regard to CSP. 
 
d)  Hydropower 
With regard to hydropower, water is stored in a reservoir behind a dam and 
electricity is generated by harnessing ‘the energy of water moving from higher to 
lower elevations’.56 The flow of water is regulated according to electricity demand.57 
After biomass, hydropower is the largest source of renewable energy internationally 
and is the largest source of RES-E. Hydropower accounts for 2.3 per cent of global 
energy and 15.8 per cent of global electricity.58 
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While there is a lot of potential for hydropower, it may have significant social and 
ecological impacts.59 The establishment of reservoirs requires that large areas of 
land are flooded, which often results in the displacement of people. This is especially 
significant in rural areas where river surroundings are densely inhabited.60 
Worldwide, 40 to 80 million people have been displaced due to hydroelectric 
schemes.61 The building of reservoirs also impacts on the natural river flow, which 
affects ecosystems and the people who rely on such water courses.62  
However, there is a distinction between large- and small-scale hydropower; and 
small-scale hydropower is associated with ‘fewer environmental and social impacts 
and [is] more readily considered as renewable’.63 Large- and small-scale hydro have 
not been precisely defined. For example, in Switzerland, the upper limit of small-
scale hydro is 10 MW compared to 5 MW in the United Kingdom and 30 MW in the 
United States of America.64 
On the other hand, there are positive aspects associated with hydropower 
including that there is no release of carbon dioxide or other pollutants. There is also 
no risk of explosions or fires.65 Furthermore, energy may be generated ‘on 
demand’,66 and it is therefore not an intermittent source like wind and solar energy. 
With regard to pumped water storage schemes, water is pumped up to a dam at 
off-peak times and is released when extra electricity is needed during peak times.67 
Pumped storage is ‘at present the only practicable and economically viable way to 
store electrical energy in very large quantities [and] plays an increasing role in 
national – and even inter-national – power systems’.68 This may provide a solution to 
the problem of the intermittency of certain renewable energy sources.69 
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e)  Geothermal energy 
Geothermal energy has been used since Roman times to heat buildings and water.70 
Geothermal energy can be used directly, by harnessing the heat from below the 
Earth’s crust71 for space heating and cooling.72 In addition, when temperatures are 
high enough geothermal energy can be used to generate electricity.73 There is much 
potential for electricity generation from geothermal energy and unlike wind and solar 
energy, electricity generated from geothermal energy is not intermittent.74 
Geothermal energy is not yet a mature technology,75 but capacity is increasing by 
about five per cent per year.76 
 
f)  Marine energy 
Marine energy encompasses a number of RETs including tidal barrage energy, wave 
energy, tidal and marine current energy and ocean thermal energy conversion.77 
This technology is not yet mature. While marine energy could be a significant source 
of energy, it is diffuse and it is thus only economical to exploit marine energy when 
certain circumstances are present, such as where tidal ranges or currents are 
extreme.78 There are few pollution issues associated with marine energy 
technologies, and the main issue relates to conflicts with other uses of the sea such 
as fishing, marine traffic and leisure activities.79 
 
g)  Nuclear energy 
Nuclear energy is a controversial energy source, internationally and in South Africa, 
inter alia because issues of general safety and the safe disposal of hazardous waste 
have not yet been resolved. One only needs to consider the nuclear accident that 
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occurred in Fukushima, Japan in early 2011. This ‘generated a worldwide impact’80 
and following on from this, various countries including Germany made the decision to 
decommission their nuclear power plants.81 
While nuclear energy is a ‘cleaner’ source of energy than fossil fuel energy, 
emissions are emitted in mining for uranium.82 In addition, since nuclear power relies 
on uranium reserves, which are limited,83 it cannot be considered a ‘renewable’ 
energy source. Therefore, nuclear energy is not considered in this research. 
 
3.2.2.2  Benefits of renewable energy 
There are numerous benefits associated with renewable energy. The main benefits 
are discussed now.  
 
a)  A sustainable source of energy 
In the first place, renewable energy has the potential to ‘meet many times the 
present world energy demand’.84 While authors differ in their projections regarding 
how much renewable energy could contribute to future energy supply, some 
consider that renewable energy could fuel practically all of the world’s energy needs 
in the not too distant future.85 Thus, relying on renewable energy, which is non-
depletable, could provide the world with a sustainable source of energy, thus 
contributing to sustainability. It has been argued that ‘[e]nergy sustainability should 
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be the overarching and holistic concept governing the question of our energy 
future’.86 
 
b)  Reduced climate change impact 
While GHG emissions are still produced with regard to the production of the 
components required for the various RETs, renewable energy is associated with far 
lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions than energy generated from fossil fuels. 
Indeed, ‘[n]o energy production or conversion technology is without risk or waste’.87 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the ‘median values’ of carbon emissions for all renewable 
energy options during their lifecycles. Median values range from 4 to 46 grams of 
carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt hour (g CO2eq/kWh) in the case of renewable 
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Figure 3.3   Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of various electricity 
generation technologies89 
 
Therefore, replacing fossil fuel-generated energy with energy generated from 
renewable sources would assist in reducing GHG emission levels, or at the very 
least, the rate at which greenhouse gases are increasing. If GHG emissions are 
decreased by relying less on conventional energy sources and more on renewable 
energy sources, negative health and other social impacts associated with climate 
change due to the combustion of fossil fuels would also be reduced. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, while developed countries are required to reduce 
their GHG emissions, pressure is growing internationally for certain developing 
countries to take on more responsibility. Another benefit of investing in renewable 
energy is that countries ‘can ensure that they will have mature and competitive 
renewable energy industries in place before they are forced to transition away from 
fossil fuels’.90 
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While there are other ways to reduce GHG emissions including through 
improving energy efficiency91 and introducing carbon-reducing methods such as 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), in light of the numerous benefits of renewable 
energy the focus in this thesis is on renewable energy (specifically RES-E). 
 
c) Energy security 
Dependence on imported fuels means that countries are dependent on the 
availability of such fuels in the countries where they are produced, for example, oil 
from the Middle East, which may be influenced by the prevailing political situation, 
which also impacts on fuel prices. Increasing the role of renewable energy in a 
country’s national energy supply would decrease the dependence on imported 
(volatile) fossil fuels,92 thereby contributing to energy security. It has been argued 
that ‘renewable energy options present perhaps the only truly long-term solution to 
humanity’s energy supply dilemma’.93 
 
d) Reduced water use  
Generating electricity from renewable energy sources is far less water-intensive. Up 
to 3 cubic meters of water are used to generate 1 MWh of electricity from coal, while 
up to 6.5 cubic meters of water are used to generate 1 MWh of electricity from oil. 
On the other hand, no water is used to generate electricity from solar or wind 
energy.94 This is significant for water-stressed South Africa. 
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e) Job creation 
It is widely acknowledged that there is significant potential for job creation in the 
renewable energy sector,95 which is especially important in the South African context 
of high levels of unemployment. In South Africa, employment per ton of coal mined 
has decreased by about five per cent per year from 1986 to 2006. This pattern 
appears worldwide and is expected to continue.96 The White Paper on the 
Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa97 also acknowledges the 
higher job creation potential of renewable technologies, provided that they are 
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Table 3.1   Estimated job creation potential of different electricity 
generation technologies99 
 
In the South African context it has been found that the implementation of solar 
water heaters (SWHs) creates even more job opportunities than RETs.100 Therefore, 
while this research does not deal with non-grid connected SWHs, their importance 
should not be underestimated. 
 
f)  Lower lead times 
Another advantage of renewable energy is that renewable energy plants actually 
take less time to build than conventional coal-fired power plants. Renewable energy 
plants have lead times of one to two years compared to four years for coal-fired 
power plants.101 This is especially significant for South Africa, which urgently needs 
to increase the energy supply to meet its social and development needs. 
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g) Contribution to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals 
Access to energy is not included as a Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and  
‘[e]nergy has been described as the “missing” Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG), the catalyst without which other goals on issues such as health, 
education and gender equality cannot be achieved’.102  
It has been argued that providing access to modern energy services, such as 
renewable energy, would support the realisation of the MDGs.103  
 
Many RETs are especially ‘suited to off-grid applications’104 and could assist in 
improving access to energy where it is difficult or expensive to connect to the 
national grid, which is especially relevant in South Africa.105 As the concern here is 
with grid-connected electricity, off-grid applications are not considered in detail. 
However, their importance should not be ignored. In addition, the role that can be 
played by energy efficiency in reducing energy demand in the first place, while not 
considered further here, is also significant.106 
Furthermore, the role that can be played by ‘smart grids’ in future electricity use 
and management may also be significant. In short, the smart grid is concerned with 
the usage of information technology to control electricity use and generation.107 In 
contrast to the traditional electricity grid that is based on the transmission and 
distribution of electricity to consumers from large (centralised) power plants, this 
technology would facilitate the decentralised provision of electricity to the smart grid 
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by various generators of electricity, including electricity generated from renewable 
sources. 
This concept is relatively new, with research and development still being 
conducted. While there is a smart grid initiative in South Africa,108 having regard to 
the scope of this research and given that the implementation of such a system may 
require the complete overhaul and/or upgrading of the current electricity distribution 
system109 and the costly introduction of advanced technologies,110 smart grids are 
not considered further in this research. However, any advantages and/or 
disdvantages of the smart grid in relation to the traditional grid and the role that it 
may potentially play in the future, including with regard to the promotion of renewable 
energy, would need to be the subject of further research. 
Despite all of the benefits associated with renewable energy (and by implication, 
RES-E), the deployment of RES-E remains low internationally. Barriers to renewable 
energy and RES-E are now considered. 
 
3.2.2.3  Barriers to the implementation of renewable energy and  
  RES- E 
There are various barriers to the implementation of renewable energy and RES-E,111 
including that certain RETs – such as wind energy and solar energy – are 
intermittent and therefore the generation of energy from these sources is dependent 
on certain conditions being present, such as the sun shining or the wind blowing. 
Thus, they cannot provide baseload energy since they cannot provide continuous 
energy at a constant rate.112 In addition, more capacity is required to generate the 
same amount of electricity than would be generated from an electricity technology 
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with a higher availability factor.113 The higher availability factors of conventional 
energy technologies compared to renewable energy technologies are reflected in 
Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2   Investment costs, efficiency and availability factors of  





 R/kW % % 
Coal    
New pulverised fuel plant 9980 35 72 
Fluidised bed combustion (with 
flue gas desulphurisation) 
9321 37 88 
Nuclear    
PBMR initial modules 17136 41 82 
PBMR multi modules 10761 41 82 
Imported gas    
Combined cycle gas turbine 4583 50 85 
Open cycle gas turbine 3206 32 85 
Imported hydro    
Imported hydro    
Renewable energy    
Parabolic trough 18421 100 24 
Power tower 19838 100 60 
Wind turbine 6325 100 25, 30, 35 
Small hydro 10938 100 30 
Landfill gas (medium) 4287 n/a 89 
Biomass co-generation 
(bagasse) 
6064 34 57 
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Storage    
Pumped storage 6064 Storage 95 
 
As noted (in 3.2.2.1) above, a potential solution is pumped storage. Various 
other storage techniques are under development.115 In addition, it should be possible 
(at least in the short-term) to combine RES-E with other non-intermittent energy 
sources such as biomass. However, this does remain a barrier that has not yet been 
resolved. 
Other barriers to RES-E include ‘high perceived risk’,116 uncertainty regarding 
resource availability,117 the lack of a legal framework for independent power 
producers (IPPs), restrictions on siting and construction,118 and barriers related to 
infrastructure and the regulation of the energy sector.119 However, the presence of 
these barriers would depend to some extent on a country’s specific circumstances, 
and could arguably be resolved through national laws and policies to some degree. 
A further significant barrier, which is the focus here, relates to the generally 
higher investment costs of RES-E in comparison to more established fossil fuel 
technologies,120 as reflected in Table 3.2 above. This is a clear deterrent to 
investment in RES-E. Table 3.2 also shows that RETs that are less mature and 
consequently less developed, such as solar technologies, cost more than mature 
technologies, such as wind energy. However, the following factors must be borne in 
mind. 
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a) Externalities are excluded from total electricity prices 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are external environmental and social costs, 
relating inter alia to climate change, air pollution and water use, which are not 
included in the price of coal-generated electricity (and fossil fuel-generated electricity 
generally). Thus the true cost of coal-generated electricity is not actually reflected in 
electricity prices. Were these costs to be included, coal-generated electricity would 
have a much higher price. It has been argued that ‘[i]f resources are to be allocated 
efficiently, then consumers should pay the full social cost – including the 
uncompensated environmental costs – of the generation and distribution of their 




b) The operating costs of RES-E are lower than those of coal-generated 
electricity 
While it is expensive to construct renewable energy plants compared to traditional 
fossil fuel power plants, the operating costs of renewable energy plants are generally 
lower. This is because fossil fuel plants incur costs with regard to extracting fuels. 
However, the ‘fuel’ with regard to a number of RETs, including solar energy, wind 
energy and hydropower is free.122 For example, the construction costs of the largest 
solar plant in the world – the Waldpolenz (based in Germany) – are five times higher 
per megawatt than the imminent Medupi power plant. However, the operation and 
maintenance costs of Medupi will be 12 times higher than those of the 
Waldpolenz.123 
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c) Coal-generated electricity will become more expensive 
There are large global coal reserves remaining, with total recoverable reserves 
estimated at 946 billion tonnes.124 While in theory there should be no concerns 
regarding energy security, it is getting more difficult to extract coal and therefore, the 
costs of extraction will increase.125 This would most likely also threaten energy 
security.  
 
d) Subsidies are provided to fossil fuel industries 
Subsidies provided to coal industries are also a barrier to the penetration of 
renewable energy. It has been estimated that US$312 billion is provided per year in 
subsidies to fossil fuels, compared to only US$57 billion per year for renewable 
energy.126 This makes energy generated from fossil fuels appear cheaper. While 
subsidies are often justified on the basis that they assist in providing energy access 
to the poor,  
‘studies have found that fossil-fuel subsidies as presently constituted tend to be 
regressive, disproportionately benefitting higher income groups that can afford 
higher levels of consumption… Without precise targeting, fossil-fuel subsidies 
are often an inefficient means of assisting the poor’.127  
Of eleven countries with low levels of access to modern energy, including South 
Africa, China, India, Pakistan and Angola, South Africa scored the lowest with regard 
to the percentage of fossil fuel subsidies reaching the poorest people. Indeed, only 2 
                                                          
124
 U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2013 available at 
www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/coal.cfm [accessed 21 October 2013].  
125
 See Banks and Schäffler The Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy in South Africa (n27) 9 
and 11; and I-Net Bridge ‘Eskom May Run out of Domestic Coal’ (21 June 2011) Independent Online 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/eskom-may-run-out-of-domestic-coal-
1.1086146#.UNB9vnfhd2k [accessed 21 June 2011]. See also K Sharife and P Bond ‘Above and 
Beyond South Africa’s Minerals-Energy Complex’ in J Daniel, P Naidoo, D Pillay and R Southall (eds) 
New South African Review 2: New Paths, Old Compromises? (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits 
University Press) 2011, 290. 
126
 UNEP FI Financing Renewable Energy in Developing Countries (n92) 28. It has furthermore been 
noted that ‘renewable energy is competitive against unsubsidised fossil fuel technologies in many 
developing countries’. See Waissbein et al Derisking Renewable Energy Investment (n120) 26. 
127
 IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 (n11) 518. 
61 
 
per cent of fossil fuel subsidies in South Africa reach the poorest 20 per cent of the 
population.128 
Subsidies may also result in ‘lock in situations’ in which ‘economic structures, 
production and consumption patterns adapt to low prices over time, and therefore 
become resistant to change’.129 Low energy prices also increase reliance on this 
energy source and encourage overuse.130  
Removing these subsidies could assist in promoting renewable energy, as coal-
generated energy would become more expensive, or rather, its price would become 
more cost-reflective, thus making renewable energy comparatively cheaper. 
However, it would be important that energy prices for poor people would not be 
increased through the removal of subsidies.131 Strong political will is required for 
subsidy reform.132 Subsidies are considered further in Chapter 4. 
 
e) Renewable energy (and RES-E) is becoming cheaper 
The costs of renewable energy are decreasing rapidly due to the phenomenon 
known as ‘learning effects’.133 As experience is gained and renewable energy 
technologies become more mature, economies of scale are achieved and costs 
decrease.134 Learning rates in the literature range from 3 to 68 per cent.135 Thus, the 
price of solar PV (globally) has decreased from US$65/watt in 1976 to US$1.4/watt 
in 2010, while the price of onshore wind power plants in the United States of America 
has decreased from US$4.3/watt in 1984 to US$1.9/watt in 2009.136  
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The costs of RES-E are projected to decrease further and to become cost-
competitive with fossil fuel-generated electricity in the not too distant future.137 In 
certain circumstances, renewable energy is already becoming ‘economically 
competitive’.138 Indeed, onshore wind energy sometimes costs less than fossil fuel-
generated energy.139   
Despite the barriers to renewable energy, investment in renewable energy is 
increasing exponentially. Investment in renewable energy increased from US$161 
billion in 2009 to US$257 billion in 2011.140 This has been attributed to various 
factors including government policies, increasing energy demand, the decreasing 
costs of many RETs and the changing prices of fossil fuels.141 The increase in 
installed capacity of certain RETs is reflected in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3   New global renewable energy capacity142 
Renewable energy technology Installed capacity (GW) 
 2009 2012 
Hydropower 915 990 
Solar PV 23 100 
CSP 0.7 2.5 
Wind power 159 283 
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A number of countries have been making significant inroads with regard to the 
rapid deployment of renewable energy. China leads worldwide with regard to total 
renewable energy capacity. Other countries with high levels of renewable energy 
capacity include the United States of America, Germany, Spain and India.143  
Germany is the world leader with regard to total renewable energy on a per 
capita basis.144 With regard to the renewable energy targets of the EU-27, Germany 
was one of only three countries (along with Denmark and Hungary) that had 
exceeded its target for 2010 by 2007.145 For reasons elaborated on in Chapter 4, 
Germany’s feed-in tariff policy is considered as a best practice example in Chapter 5. 
Closer to home, RES-E has increased in sub-Saharan Africa by 72 per cent 
between 1998 and 2008, although most of this increase is made up by 
hydropower.146 In particular, Kenya appears to be taking great strides. In 2008, 21 
per cent of Kenya’s electricity supply was generated by non-hydro renewable energy 
sources (including geothermal, biomass and wind energy), while all renewable 
energy sources accounted for 62 per cent of total electricity supply.147 
While it could be argued that it is more difficult to implement RES-E in 
developing countries than in more developed countries like Germany and the United 
States, it is clear that developing countries such as China, India and Kenya are 
forging ahead with their renewable energy plans.  
The next section considers the domestic context. It briefly sets out the history of 
South Africa’s energy sector and then discusses South Africa’s energy supply as 
well as electricity tariffs in South Africa. The following section discusses renewable 
energy and considers the barriers faced by renewable energy and the potential for 
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renewable energy. The chapter concludes with some observations regarding some 
of the elements that are considered necessary to create an enabling environment for 
renewable energy in South Africa.  
 
3.3   The South African context 
 
3.3.1  History of South Africa’s energy sector  
Energy generation has played a significant role in South Africa’s socioeconomic 
development and  
‘has lent prosperity and security to the country by providing heat and power for 
industry, transportation, and household use. The sector has been largely driven 
by economic and political forces, which have had a profound impact on energy 
policies’.148 
Most of South Africa’s electricity is provided by Eskom. Eskom started off in 
1923 as the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom).149 Escom was renamed Eskom 
in 1987150 and was converted into a public company in 2001,151 with the state as sole 
shareholder. State-owned Eskom is responsible for the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity.152  
 
3.3.1.1  Pre-1994 
During apartheid, and based on the policy of separate development, the government 
was concerned with providing  
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‘modern energy services to the “white” population group, which formed 11% of 
the population, and limited or no services at all to the rest of the population. High 
priority was given to the needs of the industrial sector because of its role in 
economic and political security. In general, this meant concentrating on 
electricity and liquid fuels, as these were crucial to economic and political 
interests. Security, secrecy and control characterised most of the policies that 
prevailed’.153 
In the late 1980s Eskom embarked on a programme of ‘low-income 
electrification’ and in 1987 adopted the slogan ‘Electricity for All’.154 There was 
overbuilding by Eskom in the 1980s, which resulted in excess capacity and a 55 per 
cent reserve margin by 1990.155 Electricity prices remained cheap while no further 
capacity was required. This is dealt with further in 3.3.3.  
In 1996 only 58 per cent of South Africa’s population had access to electricity, 
and the statistics were skewed along racial lines, with only 25 per cent of non-urban 
black households being electrified compared to 97 per cent of non-urban white 
households.156 
 
3.3.1.2  Post-1994 
In 1994 the new democratically elected African National Congress government 
embarked upon an intense electrification programme. This was assisted by the fact 
that at the end of apartheid, South Africa’s ‘world-class’ electricity supply industry 
faced few of the barriers usually experienced by developing countries with regard to 
electrification, including a lack of funding, skills and infrastructure.157  
During 1994 and 1999 the focus was on achieving high connection rates, which 
was accomplished through the use of creative ways to decrease costs and 
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‘overcome institutional barriers’.158 This phase of electrification was effectively cross-
subsidised by other electricity users.159  
It should be noted that while the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 includes various socio-economic rights such as the right of access to adequate 
housing160 and the right of access to sufficient food and water,161 it does not include 
a right of access to energy or electricity. 
Once Eskom was converted into a public company and it was required to start 
paying tax, it was unwilling to fund the electrification programme, with the result that 
from 2001 the electrification programme was funded by the state directly from the 
fiscus.162 
In 2003 a free basic electricity (FBE) policy was introduced in terms of which 
poor households that were connected to the grid were provided with 50 kWh of free 
electricity per month.163 The FBE policy also makes provision for a subsidy to be 
provided in respect of solar heater systems in households that are not connected to 
the grid.164 
The result of the electrification programme was that between 1994 and 2009, 4.9 
million households were electrified, and by 2009, 75 per cent of households had 
access to electricity.165 By 2011, 81 per cent of households had been connected to 
the grid.166 Despite this electrification, many households cannot actually afford the 
electricity and therefore continue to rely on coal and paraffin.167 
                                                          
158
 Ibid, 3128. 
159
 Ibid, 3129. 
160
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 26(1). 
161
 Ibid, Section 27(1)(b). 
162
 Bekker et al ‘South Africa’s Rapid Electrification Programme’ (n152) 3129. 
163
 Department of Minerals and Energy Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (Free Basic 
Electricity) Policy GN 1693 in Government Gazette No. 25088 dated 4 July 2003, Regulation 4.1. 
164
 Ibid, 1. 
165
 Department of Energy Electrification Statistics 2009 available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/explained/statistics_electrification_2009.pdf [accessed 2 March 
2011] 10-11. 
166
 Department of Energy Revised Strategic Plan 2011/12 -2015/16 available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163946 [accessed 10 July 2012] 30. 
167
 Department of Minerals and Energy, Eskom, Energy Research Institute (University of Cape Town) 
Energy Outlook for South Africa: 2000 2002 available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=124706 [accessed 13 November 2010] xi. See 
also H Winkler ‘Energy Demand’ in H Winkler (ed) Energy Policies for Sustainable Development in 
South Africa: Options for the Future 2006 (Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town) 29. 
67 
 
While the high priority given to the industrial sector has been important in 
securing South Africa’s international economic competitiveness, the ‘apparent 
abundance [of coal] coupled with relatively low coal prices … have encouraged the 
development of many energy-intensive industries’.168 The importance of cheap 
electricity to South Africa’s industrial development has made it difficult to move away 
from conventional energy.169 
In 2007/2008 there were electricity shortages and ‘load shedding’ took place 
throughout South Africa. This was despite the fact that already in 1998 it was 
projected by government that ‘growth in electricity demand … [would] exceed 
generation capacity by approximately the year 2007’.170 This led to the preparation of 
the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030,171 which sets out South Africa’s planned 
electricity expansion programme until 2030. The Integrated Resource Plan is 
discussed further in 3.3.2.3 below. 
Further policy documents and legislation dealing with electricity and renewable 
energy, including the White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South 
Africa,172 the White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South 
Africa173 and the National Energy Act,174 are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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3.3.2  Energy supply in South Africa  
3.3.2.1  South Africa’s energy and electricity profiles 
South Africa’s energy and electricity supplies are dominated by coal. In 2009 almost 
70 per cent of South Africa’s total primary energy supply was supplied by coal. South 
Africa’s total primary energy supply is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
  
 Figure 3.4   Total primary energy supply in South Africa175 
 
With regard to electricity supply, out of a total of 248 TWh of electricity supplied 
in 2011, only about 0.001 per cent of electricity was supplied by wind energy and 0.8 
per cent was supplied by hydro power. On the other hand, 92.8 per cent of electricity 
was supplied by coal and 5 per cent was supplied by nuclear energy.176 This is 
reflected in Figure 3.5. 
 
                                                          
175
 Statistics obtained from International Energy Agency Share of total primary energy supply in 2009 
available at http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/ZATPESPI.pdf [accessed 23 July 2012]. 
176
 Eskom Integrated Report 2011 available at 













Figure 3.5   Electricity supply in South Africa177 
 
 
3.3.2.2  Sources of energy in South Africa 
 
a) Coal 
Coal was ‘formed millions of years ago from massive accumulation of dead, land-
based plant life, mainly trees’.178 The plant material (and coal) is made up primarily 
of carbon, which is released when coal is combusted. Because coal takes millions of 
years to form, it is classified as a non-renewable source of energy.179  
It has been estimated that South Africa has coal reserves of about 38 billion 
tons, and thus has the sixth largest coal reserves in the world.180 Most of South 
Africa’s coal (about 84 per cent) is produced in Mpumalanga, with much smaller 
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quantities being produced in the Free State, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal.181 The 
export of high-grade coal means that low-grade coal is used for electricity generation 
in South Africa.182 The numerous negative impacts of coal-generated electricity were 
discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030183 (IRP 2010-2030) sees 
coal capacity decrease from about 80 per cent in 2010 to about 46 per cent by 
2030.184 The contribution of coal to electricity supply will decrease from 90 per cent 
in 2010 to 65 per cent in 2030.185 The major additions in respect of coal-generated 
power are the Medupi and Kusile power stations, which were anticipated to come on 
board in 2013 and 2017 respectively. Kusile (with a capacity of 4800 MW) and 
Medupi (with a capacity of 4764 MW) will be the third and fourth largest coal-fired 
power stations in the world respectively.186 It was initially projected that Medupi 
would cost about US$30 billion to construct, however, more recently it has been 
projected that it will cost US$120 billion to construct.187 
Importantly, coal provides baseload power. In order to provide this baseload 
power, coal power plants in South Africa run continuously and are ‘generally only 
shut-down for scheduled maintenance or emergency repairs’,188 and thereafter take 
eight hours to start up again. Therefore, the grid is currently not well-suited to 
shutting down in order to accept renewable energy and then restarting (quickly) 
when more power is required.189  
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In South Africa, coal is also converted to liquid fuels at the Sasol plants, which 
were built for political reasons to ensure that South Africa would be independent of 
foreign oil. The process is highly energy- and carbon-intensive.190 
 
b) Oil 
South Africa has very small oil reserves and imports most of its oil, primarily from 
Saudi Arabia.191  
 
c) Nuclear energy 
South Africa’s entire nuclear supply is provided by the Koeberg power station in the 
Western Cape. Nuclear energy relies on uranium, which is a by-product of gold 
mining.192 Reserves of uranium in South Africa have been estimated at 261 000 
tonnes.193 A much larger role for nuclear energy is planned in the future in terms of 
the IRP 2010-2030,194 and it is envisaged that nuclear energy will contribute about 
20 per cent to total electricity supply by 2030.195 
 
d) Gas 
It was previously thought that South Africa had only small reserves of natural gas 
and as appears from Figures 3.4 and 3.5 above, gas contributes very little to South 
Africa’s energy and electricity supplies. However, this may change with the recent 
discovery of shale gas in the Karoo region of South Africa. Estimates of the potential 
for shale gas vary. One estimate puts the potential for shale gas at 450 trillion cubic 
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feet (tcf).196 There has been considerable public opposition to the mining of shale 
gas in the Karoo. Nevertheless, government appears committed to proceeding with 
hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, and has recently published draft Technical 
Regulations for Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation.197  
 
e) Renewable energy 
Most of South Africa’s renewable energy is provided by biomass, which consists 
primarily of fuelwood used in households, which is harvested unsustainably.198 In 
addition, biomass, in the form of sugarcane bagasse is used directly by sugar 
refineries to generate electricity. Pulp mills also generate electricity directly from bark 
and ‘black liquor’.199  
The wind energy contribution to South Africa’s electricity supply is provided by 
the (privately-owned) Darling Wind Farm in the Western Cape and Eskom’s 
Klipheuwel Wind Farm.  
With regard to hydropower, South Africa has only 668 MW of installed capacity. 
Small hydro plants account for about 68 MW of this capacity. In addition, pumped 
storage schemes with a capacity of 1580 MW have been installed.200  
Furthermore, over 350 000 solar water heaters (SWHs) had been installed by 
the first half of 2013.201 While SWHs do not provide electricity directly, they displace 
the need for electricity generation. In 2009 about 1.35 TWh of energy was harnessed 
by SWHs.202  It has been estimated that the use of SWHs could displace 42 TWh of 
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electricity consumption by 2030.203 In addition, there are off-grid renewable energy 
installations such as solar PV panels, which have wide application in rural areas.204 
Renewable energy projects may receive subsidies from the Renewable Energy 
Finance and Subsidy Office (REFSO), which is located within Eskom. The REFSO 
has provided subsidies to six projects with a total installed capacity of 23.9MW.205 
 
3.3.2.3  Future electricity supply 
As a result of the electricity shortages and load shedding experienced in 2007/2008 
it was determined that electricity capacity should be expanded.206 The IRP 2010-
2030 envisages that electricity capacity will be expanded from the 2010 level of 
approximately 44.5 GW to approximately 89.5 GW by 2030. The planned capacities 
of the various electricity technologies by 2030 are reflected in Table 3.4. An Update 
to the IRP 2010-2030207 was recently published, which sees slightly different roles 
for these electricity technologies. However, the IRP 2010-2030 ‘remains the official 
government plan for new generation capacity until replaced by a full iteration’.208 
Thus, the focus remains on the current iteration of the IRP.  
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Table 3.4   Total electricity capacity by 2030209 
Electricity source Total capacity 
 MW Percentage 
Coal 41071 45.9 
OCGT 7330 8.2 
CCGT 2370 2.6 
Pumped storage 2912 3.3 
Nuclear 11400 12.7 
Hydro 4759 5.3 
Wind 9200 10.3 
CSP 1200 1.3 
PV 8400 9.4 
Other 890 1.0 
 
Table 3.4 shows that wind energy, CSP and solar PV will together make up 21 
per cent of South Africa’s electricity capacity in 2030. However, this 21 per cent of 
renewable energy capacity does not translate well into overall electricity supply, as 
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Figure 3.6   Electricity supply by 2030211 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that coal will still supply the majority of electricity in 2030. 
Although there is a significant reduction from over 90 per cent today to the planned 
65 per cent by 2030, it appears that the shortfall will, for the most part, simply be 
replaced by nuclear power.  
It was recently argued in a report, commissioned by the National Planning 
Commission, that energy demand has decreased and that in 2030 it will be closer to 
61 GW than to the 89 GW envisaged in the IRP 2010-2030. It is therefore argued in 
the report that investments in nuclear energy will not be required for at least the next 
15 to 25 years.212  
The Department of Energy has started to review the IRP 2010-2030,213 and as 
noted above an Update to the IRP 2010-2030 has been published. The Update 
Report projects that electricity demand in 2030 will range between 345 and 416 TWh 
(81.4 GW) as opposed to the 454 TWh (89.5 GW) projected in the IRP 2010-2030.214 
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The Update also sees a smaller role for nuclear energy, which would provide 6660 
MW instead of 11 400 MW in 2030.215 Yet, the IRP 2010-2030 ‘remains the official 
strategy’ until replaced by a new iteration.216  
 
3.3.3  Tariffs  
Electricity tariffs in South Africa have traditionally been very low and in 2002 South 
Africa produced the cheapest electricity in the world.217  There are a number of 
reasons for the ‘unrealistically low’218 electricity prices.  
In the first place, there was excess electricity capacity due to Eskom’s over-
investment in the 1980s, which kept prices low while no additional capacity (nor 
investment) was required. Therefore, electricity prices have not reflected true 
costs.219 In addition, electricity prices have not included external costs, or 
externalities, arising due to harm caused to the environment and society by fossil 
fuel-generated energy.220 This issue is discussed further in 3.3.4.2 below and 
Chapter 4.  
Further reasons for the low electricity prices include ‘[a]ccess to large reserves of 
low-grade coal and the use of technologies that maximise economies of scale’, the 
subsidising of Eskom’s investment by forward cover by the Reserve Bank,221 the 
close proximity of power plants to mines222 and the fact that more than 80 per cent of 
Eskom’s sale revenue comes from large industrial and mining customers, which cost 
less to serve and are ‘generally in a position to negotiate favourable prices’.223 In 
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addition, until Eskom became a public company in 2001,224 it was exempt from 
paying tax.225  
While the low electricity prices have enabled South Africa to be competitive in 
the minerals processing market, they have not encouraged investment in alternative 
sources of energy or energy efficiency.226 Furthermore, the ‘unrealistically low’ price 
of electricity has deterred potential competitors from entering the market.227 
Electricity prices have started to increase in the last decade. From 2003 the 
costs of electrification started to become more expensive as the focus shifted to 
electrifying rural (more remote) areas and due to the increasing costs of the 
necessary commodities such as steel, copper and aluminium.228 Average electricity 
tariffs from 2007 to 2013 are reflected in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5   Average electricity tariffs from 2007 to 2013229 compared to 
  inflation230 
Financial 
year 
Electricity tariff (R cents 
per kilowatt hour) 
Increase in 
electricity price (%) 
Consumer price 
index (%) 
2007 18   
2008 19.4 7.8 9.4 
2009 24.7 27.3 6 
2010 31.9 29.2 3.4 
2011 40.3 26.3 6.4 
2012 50.3 24.8 5.7 
2013 65 29.2 5.3 
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Further price increases are due to take place. Eskom recently applied, in terms 
of the Multi-Year Price Determination 3, for tariffs to be increased by 16 per cent per 
year for the next five years.231  The National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) approved a price increase of 8 per cent (per year) for the next three 
years.232  
It should be noted that there is a significant discrepancy between the tariffs paid 
by different categories of users. For instance, the Department of Energy reported 
that in 2006 the average electricity price was 17.05c/kWh. While the price of 
electricity for ‘Domestic and Street Lighting’ was 40.08c/kWh, the electricity price 
was 14.75c/kWh for ‘Industrial’, 16.19c/kWh for ‘Eskom Mining’ and 9.83c/kWh for 
‘International’.233 In addition, it is an open secret that a few energy-intensive 
companies have special pricing arrangements with Eskom. For instance, the price 
reportedly paid by BHP Billiton is 16c/kWh compared to the general rate of 
65c/kWh.234                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The next section considers the development of renewable energy in South 
Africa, and inter alia discusses the barriers to, and potential for, renewable energy 
and RES-E. 
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3.3.4  The development of renewable energy and RES-E in 
 South Africa  
3.3.4.1  Introduction 
To date, RES-E has not played any significant role in South Africa as evidenced by 
the low contribution of RES-E to South Africa’s total electricity supply.  
In 2003 government acknowledged that South Africa must be a ‘responsible 
global neighbour’ and that ‘alternative means of producing energy such as 
renewable energy sources, which have less impact on the environment compared to 
fossil fuels have to be considered’.235 Government accordingly established a target 
of ‘10 000 GWh … renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 
2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro’.236 
Yet government has not pursued this target very actively.237 Indeed, by 2009 only 
three per cent (296 GWh) of this target had been achieved.238 To date, this target 
has been a primary driver for renewable energy policy in South Africa.239 
In more recent years there has been a greater impetus to increase the uptake of 
renewable energy. The 10 000 GWh target has been amplified by the IRP 2010-
2030,240 which envisages that RETs will account for 21 per cent of total capacity and 
9 per cent of total energy supply by 2030.  
The Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) was initially introduced to support 
the achievement of the 10 000 GWh target and to promote the competitiveness of 
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renewable energy in comparison to conventional energy options,241 but was replaced 
by the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
(REIPPPP) in 2011. The REFIT and REIPPPP are both discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.  
 
3.3.4.2  Barriers to renewable energy and RES-E 
Eskom supplies 95 per cent of South Africa’s electricity242 and owns the entire 
transmission infrastructure and half of the distribution network.243 It therefore holds a 
monopoly with regard to the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in 
South Africa. Indeed, the structure of the energy sector and regulatory environment 
have not been ‘conducive to entry’,244 which was acknowledged in the White Paper 
on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (REWP).245  
It has furthermore been argued that  
‘[a]s monopolistic energy providers, both Eskom and Sasol wield considerable 
power. They use their influence to protect those of the energy market’s features 
suited to their core competencies. Fostering a favourable environment for 
renewable energy providers is certainly not a part of this strategy’.246  
To date, there has not been any incentive for Eskom (or Sasol) to move away 
from fossil fuel-based energy. Indeed, Eskom’s plans with regard to renewable 
energy include only 100 MW of wind energy (the Sere wind power plant) and 100 
MW of solar energy (in the Northern Cape), as well as the installation of solar panels 
at 13 coal-fired power stations.247 In this regard it has been argued that Eskom ‘lacks 
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the will to meaningfully contribute to the area of alternative power generation, 
particularly in [renewable energy]’.248  
It has been generally acknowledged that competition is important, and that 
competition in the energy sector can lead to decreased costs and increased 
consumer satisfaction.249 In the South African context it is therefore important to try 
to reduce Eskom’s monopoly through the introduction of IPPs.  
Other barriers to renewable energy in South Africa include: a lack of local 
experience; difficulties in securing a black economic empowerment [BEE] partner; 
excessive permitting requirements and siting restrictions; that the public is not largely 
informed or aware of the benefits of renewable energy; too many agencies involved 
in the approval process and the difficulty experienced by IPPs in gaining access to 
the grid and obtaining the requisite approvals and licences.250 Another barrier that 
may arise, as demand for RETs increases, is the availability of the necessary 
components.251  
While it is crucial that all barriers are resolved, as highlighted earlier the focus of 
this research is on the financial barrier. In South Africa too, the initial costs of 
renewable energy are generally higher than those of conventional fossil fuel-
generated energy.  
As was noted with regard to the international context, when considering the 
costs of renewable energy and RES-E there are a number of factors that must be 
borne in mind, namely that: a) external costs of fossil fuel-generated energy are 
currently excluded; b) the operating costs of RES-E are lower than those of coal-
generated electricity; c) coal-generated electricity will become more expensive; d) 
subsidies are provided to fossil fuel industries; and e) renewable energy (and RES-
E) is becoming cheaper. These factors are equally relevant to the South African 
context and a few of these are considered in more detail. 
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With regard to externalities, in South Africa ‘the price of electricity has never 
included any part of the environmental and social impacts of electricity 
generation’.252  This can lead to resources being misallocated.253 This also means 
that renewable energy and conventional energy do not compete on an equal playing 
field.254 
A study has calculated the external costs of various technologies including coal, 
nuclear, gas, biomass, hydro, wind, CSP and PV, which are reflected in Table 3.6. 
The ‘total externality costs’ are indicated in the second last row. 
 
Table 3.6   Best estimates of external costs for electricity generation  
  technologies in South Africa255 
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Table 3.6 illustrates that coal-generated electricity has an externality cost of 
55c/kWh, compared to between 0.8 and 6 c/kWh for various RETs. In addition, the 
proviso to Table 3.6 refers to an additional ‘water damage externality’ cost for 
‘Eskom’s coal mining needs’ (in the context of acid mine drainage),256 which is 
estimated at about 38c/kWh.  
This study suggests that, at the very least, an additional 55c/kWh (or possibly 
93c/kWh) needs to be added to the current price of coal-generated electricity. It is 
clear that it would be much easier for RETs to compete with coal on this basis. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the environment and society are ‘subsidising the coal 
combusting industries on average by an amount more than the private cost of 
coal’.257 Without government and industry action to address these externalities, 
society will continue to assume these costs.258 
While external costs do need to be internalised, it is clear that this would impact 
significantly on industries that use coal. It would be important that internalising these 
external costs does not impact negatively on poor people.259  
As highlighted in 3.2.2.3 above, the costs of renewable energy are decreasing 
rapidly. It is already considered that onshore wind may be cheaper than coal-
generated electricity in certain circumstances. Indeed, the average cost of wind 
energy under South Africa’s REIPPP Programme (discussed in detail in Chapter 7) 
was 89 cents per kilowatt hour (c/kWh) in the second round of bidding and about 
66c/kWh in the third round of bidding.260 On the other hand, it has been reported that 
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electricity generated from the new coal power plants, Medupi and Kusile, will cost 
97c/kWh,261 making wind energy a cheaper and cleaner alternative.  
Furthermore, if technology learning effects with regard to renewable energy 
technologies are included in RES-E scenarios for South Africa  
‘the mitigation costs are dramatically reduced, or even provide a saving relative 
to business-as-usual. If such scenarios materialised, it would no longer take 
legislation to mandate shares of renewables, but greater uptake should be driven 
by economic incentives’.262 
Coal-generated electricity is also projected to become more expensive as carbon 
capture and storage is taken into account.263 The cost of coal-generated electricity 
would undoubtedly also increase when a carbon tax is introduced in South Africa.  
 
3.3.4.3  Potential for renewable energy in South Africa 
It has been noted that South Africa’s renewable energy potential is ‘enormous’, 
greatly exceeding current and projected demand.264 Government has acknowledged 
the country’s significant renewable energy resources and has stated that ‘so far 
these have remained largely untapped’.265   
There appears to be no single study that has comprehensively determined the 
potential contributions of all of the RETs. Therefore, the figures referred to below 
have been obtained from various sources.  
CSP is considered to be ideal for South African conditions and it has been 
argued that South Africa’s renewable energy potential ‘lies overwhelmingly with solar 
energy’.266 For instance, Upington (in the Northern Cape) has more than 7 kWh/m2 
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of daily average direct normal irradiation (DNI or amount of solar radiation), which is 
higher than that of ‘sun-soaked countries’ including Morocco, India and Spain.267 The 
average daily DNI in South Africa is reflected in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7   Average daily direct normal irradiation268 
 
It has been argued that if CSP were to be implemented in only four provinces – 
the Northern Cape, the Free State, the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape – that 
the potential capacity for South Africa would be 547.6 GW, with the greatest capacity 
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by far being in the Northern Cape.269 However, the plants would not run at full 
capacity throughout the year. Assuming that the plants only ran at 40 per cent 
capacity, they would still provide 1861.4 TWh of energy per year,270 while South 
Africa’s projected electricity demand for 2030 is just 454 TWh.271 
While one would need to consider the practical potential for solar energy, as 
economic factors must be factored in, it is clear that solar energy could in theory, 
satisfy all of the country’s electricity demands. Rolling out solar energy on a large 
scale would only be feasible if dry or ‘water-wise cooling methods’ were to be 
implemented, due to water shortages in South Africa.272 
It has been argued that in the long term, CSP could potentially compete with 
baseload energy technologies.273 Furthermore, due to the lack of market maturity, 
there is potential for ‘South Africa to develop a competitive advantage in [the] design 
and manufacture of … [CSP], particularly if able to prove the technology at scale’.274  
With regard to wind energy, in his doctoral dissertation, Killian Hagemann 
estimated the technical potential of wind energy to be 80 TWh per year.275  
With regard to biomass, it has been estimated that biomass by-products could 
provide more than 12 900 GWh (12.9 TWh) of electricity per year.276 However, 
particular attention would need to be paid to the sustainability of biomass especially 
due to the fact that South Africa is water-stressed.277 It has been estimated that 
landfill gas has a potential of 7.2 TWh per year, potentially increasing to 10.8 TWh 
per year by 2040.278  
With regard to other sources of renewable energy, the potential for hydropower 
is not great. This is inter alia because as a water-stressed country, South Africa is 
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vulnerable to drought.279 Most of the potential for hydropower in South Africa is 
limited to small-scale hydropower projects.280 The potential of pumped storage has 
been estimated at 11.8 GW.281 
Estimates regarding the potential contributions of various RETs are compiled in 
Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7   Estimates of the technical potentials of various RETs in 
South Africa 
RET Study 





 Potential contribution (TWh) 
PV    1000 (economic 
potential: 0)  
 
CSP  1861.4  1000 (economic 
potential: 52) 
 
Wind 80  64 80 (economic 
potential: 23) 
106  
Biomass   5.9  16.4  
Landfill 
gas 
  0.6  7.2  
Hydro   9.2  14.6  
Pumped 
storage 
    [11.8GW] 
Ocean     70  
 
These estimates generally represent the technical potentials of the various 
RETs, rather than representing their economic potentials. For example, while the 
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technical potentials presented by Edkins, Marquard and Winkler are 1000 TWh for 
CSP and PV and 80 TWh for wind energy, the economic potentials provided are 52 
TWh for CSP, 0 TWh for PV and 23 TWh for wind.287 However, it is submitted that 
the estimate provided for PV of 0 TWh is modest, especially considering that in 
terms of the IRP 2010-2030, solar PV will account for 3 per cent of electricity supply 
(about 14 TWh) in 2030.288 The total economic potential of just these three RETs – 
CSP, solar PV and wind – amounts to 75 TWh, which is 16.5 per cent of the 
projected energy demand for 2030.  
While it is not competent, nor is the object, to determine an appropriate target for 
RES-E it is instructive to consider the various RES-E targets that are considered in 
the literature to be feasible, which include: 13 per cent RES-E by 2020 ‘and easily 70 
per cent or more by 2050’;289 15 per cent RES-E by 2020;290 36 per cent RES-E by 
2030;291 27 per cent RES-E by 2050292 and at least 27 per cent RES-E by 2030.293 It 
is significant that one study considered that achieving 15 per cent RES-E by 2030 ‘is 
possible with hardly any change in public and private investments’.294 In contrast, 
under the IRP 2010-2030, RES-E will contribute only 9 per cent to electricity supply 
by 2030. 
 
3.3.4.4  Creating an enabling environment for renewable energy and 
 RES-E 
It has been noted that the large-scale deployment of RETs ‘requires both financing 
and regulatory support to compete with the dominant and mature fossil technologies, 
themselves often supported by a well-established historical subsidy base’.295 
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It is important that there be policy in place to promote RES-E.296 In this regard, 
clear objectives and targets should be established.297 In addition, any target for RES-
E should be binding.298 It is also submitted that such a target should be as ambitious 
as possible, and that it should be consistent with targets that have been considered 
in relevant studies, like those referred to in 3.3.4.3 above. Furthermore, priority grid 
access for RES-E is essential.299 
The ability of independent power producers to access the grid must be facilitated 
with provision being made inter alia for generation licences, infrastructure to connect 
renewable energy plants to the existing infrastructure, as well as power purchase 
agreements of sufficient length.300  
Enabling policies to support RES-E should also assist renewable energy 
developers in obtaining finance and successfully siting projects.301 The development 
of renewable energy also requires the commitment of all sectors of society as well as 
political commitment.302  
In this regard, it is important that the external costs of fossil fuel-generated 
electricity be internalised.303 However, even if environmental externalities were to be 
included in electricity prices, renewable energy would generally still require financial 
support in order to ‘achieve the necessary economies of scale, technological 
development and investor confidence’.304 Once RETs ‘become competitive and are 
driven by market forces alone’, such financial support would no longer be required 
and should be phased out.305 
An important consideration in the South African context, however, is that the 
present ‘minerals-energy complex’ plays an important role in South Africa’s economy 
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and exports and is an important source of local and international investment for the 
country.306 
To the extent that an enabling environment for RES-E is created, ‘[w]ith the 
political will and South Africa’s abundance of renewable energy resources, the 
country could become a renewable energy leader in Africa’.307 In this regard, there is 
an opportunity for South Africa to ‘leapfrog’ over the developments of some 
developed countries. Indeed, rapidly industrialising countries such as China, Brazil, 
India and South Africa ‘are becoming favourable theatres for innovation’.308  
 
3.4   Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of energy and renewable energy. Even 
though renewable energy has important benefits, there are various barriers to its 
implementation, including that its initial costs are generally higher than those of fossil 
fuel-generated energy. In South Africa, coal accounts for the majority of the country’s 
energy and electricity supplies, and has traditionally been very (unrealistically) 
cheap. This has acted as a significant barrier to renewable energy in the country.  
This chapter has considered the potential role that could be played by renewable 
energy in South Africa’s future energy supply. It  was seen that the country has 
considerable renewable energy resources, especially solar energy, and that there is 
the potential for South Africa to become a leader in renewable energy. While the IRP 
2010-2030 sees a larger role for RES-E in the future, it appears that the ‘target’ of 9 
per cent contribution to electricity supply is relatively unambitious. 
Elements that are considered necessary to create an enabling environment for 
RES-E in South Africa have been briefly outlined. In addition to legal or regulatory 
measures such as establishing an ambitious RES-E target and creating ‘preferred 
grid access’ for renewables, financial barriers need to be addressed.  
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Chapter 4 now considers market-based instruments generally and discusses the 
rationale for their implementation. It also describes and discusses various market-






4.1   Introduction 
Amongst other things, this chapter seeks to identify the instrument that has been the 
most effective in promoting renewable energy, and at a later stage (in Chapter 8) its 
implementation in the South African context will be discussed. The approach taken is 
to first discuss command-and-control instruments, including the reasons for their 
traditional dominance as well as their shortcomings (in 4.2). This chapter goes on to 
discuss environmental fiscal reform and the introduction of market-based 
instruments generally, as well as the reasons for their increasing prominence (in 
4.3). It then describes market-based instruments that have been introduced to 
support renewable energy at the international level and discusses their effectiveness 
in this regard (in 4.4). While not directly concerned with renewable energy, this 
chapter also briefly considers carbon pricing (in 4.5).  
 
4.2   Command-and-control instruments 
‘Command-and-control’ approaches have traditionally been the dominant 
instruments for environmental regulation.1 These instruments are regulatory in 
nature and ‘operate by imposing mandatory obligations or restrictions on the 
behaviour of firms and individuals’.2 Examples include: standards, (land) zoning, 
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quota restrictions, for example, with regard to the tonnage of fish that may be caught, 
permitting requirements, controls on technology and emissions permitting.3 
Reasons for the dominance of command-and-control instruments include that 
they are considered to be more ‘secure’,4 in that non-compliance with standards or 
other similar measures is prohibited and would lead to the imposition of sanctions. 
This arguably provides assurance that environmental objectives will be achieved.5 
This is in contrast to market-based instruments (MBIs), which are not compulsory in 
nature and do not prescribe mandatory objectives or standards, but rather incentivise 
‘environmentally friendly behaviour’6 and disincentivise ‘environmentally unfriendly 
behaviour’.7 For example, it would be preferable to impose a complete ban on a toxic 
substance, rather than simply discourage its use through a product tax.8  
Furthermore, command-and control instruments can be relatively simple to 
administer and monitor,9 and there are ‘a number of documented situations in which 
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regulatory standards have worked well’.10 For example, a law may prescribe that 
firms must implement a certain technology to reduce carbon emissions (command-
and-control). Alternatively, government may implement a carbon tax in respect of 
carbon emissions emitted over a certain level (a market-based approach). The latter 
would require the continuous monitoring of emissions to determine whether a firm 
has emitted above the relevant level (and if so, the tax due), while compliance with 
the former could be established by simply visiting the relevant firm to determine 
whether the technology has actually been implemented.11 While this example does 
not take into account which instrument would be more effective in reducing carbon, 
the former would arguably be preferable in certain contexts, for instance, where firms 
or countries do not have sophisticated monitoring technology or systems in place.12 
The implementation of uniform standards (regarding either pollution reduction or 
technologies) would arguably also be relatively simple to administer as they involve 
the uniform treatment of all firms or individuals. It has also been noted that industry 
tends to prefer direct regulation to incentive measures,13 inter alia because ‘firms 
may have greater influence over the specifics of uniform standards’.14  
However, it has been argued that ‘inappropriate over-reliance has traditionally 
been placed on the command-and-control approach to regulation’,15 and various 
problems have been identified with regard to these instruments. It has inter alia been 
recognised that the imposition of uniform pollution standards can be inflexible and 
lead to inefficiencies. This is because ‘the efficient pollution level will vary from case 
to case’.16 This means that while one firm might be able to comply with a pollution 
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standard relatively easily and cheaply, it might be far more difficult and expensive for 
another firm to comply with the same standard.17 If standards are applied uniformly, 
without adapting them to the specific circumstances of a firm, this can increase costs 
‘without improving environmental effectiveness’.18 On the other hand, environmental 
effectiveness could be improved, for example, by allowing a firm that must comply 
with an emissions standard (command-and-control) to buy emission credits (a 
market-based approach) from a firm that is able to reduce its pollution more easily 
and cheaply than the former. 
Furthermore, once compliance with a pollution standard has been achieved, 
there is no incentive to reduce pollution further19 or to adopt new, more efficient 
technologies.20 For example, a law may provide that sulphur dioxide emissions may 
not exceed five grams per 100 grams and prescribe a fine in the case that this 
standard is violated. Once a firm complies with this standard, there is no incentive to 
reduce emissions below five grams per 100 grams and emissions below the 
standard ‘are essentially free for the polluter’.21  
Implementation of command-and-control instruments may actually be more 
complex than originally thought due to the fact that a mature and corruption-free 
government is required for their enforcement.22 It has also been argued that 
implementation of command-and-control instruments is expensive and resource-
intensive.23 Finally, and importantly, command-and-control instruments ‘fail … to 
remedy market failure to account for the use of environmental goods and services 
such as soil, air, water, fauna, flora and broader ecosystems’.24 
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4.3   Environmental fiscal reform and market-based   
  instruments 
While command-and-control instruments are still dominant,25 there has been a move 
internationally towards ‘environmental fiscal reform’, which has been implemented in 
a number of European Union (EU) countries including Sweden, Denmark, Germany, 
the United Kingdom (the UK), Estonia and the Czech Republic.26 Environmental 
fiscal reform can be described as  
‘a range of taxation or pricing instruments that can raise revenue, while 
simultaneously furthering environmental goals. This is achieved by providing 
economic incentives to correct market failure in the management of natural 
resources and the control of pollution’.27 
Environmental fiscal reform essentially involves the implementation of 
environmentally-related fiscal instruments. A number of terms have been used, 
sometimes interchangeably, to describe such instruments including ‘economic 
instruments’, ‘market-based instruments’ and ‘economic incentives’.  
In the context of pollution, ‘market-based instruments’ have been defined as 
‘regulations that encourage behavior through market signals rather than through 
explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods’,28 and furthermore as 
‘a group of policy instruments that seek to correct environmentally-related market 
failures through the price mechanism’.29 Examples include tax benefits, direct 
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subsidies, emission charges or taxes, tradable (pollution) permits, user charges and 
product taxes.30  
This research uses the term ‘market-based instruments’ in order to emphasise 
the impact of the instruments discussed herein on the market. The term ‘market-
based instruments’ (MBIs) is used in a wide sense to include those instruments that 
are concerned with promoting environmental objectives and that are economic or 
financial in nature and have an impact on the market. The decision to use this term is 
strengthened by the recognition that climate change is the world’s greatest market 
failure.31 
It should be noted that there is a distinction between price and quantity 
instruments.32 ‘Quantity instruments’ refer to instruments for which the quantity is 
prescribed by government and the price is determined by the market, such as carbon 
trading and the trading of renewable energy certificates. On the other hand, ‘price 
instruments’ refer to instruments for which the price is determined by government 
and the quantity is determined by the market, including carbon taxes and feed-in 
tariffs.33 All of these instruments are considered in detail below. 
Despite the dominance of command-and-control instruments,34 more attention is 
being paid to MBIs as it is increasingly being recognised that they may provide an 
efficient, flexible and cheaper way to control pollution,35 when used alongside 
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command-and-control instruments.36 Furthermore, MBIs ‘achieve improved 
environmental outcomes through the market by altering the relative prices that 
individuals and firms face’.37 The role of MBIs has also increased in South Africa, as 
discussed in Chapter 7 below.  
The rationale for the implementation of MBIs is considered in more detail in the 
following section. Thereafter, this chapter inter alia considers the advantages of 
MBIs (in 4.3.2) as well as specific market-based instruments (in 4.4 and 4.5). 
 
4.3.1  Economic rationale for the introduction of MBIs 
Historically, natural resources have been exploited with no regard to the 
consequences of such exploitation, including depletion of natural resources and 
adverse impacts on the environment and human health. This situation has come 
about because the environment and environmental quality have not traditionally 
been conceived of as having any economic value.38  
In the context of energy specifically, this results in externalities, which arise when  
‘certain environmental costs of production are not reflected in the market cost of 
the commodity (in this case, energy). To the extent that the ultimate consumer of 
these products does not pay these costs, or does not compensate people for 
harm done to them, they do not face the full cost of the services they purchase 
(i.e. implicitly their energy use is being subsidised) and thus energy resources 
will not be allocated efficiently’.39  
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When resources are not allocated efficiently, this results in a market failure – 
which can be resolved by including environmental and social costs in the market 
prices of goods and services (through MBIs) so that external costs are internalised, 
which is necessary ‘for the optimal allocation of resources’.40 
With regard to renewable energy specifically, it has been noted that  
‘[w]ithout government support to stimulate technological change, market forces 
alone would result in less than optimal diffusion of renewable sources… As long 
as negative externalities of fossil fuel use are not internalized in its prices there is 
a strong case for government intervention in energy markets’.41 
 
4.3.2  Advantages of MBIs  
The advantages of MBIs that are discussed in the literature are generally discussed 
in relation to pollution control. However, these can provide lessons with regard to the 
MBIs that could be used to promote renewable energy. 
A significant advantage of MBIs, in the context of pollution, is that they provide 
more flexibility ‘by allowing polluters to allocate pollution reductions more heavily 
where they are less expensive to achieve’, which reduces the costs of compliance.42 
This is referred to as ‘static efficiency’.43 One study estimated that the use of 
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incentive-based measures in the United States of America (the USA) generated a 
saving of US$ 11 billion in 1992, compared to command-and-control measures.44 
MBIs could be used to provide more flexibility in the context of renewable energy 
specifically. For example, a government might prescribe that ten per cent of the 
energy needs of all firms must be generated from renewable energy sources 
(command-and-control), with no regard to the ability of different firms to comply with 
this requirement. However, an MBI, such as the trading of renewable energy 
certificates, would provide flexibility in complying with this requirement, as firms 
could opt to buy renewable energy certificates if this was cheaper than actually 
investing in renewable energy.  
A further benefit is that MBIs may raise revenue, which can be valuable in 
developing countries.45 It should be noted however that economic instruments 
(market-based and financial) are  
‘not “just another tax”. Indeed, in some cases they involve no taxation at all. 
Their purpose may be to change the relative prices of goods and services and 
thereby to change behaviour, not necessarily to raise revenue’.46  
While both command-and-control measures and MBIs require monitoring and 
enforcement, it has been argued that many MBIs encourage more transparency than 
command-and-control measures inter alia through trading levels and fee receipts.47 
In contrast to command-and-control instruments, MBIs incentivise pollution 
reduction beyond a uniform standard. In particular, environmentally-related taxes 
provide polluters with an ongoing incentive to reduce emissions, since ‘every unit of 
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emission that is not emitted saves money for the company’.48 This is referred to as 
‘dynamic efficiency’.49 
Four primary criteria for assessing environmental policy instruments generally 
have been identified, namely environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, 
distributional considerations and institutional feasibility.50 While these will not be 
discussed specifically here, these have been touched on above. For example, it has 
been seen that in many cases market-based instruments are more cost-effective 
than command-and-control instruments.  
It is generally agreed that MBIs should not replace command-and control 
instruments and that they should be implemented in conjunction with regulatory or 
command-and-control approaches.51 
 
4.3.3  The role of subsidies 
Subsidies generally refer to ‘all measures that keep prices for consumers below 
market level or keep prices for producers above market level or that reduce costs for 
consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support’.52  
Attention must be paid to the impacts of subsidies paid to fossil fuel industries, 
which are negative or ‘perverse’. Internationally, there are many subsidies in place 
for polluting and energy-intensive activities and subsidies for fossil fuels grew to 
US$523 billion in 2011.53 In the South African context, government provides 
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‘significant incentives for investment in energy-intensive industries … [which] are still 
an important source of employment, investment and income for the country’.54  
While (negative) subsidies are not externalities they cause economic 
inefficiency, which may manifest in several ways, including by causing increased 
energy consumption due to decreased incentives to conserve energy (because 
energy is cheaper), reducing the incentive for energy generators to decrease their 
costs by ‘cushioning them from competitive market pressures’, exhausting 
government revenue, as well as undermining the ‘development and 
commercialisation of other technologies that might ultimately become more 
economically (as well as environmentally) attractive’.55 
Furthermore, as noted above (in 3.2.2.3), subsidies lead to ‘lock-in’ situations.56 
It has also been argued that subsidies that are intended to benefit the poor actually 
benefit energy companies and wealthier households, to the detriment of the poor57 
and that they tend to extend ‘inefficiency and harmful emissions throughout the 
energy chain’.58  
There have thus been calls for such subsidies to be removed, even in the face of 
opposition from powerful interest groups and the public.59 The importance of 
removing subsidies in developing countries in particular has been noted,60 as well as 
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the fact that subsidies should be removed before considering the implementation of 
environmentally-related taxes.61              
Removing subsidies ‘would send market signals to consumers and encourage                                                                
more rational use and valuation of power resources’.62 It would also promote 
competition in the electricity industry by removing the advantage enjoyed by nuclear 
and fossil fuel industries.63 Furthermore, removing subsidies would lead to 
government revenue becoming available, which could be used to fund other 
programmes.64 It has also been shown that eliminating subsidies that promote fossil 
fuels would significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions.65 
Reforming fossil fuel subsidies would of course encounter great resistance and 
would be difficult politically. However, policymakers could introduce measures to 
overcome the resistance and to reduce any hardship such as ensuring that subsidy 
reform takes place gradually.66 
 
4.3.4  The South African context  
As noted above, the South African government has started to consider the 
introduction of market-based instruments, which was evidenced by the publication of 
the Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to 
Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa in 2006.67 Government has 
also specifically recognised that MBIs are capable of promoting renewable energy 
and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in South Africa,68 and a number of 
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MBIs that are concerned with promoting renewable energy have been introduced in 
recent years. These are discussed fully in Chapter 7. 
 
Specific market-based instruments will now be considered in more detail and 
reference will also be made to international experience with some of these 
instruments. It has been noted that more than one policy instrument is usually 
required to effectively promote investment in renewable energy.69  
 
4.4   Market-based instruments that are of relevance to  
  renewable energy  
There are a number of MBIs that could promote the uptake of renewable energy 
(whether directly or indirectly), including direct subsidies, feed-in tariffs, tradable 
renewable energy certificates, tax incentives, emissions charges and taxes and 
product taxes. This section is concerned with considering those MBIs that are 
directly relevant to the promotion of renewable energy.  
Internationally, feed-in tariffs and the renewable obligation, combined with 
tradable renewable energy certificates, have been the most widely implemented.70 
The feed-in tariff appears to be most popular in European countries while the 
renewable portfolio standard or renewable obligation is preferred in the USA and 
UK.71 For this reason both the feed-in tariff and renewable obligation will be 
described here. Due to the fact that renewables tendering has been implemented in 
South Africa, this will also be described below. Furthermore, a number of ‘secondary’ 
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or supporting MBIs, which play a less central role in countries’ strategies to promote 
renewable energy will be briefly outlined. 
 
4.4.1  Primary instruments 
 
4.4.1.1  Feed-in tariffs  
The (renewable energy) feed-in tariff (FIT) enjoys strong support globally and by 
early 2013 some form of FIT policy had been implemented in 71 countries and 28 
states or provinces.72  
Under the FIT, renewable energy generators receive a guaranteed rate for their 
electricity from government.73 Rates or tariffs are usually differentiated with reference 
to the renewable energy technology (RET) and the size of the relevant project.74 
Thus, generators would receive different rates per kilowatt hour, depending on 
whether they are producing energy from wind, solar, biomass or hydro. It is important 
that the period for which the rate is received ‘cover[s] a significant proportion of the 
working life of the installation’ and that this period is established in law.75 An 
obligation is usually imposed on grid operators (or suppliers) to buy renewable 
energy from renewable energy generators.76 In some jurisdictions, such as Spain, 
renewable energy generators are provided with the option of receiving a premium on 
top of the market price of electricity, instead of a fixed tariff.77  
There are a number of arguments for and against the FIT. Those opposed to the 
FIT argue that the FIT does not promote competition as it does not encourage 
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renewable energy generators to generate electricity at least cost due to the fixed 
prices.78 Furthermore, it is argued that the FIT encourages more government 
intervention, which is not considered to be desirable.79 In addition, the failure to set 
tariffs at appropriate levels, or to revise tariffs could lead to consumers paying 
unreasonably high prices80 and producers earning windfall profits.81 Importantly, if 
the price rather than the quantity of renewable energy is prescribed, it is not possible 
to know beforehand the amount of renewable energy that will be taken up.82 
However, with regard to concerns around competition, it has been argued that 
renewable energy generators have an interest in keeping costs low and using the 
most cost-effective components, which has pushed technology costs down.83 In 
addition, it has been shown that there was more competition among the producers of 
wind turbines under the FIT (in Germany) than under both the renewable obligation 
and renewables tendering (in the UK).84  
Furthermore, a general feature of the FIT is degression, which means that tariffs 
are decreased by a certain amount per year, on the basis that as experience is 
gained and RETs become more mature, their costs will decrease.85 As discussed 
earlier, this is due to the phenomenon known as ‘learning effects’.86 Because tariffs 
are progressively reduced, this would incentivise renewable energy developers to 
seek cheaper means of production in order to remain profitable.87 As prices are 
decreased by the relevant authority, this will lead to decreased costs for consumers. 
Furthermore, the FIT has relatively low administration and transaction costs, and 
thus does not impose high costs on society.88  
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While the FIT has ‘a reputation for being inherently “expensive”’, feed-in tariffs 
are flexible and can be applied in different ways and thus will not necessarily ‘be 
“expensive” from the point of view of ratepayers’.89  
Another advantage of the FIT is that because it provides differentiated tariffs for 
different renewable energy technologies, it encourages the development of all RETs 
(that are included in the relevant FIT programme), as opposed to simply encouraging 
investment in the cheapest technologies.90 The FIT can also promote the 
development of a local renewable energy industry, which may lead to many 
opportunities including job creation.91 
The most important advantage of the FIT is that, through providing fixed, 
guaranteed prices, it provides certainty and security to renewable energy generators, 
which is necessary to encourage investment and growth in the renewable energy 
industry.92 In this regard, it is significant that construction of wind plants in Denmark 
was brought ‘almost to a halt’ when a move to the renewable obligation (discussed in 
4.4.1.2) was announced.93  
The FIT has been implemented as the main instrument to support the promotion 
of electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in 20 of the 27 EU 
countries,94 and FITs have been responsible for 93 per cent of onshore wind 
capacity and almost all of solar PV capacity installed in Europe until the end of 
2010.95 Furthermore, feed-in tariffs are the most common type of renewable energy 
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policy implemented in developing countries, although they are often combined with 
other policies.96  
Germany is widely considered to be the largest success story with regard to the 
deployment of renewable energy through the feed-in tariff. Indeed,  
‘[d]espite modifications and improvements to the details of the policy, the 
German framework … has fostered a high level of investor certainty by framing 
its FIT policy as a central part of a long-term strategy to meet its overall 
objectives’.97  
However, the FIT has not been successful everywhere and has not led to much 
renewable energy deployment in jurisdictions such as Greece and Finland.98 The 
design of the instrument is therefore important and there are various elements that 
governments should consider, including the level of support (the tariffs) that will be 
provided as well as the duration of such support. Governments should also consider 
how often the tariffs will be reviewed or revised,99 whether tariffs will be differentiated 
within renewable energy technology categories to take account of different plant 
sizes or levels of wind or solar radiation (a ‘stepped tariff’),100 whether there will be 
tariff degression and the rate thereof,101 whether renewable energy generators 
should be required to forecast and report in advance how much electricity they will 
supply to the grid102 and whether generators will have the option of choosing 
between a fixed tariff and a premium.  
It has been noted above that a feed-in tariff for renewable energy (the REFIT) 
was introduced in South Africa in 2009.103 While it was replaced by a renewables 
tendering programme before really getting off the ground, both the REFIT and the 
                                                          
96
 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs  in Developing Countries (n89) 14. 
97
 TD Couture, K Cory, C Kreycik and E Williams A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy 
Design (for the national Renewable Energy Laboratory, US Department of Energy) 2010 available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf [accessed 24 April 2012] 11.   
98
 See D Reiche and M Bechberger ‘Policy Differences in the Promotion of Renewable Energies in the 
EU Member States’ 2004 (32) Energy Policy 843-849, 847. It has been noted that in Greece the same 
tariff was applied in respect of all RES-E projects. See P del Río ‘The Dynamic Efficiency of Feed-in 
Tariffs: The impact of different design elements’ 2012 (41) Energy Policy 139-151, 147. 
99
 Mendonça Feed-In Tariffs (n74) 92. 
100
 Ibid, 93. It has been argued that a stepped tariff increases the efficiency of the FIT policy. See 
Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n69) 5. 
101
 Mendonça Feed-In Tariffs (n74) 96. 
102
 Ibid, 101. 
103
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n86). 
109 
 
renewables tendering programme are discussed in Chapter 7. With regard to the 
viability of a FIT policy in South Africa, one study found that  
‘renewable energy policies, in particular the REFIT, aimed at substantial 
renewable energy targets can encourage GHG savings and employment without 
requiring too much additional private and public investment above the Baseline 
projection’.104  
  
4.4.1.2  Renewable obligation 
This instrument is referred to as the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in the USA 
and the renewable obligation (RO) in the UK. This research uses the term 
‘renewable obligation’. 
Under the RO, government decides how much electricity should be generated 
from renewable energy sources and imposes an obligation on generators, suppliers 
or consumers regarding a minimum amount of renewable energy105 (to be 
generated, supplied, or consumed). The obligation is usually placed on suppliers,106 
and successively higher targets are set for each compliance period. No distinction is 
traditionally made between different renewable energy technologies. The RO is 
administered by government.  
Suppliers (or generators or consumers) obtain green certificates or renewable 
energy certificates for the renewable energy supplied (or generated or consumed).107 
A renewable energy or green certificate ‘represents the “renewable” value of 
electricity produced from renewable sources’,108 and certifies that the renewable 
energy has actually been supplied (generated or consumed). The possession of 
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such certificates at the end of a compliance period demonstrates compliance with 
the target that has been imposed on a particular supplier (generator or consumer).109 
While not always the case, this instrument is often combined with the option to 
trade renewable energy or green certificates to provide ‘flexibility in achieving 
compliance’.110 When combined with the option to trade, the RO combines both 
command-and-control and market-based elements.111 Thus, a firm that is not able to 
generate or supply the required amount of electricity from renewable sources, has 
the option to buy renewable energy certificates from firms that have been able to 
comply with their obligations and that have surplus certificates.112 At some stage 
generators are required to submit their renewable energy or green certificates to 
show that they have complied with their respective obligations.113 A penalty is usually 
imposed for non-compliance.114 
In some jurisdictions, such as in the UK, a ‘buy out price’ is established. This has 
the effect of placing a ‘cap’ on the price that is paid for RES-E,115 as electricity 
generators would opt to pay the buy-out price if renewable energy is more expensive 
than this. Experience in various EU countries shows that greater compliance with the 
RO is achieved if the buy out price (or penalty) is (significantly) higher than the price 
of a certificate.116 In the UK, the revenue raised from the payment of the buy-out 
price by those who do not comply with their obligations, is ‘recycled back’ to those 
entities that do comply with their obligations,117 providing a further incentive to 
comply with the renewable obligations. 
The renewable electricity and the actual certificates are traded at different 
markets, namely the ‘physical electricity market’ and the ‘financial certificate 
market’.118 
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The RO combined with tradable renewable energy certificates has been 
implemented in the UK, a number of states in the USA, as well as in several 
European countries. There is also an international trading system that is linked to all 
tradable renewable energy certificates (TRECs) in the world – the Renewable 
Energy Certificate System (RECS).119  
This instrument is preferred by ‘free-market proponents’120 as it appears to 
feature little government involvement.121 The RO does not specify the price at which 
renewable energy must be bought, only the amount of electricity that must be 
procured from renewable sources. Generators or suppliers of electricity thus have 
the choice as to which RETs to invest in and at what price.122 The result is that 
generators and suppliers invest in technologies that are more well-established or 
mature and thus cheaper123 than less mature technologies such as solar energy.  
The emphasis on least-cost leads to prices being brought down quickly as 
renewable energy generators try to generate renewable energy as cheaply as 
possible.124 Proponents of the RO thus argue that it is cheaper and more effective 
than the feed-in tariff.125 
An important advantage of the renewable obligation is that it ‘[a]llows control 
over [the] amount of renewable capacity added’.126 In theory, it should also provide 
more certainty regarding the market share of renewable energy in the future.127 
Raising the renewable energy target can lead to long-term planning for renewable 
energy,128 and thus security for renewable energy developers. 
However, the claim of cost-effectiveness has been disputed and several 
assessments have shown that the cost of renewable energy has actually been 
cheaper under the FIT than under the RO due in part to the uncertainty and risk 
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under the RO system129 (discussed further below). It has been argued that the 
development of wind energy has been more expensive in the UK than in any other 
country in Europe.130 Furthermore, the UK has low levels of renewable energy 
generally when compared to countries that have introduced the FIT such as 
Denmark and Germany.131 This is despite the UK having ‘one of the best wind 
potentials in Europe’.132 One study has shown that onshore wind producers 
experienced high profits under the RO (in comparison to under the FIT), despite very 
low growth in wind energy.133 This suggests that the RO is more profitable for RE 
generators, which would arguably increase the costs for consumers. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the ‘opacity of [tradable green certificate] schemes helps to explain 
why they escaped from political controversy, unlike the more modest profits in the 
FIT case’.134 
Furthermore, due to the emphasis on least-cost, the RO would implicitly not 
encourage investment in RETs that are less mature, such as solar energy, as more 
expensive technologies ‘will generally not be chosen during the competitive 
process’.135 This would result in less mature RETs not enjoying the investment 
required to enable them to achieve economies of scale.136 The RO also does not 
encourage renewable energy investment beyond the target, as ‘profitability exists 
only within the quota’.137 
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Another disadvantage is that the emphasis on least-cost often leads to 
development occurring in concentrated areas, for example, where there is a high 
wind yield,138 which may result in opposition to renewable energy projects.139  
The RO does not provide price certainty to investors as the prices are 
established by the market.140 Furthermore, the UK experience has shown that when 
a RO is imposed on suppliers, suppliers are opposed to entering into long-term 
contracts with renewable energy generators, in case prices decrease in the future. 
This further undermines price security for renewable energy generators.141 The 
negotiation of contracts on an individual basis also means that generators do not 
have certainty regarding the volume of renewable energy that will be taken up in the 
future.142 
Due to the high investment risks and transaction costs, smaller investors would 
be disadvantaged in comparison to larger, more established investors.143 In addition, 
the design of the RO is much more complex than the FIT, inter alia because it 
combines electricity markets and certificate markets.144 
A report by a government-sponsored body in the United Kingdom found that the 
RO in the UK was not efficient and would not lead to the renewable energy targets 
being met.145 Indeed, in 2010 a feed-in tariff policy in respect of small-scale projects 
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was introduced in the UK.146 It has been argued that the FIT is more effective in 
developing renewable energy than the renewable obligation.147 
Some of the design issues that must be considered in implementing the RO 
include determining the minimum percentage or proportion of electricity that must be 
procured from renewable sources and determining how this will increase over 
time.148 It is also necessary to determine which RETs should be included under this 
instrument,149 who should be subject to the obligation150 and whether a ‘buy out’ or 
penalty price should be established.151 With regard to the certificates, it is important 
that they be made tradable so as to ‘establish a real market for certificates’.152 
Authorities would also need to decide whether certificates may be ‘banked’ or 
‘borrowed’.153 Other considerations relate to the organisation of the market and the 
institutions involved in this scheme.154 
The implementation of a tradable renewable energy certificate (TREC) system 
has been considered in South Africa in a study entitled ‘Tradable Renewable Energy 
Certificates: System Feasibility Study’.155 This will be considered further in Chapter 
7.  
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4.4.1.3  Renewables tendering  
Under this instrument, the relevant authority specifies an amount of electricity to be 
generated from renewable sources and generators bid for contracts to enter into 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) through a competitive bidding process.156 
Tenders may be differented according to the type of RET.157 The relevant authority 
specifies the maximum price of electricity per kilowatt hour.158 Therefore, prices are 
not fixed and are determined through the bidding process, and it is usually the most 
competitive bids (i.e. the bids providing the lowest cost per kilowatt hour) that are 
awarded contracts.159 The prices that are proposed in the winning bids are 
guaranteed for a specified period.160  
Bidding systems encourage competition between renewable energy generators 
as it is the most competitive bids (i.e. the lowest bids) that are awarded contracts. 
This provides an incentive for generators to use the most economical 
components.161 Thus, it has been argued that this system is cost effective.162 For 
instance, under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation163 wind energy prices decreased from 
12.34p/kWh in 1998 to 3.99p/kWh in 2000.164  
It is also arguable that renewables tendering ensures that the development of 
renewable energy is controlled, since tendering processes ‘are issued for finite 
blocks of power [footnote omitted] with specific, standardized conditions that define 
access and eligibility’.165 In addition, tendering can provide a timetable regarding the 
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procurement of additional electricity capacity, which can assist with future energy 
planning.166  
On the other hand, tendering processes may be very complex. Another problem 
that has arisen is that ‘unrealistically low bids’ may be submitted, which leads to 
funds being committed to projects that are not completed.167 It has been noted that in 
Europe ‘contract failure rates under competitive tenders for renewable energy 
ranged from 67%-78% … Contract failure rates are no[t] always so high, however, 
and results are highly dependent upon design’.168 
Indeed, when the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (the NERSA) 
introduced the REFIT (before this was abandoned in favour of a tendering 
programme) the NERSA noted that  
‘[t]endering systems tend to favour established businesses and can allow 
existing companies to keep potential competitors out of the market by bidding 
low on projects, regardless of whether or not the company has any intention or 
ability to actually build the renewable energy project’.169  
Furthermore, oversight will be required to oversee and confirm the outcome of 
an auction.170 Tendering can also result in ‘market concentration’ with a few (well-
established and well-funded) investors receiving most of the contracts.171 In part this 
is because the tendering process requires prospective investors to  
‘incur significant upfront costs in order to mount a bid with no assurance that 
they will obtain a contract. It is likely that this will reduce investment certainty, 
make project financing more tenuous, and limit the market to a smaller subset of 
players’.172  
This may act as a barrier to smaller projects. Thus competitive tendering may not 
be appropriate ‘in countries where the policy goals include supporting a diversity of 
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project sizes and/or attracting a broad range of capital providers to participate in the 
market’.173  
Furthermore, the RO does not provide certainty to renewable energy generators 
inter alia due to ‘intermittency of tenders’.174 In this regard it has been argued that  
‘bidding rounds can be time-consuming, costly and can create cycles of stop-
and-go. Because quotas often create on-off cycles, they do not allow for 
continuous development of the market, they discourage innovation, and they 
make it difficult to establish a strong domestic industry because investment in 
production facilities will take place only with a short-term perspective. This in turn 
limits potential job growth and economic development benefits associated with 
renewable energy’.175  
However, in order to decrease costs sustainable markets are essential and, to 
date, these have been provided most consistently by payment systems (i.e. the 
FIT).176 It can therefore be argued that while tendering provides certainty to 
policymakers, it does not provide investment security to prospective renewable 
energy generators, which is necessary for the development of a sustainable 
renewable energy industry. A number of authors have argued that renewables 
tendering has not been as successful as feed-in tariffs in promoting renewable 
energy.177 Indeed, up till the end of 2000, 20 times more renewable energy capacity 
was installed in Germany, Spain and Denmark under the FIT, than in the UK, Ireland 
and France under a tendering programme.178 
Tendering programmes were replaced in both the UK and Ireland, leaving 
France as the only EU country that makes significant use of the tendering 
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process.179 Tendering programmes have also been used in other countries including 
China, India and the USA.180 With regard to the countries that have renewables 
tendering programmes in place, it should be noted that these programmes are 
generally not broad-based programmes and usually only apply in respect of specific 
RETs, specific quantities of RES-E or specific projects. For example, Egypt recently 
introduced a bidding process in respect of a single 1000 MW wind farm.181 In 
addition, China and India use tendering programmes in conjunction with both the 
feed-in tariff and renewable obligation, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
A renewables tendering programme, the Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), was introduced in South Africa in 
2011 and is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
 
4.4.1.4  General comments 
In light of all of the above, the feed-in tariff has emerged internationally as the 
instrument that has been the most effective in driving growth in renewable energy. 
Indeed, it has been noted that  
‘[t]o date, feed-in – or pricing – systems have been responsible for most of the 
renewable electricity capacity and generation, while driving down costs through 
technology advancement and economies of scale, and developing domestic 
industries’.182  
It has been argued more strongly that  
‘[I]t is the overwhelming conclusion of the world’s leading researchers in this 
area of policy that [feed-in tariffs] – if well designed and implemented, and in 
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concert with complementary programmes – give rise to the fastest, lowest-cost 
deployment of renewable energy’.183 
As noted in Chapter 1, the first research objective was inter alia concerned with 
identifying the market-based instrument that has been most effective in promoting 
renewable energy worldwide. In light of the above, it will thus be considered in 
Chapter 8 how a feed-in tariff policy might be implemented in the South African 
context, with reference to the international examples discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.2  Secondary instruments 
The following instruments (in 4.4.2.1 to 4.4.2.4) are ‘secondary’ in nature and would 
not constitute a country’s primary support instrument for renewable energy, but 
would rather accompany primary instruments, such as those that have been 
discussed above. A brief overview of a few secondary instruments follows below. 
 
4.4.2.1  Energy levy 
This involves the imposition of a levy on all energy that is not generated from 
renewable sources. The levy would ultimately be paid for by consumers. Such a levy 
has been implemented in South Africa and is discussed further in Chapter 7.  
 
4.4.2.2  Subsidies for renewable energy 
Under this instrument, government offers financial subsidies to firms to assist them in 
starting up renewable energy projects. Support may be provided as a certain amount 
per kilowatt hour generated or as a certain percentage of the total start up costs.184 
Subsidies for renewable energy are in contrast to the ‘perverse’ incentives provided 
to fossil fuel industries, discussed in 4.3.3 above. 
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In South Africa, subsidies are provided by the Renewable Energy Finance and 
Subsidy Office (REFSO), which is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
4.4.2.3  Net metering 
Under this instrument people who have installed renewable energy generation 
systems at their home or work, may feed their excess energy to the grid, for which 
they are paid wholesale prices by the utility.185 The overall consumption of electricity 
by such consumers is measured by a ‘bi-directional meter or a pair of unidirectional 
meters spinning in opposite directions’.186 If generation is greater than consumption, 
the meter spins backwards,187 thereby indicating the compensation due to the 
relevant consumer. However, if generation does not exceed consumption, then no 
compensation would be due to the relevant consumer.  
Net metering has been implemented in a number of countries, including Japan, 
Thailand, Canada and several states in the USA.188 This instrument has been 
recommended for implementation in South Africa.189  
 
4.4.2.4  Subsidies for solar water heaters 
Under this instrument, government provides subsidies for the installation of solar 
water heaters. A subsidy programme for solar water heaters was introduced in South 
Africa in 2008 and is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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4.5   Market-based instruments of relevance to carbon  
  pricing: Carbon taxing and trading 
The aim of carbon taxing and trading is to internalise the negative impacts arising 
from climate change by ‘[p]utting a price on carbon’.190 A general difference between 
carbon taxation and carbon trading is that a carbon tax is a ‘price instrument’ (i.e. the 
price is established) while carbon trading is a ‘quantity instrument’ (i.e. the quantity of 
allowed emissions is established).191 The decision to implement carbon taxation or 
trading will depend inter alia on a country’s particular circumstances.192  
As noted above, carbon taxation and carbon trading are not directly concerned 
with promoting renewable energy, since they are concerned primarily with reducing 
carbon emissions. However, over 90 per cent of South Africa’s electricity is 
generated from coal, which is heavily carbon-intensive. Thus, an instrument that 
discourages generation of electricity from coal would theoretically result in a shift 
away from coal to less carbon-intensive energy sources, including renewable 
energy. Indeed, the South African government considers that a carbon tax, in 
addition to reducing emissions, would encourage a shift away from coal-generated 
energy, inter alia to renewable energy.193  
There is therefore some degree of overlap between MBIs that promote 
renewable energy directly and carbon pricing, since both would encourage an 
increase in the uptake of renewable energy, which would necessarily lead to a 
decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. However, in light of the focus of this 
research, namely the promotion of renewable energy, carbon pricing is treated here 
as being of indirect relevance to promoting renewable energy. 
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The South African government plans to implement a carbon tax in 2015,194 which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Government has also considered the introduction 
of carbon trading and has announced that it will publish a discussion paper on 
emissions trading.  
Carbon taxation generally is discussed in 4.5.1 and carbon trading is discussed 
thereafter in 4.5.2. 
 
4.5.1  Carbon taxation195 
4.5.1.1 The economic rationale 
The idea of environmental taxation generally is usually attributed to A.C. Pigou196 
who, in short, argued that where one person provides a service that results in 
‘incidental uncharged disservices’ to another person and ‘technical considerations’ 
make it such that it is not possible to pay compensation to the injured party,197 that 
the person should be held responsible for these ‘incidental uncharged 
disservices’.198 This can be achieved through the imposition of ‘extraordinary 
restraints’ or taxes by government,199 which should result in the situation where the 
‘tax-inclusive price faced by the consumer is then equal to the marginal social cost of 
the product’.200    
However, ‘ideal Pigouvian taxes are seldom seen in practice’ due to the difficulty 
in determining the appropriate tax rate (which arises from a lack of information),201 
and tax rates are usually set below the costs of the pollution to society.202 
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While a number of authors deal with environmental taxation generally,203 the 
concern here is with carbon taxation specifically, which is now considered. 
 
4.5.1.2 Implementing a carbon tax  
 A carbon tax internalises the external costs of electricity production and 
generation,204 thus making electricity generated from carbon-intensive fossil fuels 
more expensive. A carbon tax is usually expressed as a price per ton of ton carbon 
dioxide (Rx/tCO2). 
A concern regarding environmentally-related taxes generally is that they ‘are not 
the most effective way for governments to raise revenue, nor are they necessarily 
the best approach to protecting the environment’.205 This is because while an 
environmental or carbon tax discourages polluting activities by putting a price on 
such activities, the activities and their associated emissions are not prohibited and 
thus emission reductions are not guaranteed.206 Polluters could simply opt to pay the 
carbon tax rather than change their behaviour. Concerns have also been raised 
regarding the impacts of a carbon tax on the poor and on industrial competitiveness, 
which are discussed further below. 
On the other hand, an important advantage of a carbon tax is that it provides an 
efficient and least-cost way to reduce emissions.207 Efficiency results in part because 
a carbon tax provides flexibility to firms regarding when emissions will be reduced, 
and so firms can choose to implement emissions reductions at a time when it is most 
suitable (and cheapest).208 
In addition, as the price of a carbon tax is fixed, it provides certainty to those 
subject to the tax209 and allows taxpayers to plan ahead and adapt their behaviour. 
This stability is important for firms wishing to make ‘long-term investment 
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decisions’.210 Carbon taxation also results in revenue that ‘is likely to be more 
predictable and stable and hence can allow for better planning (by government) of 
revenue recycling or tax-shifting programmes’211 (discussed further below).  
A carbon tax can also be easily linked to an existing tax administration 
system,212  which would reduce complexity, which is arguably important in the South 
African context. Furthermore, revenue raised from environmental taxes replaces the 
revenue raised from more distortionary means or taxes, which adds to their 
‘efficiency value’.213 While both carbon taxes and carbon trading are capable of 
raising revenue, experience shows that the revenue generated through carbon 
taxation is likely to be substantial.214 
A carbon tax could be an important tool to promote renewable energy, as ‘a tax 
[set] at an appropriate level and phased in over time to the “correct level” will provide 
a strong price signal to both producers and consumers to change their behaviour 
over the medium to long term’.215 Furthermore, establishing a ‘meaningful carbon 
price, through internalising environmental and social costs would help to create ‘a 
level playing field between renewable and conventional energy options’.216 Imposing 
a carbon tax in South Africa could provide a way to simultaneously reduce emissions 
and raise revenue.217 
There are various issues that must be considered in implementing a carbon tax, 
namely the tax base, the tax level, who is subject to the tax and the use of the 
revenue.218 These are outlined briefly. 
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a)  Tax base 
It is preferable that environmental taxes, including a carbon tax, are ‘directly linked to 
the source of the pollution’.219 This would require that carbon dioxide that is emitted 
from factories etc. is monitored and taxed directly. This is the most effective and 
efficient way to encourage a decrease in carbon emissions as it is the most 
‘precisely targeted’.220 However, monitoring of emissions can be difficult and 
expensive, especially in developing countries.  
The next best option is to ‘tax an input or other activity that is associated with the 
polluting activity’.221 Therefore, the tax could be imposed (indirectly) on the coal used 
to generate electricity or on the actual electricity generated from the polluting activity. 
The former approach, i.e. taxing the input, has been recommended for developing 
countries and is considered to be more targeted than the latter.222 
 
b)  Tax level 
The carbon tax should be set at the correct level to ensure that external costs are 
internalised into the cost of electricity generation.223 Ideally, the cost of reducing 
pollution should be less than the tax itself in order to provide an incentive to reduce 
pollution.224 However, determining these costs may be difficult, practically and 
politically.225 A number of studies have been carried out to establish the price of 
carbon dioxide. The estimates in these studies vary substantially from below US$10 
to over US$300.226  
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c)  Who is subject to the tax 
Government must decide who the tax will be imposed on. Concerns have arisen 
regarding the impacts of a carbon tax on the poor and on energy-intensive 
industries. These concerns may be alleviated by providing exemptions to the poor 
and to energy-intensive firms, or these groups could pay a reduced tax. These 
concerns are considered further below and in Chapter 8. 
 
d)  Use of the revenue 
There is no consensus on how the revenue raised from a carbon tax should be used 
and this aspect would depend on the priorities of the relevant government. The 
revenue raised from a carbon tax could be directed to the general fiscus or 
environmentally-related programmes,227 or more specifically to investments in 
renewable energy or energy efficiency. It has also been suggested that government 
could reduce other taxes such as value-added tax (VAT) or taxes on food,228 in order 
to address concerns regarding the impacts of a carbon tax on the poor. Another 
option is to pay compensation to the poor,229 or to decrease the social security 
contributions paid by employers (which would lower labour costs).230 It is widely 
agreed that ‘revenue recycling can significantly lower the costs of a carbon tax’.231  
With regard to energy-intensive industries in South Africa, government could 
implement measures such as exempting certain sectors temporarily or reducing tax 
rates.232 However, it would be problematic if the most energy-intensive entities (like 
Eskom and Sasol) receive respite from such a tax, as this would arguably reduce its 
effectiveness. It is thus important that measures implemented to reduce threats to 
competitiveness do not undermine the effectiveness of this MBI. 
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e)  Revenue neutrality and double or triple dividends 
The above touches on the importance of ‘revenue neutrality’. While it is not possible 
to discuss this fully, revenue neutrality refers to the principle that the overall tax 
burden should not be increased, which is important with regard to the acceptability of 
environmental taxes.233 Therefore, if government introduces or increases one tax 
(i.e. a carbon tax), other taxes (such as taxes on foodstuffs or labour) should be 
decreased.234 This has been demonstrated internationally and a number of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have 
implemented ‘fiscally neutral environmental tax reforms’.235  
It has been found that by reducing taxes on ‘goods’ (such as labour) and 
increasing taxes on ‘bads’ (such as pollution or carbon) a so-called ‘double dividend’ 
may be achieved.236 This may result because a tax on carbon should lead to a 
reduction in carbon dioxide, thus reducing pollution, which is a ‘welfare gain’. If the 
revenue generated from the carbon tax is used to reduce other taxes (such as taxes 
on labour) a second gain is possible as reducing other taxes will reduce welfare 
losses.237 
One South African study found that the imposition of four types of environmental 
taxes (all concerned with reducing carbon emissions), including a direct tax on 
carbon emissions, yielded a ‘triple dividend’ (if they were ‘recycled’ by being 
combined with reduced food prices), namely by: reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, increasing gross domestic product (GDP) and alleviating poverty 
(‘because poor consumers’ consumption basket mostly consists of food’).238 
While a carbon tax may not be appropriate in developing countries that have low 
or non-existent income taxes, South Africa, with its relatively high level of income 
tax, is specifically considered to be an exception to this principle.239   
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A carbon tax is being considered for implementation in South Africa, and the 
National Treasury has most recently released the Carbon Tax Policy Paper,240 which 
is discussed in Chapter 7. It should be noted that the National Treasury considers a 
carbon tax to be preferable to emissions trading for various reasons including that it 
provides for greater oversight by revenue authorities and that its costs and 
administrative burden are lower.241  
Carbon trading is now briefly considered. 
 
4.5.2  Carbon trading 
Under a carbon trading scheme, the government establishes a limit or cap on 
emissions and then allocates the cap as allowances or permits amongst emitters, 
who are required to ‘hold allowances equal to their emissions’ at the end of a defined 
period, either by mitigating their emissions or trading allowances.242 A permit would 
represent a certain quantity, for example, one permit would represent one ton of 
carbon dioxide.  
Allowances may be allocated through auctioning by the relevant authority,243 or 
through grandfathering, in terms of which allowances are given away to existing 
firms.244 The amount of allowances allocated (grandfathered) is based on the 
historical emissions of existing firms.245 In practice, grandfathering is generally 
preferred by existing firms as it ‘may reduce the rate of entry of new firms and slow 
technological change’.246 
Carbon trading combines elements of the command-and-control and market-
based approaches through its setting of an emissions limit and its use of the market 
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respectively.247 This instrument creates scarcity by allocating ‘fewer allowances than 
emissions’, which forces emitters to either reduce their emissions in accordance with 
their allocations or to buy additional allowances to offset their excess emissions.248 
Such a system will only be effective if a sanction is imposed if emission limits are 
exceeded and the required permits have not been obtained.249  
Internationally a number of emission trading schemes have been established. 
Trading schemes regulating carbon dioxide have been implemented in the EU (the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme or EU ETS),250 Australia (New South 
Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme) and the USA (Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative). 
An advantage of carbon trading is that it allows government to specify the carbon 
reduction target251 and thus provides more certainty with regard to the emission 
reductions that will actually be achieved. 252 
However, this may come at a potentially considerable price,253 which is not 
certain,254 as this is determined by the market. Price volatility reduces certainty for 
those involved in the scheme and does not encourage decisions regarding long-term 
investment.255 Furthermore, whether the carbon reduction target will actually be 
achieved depends on the coverage of the scheme,256 as emissions trading schemes 
do not cover all of a country’s emissions. In practice, carbon trading has not been as 
effective as carbon taxation in reducing emissions. It has been argued that this is 
due to the ‘high levels of uncertainty and incomplete information’.257  
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A carbon trading system is more complex than a carbon tax as governments 
would need to create new institutions258 as well as entirely new processes, as 
opposed to simply relying on existing tax instruments259 and extensive data are 
required for the effective implementation of such a system.260 In the South African 
context, it has been suggested that ‘emissions trading may just be too sophisticated 
for a developing country with an existing skills deficit and major gaps in available 
emissions data from industry’.261  
Furthermore, carbon trading systems may lack transparency due to hidden 
pricing and costs.262 Criticism may also be levelled against emissions trading as, 
morally, the impression is created that pollution is acceptable, provided that one has 
paid for the right to pollute.263 
Nevertheless, carbon trading appears to be preferred to carbon taxation in 
developed countries for various reasons, including that trading systems prevent the 
entry of new players to the market, which protects the position of existing firms,264 
and due to political pressure and lobbying by those in favour of carbon trading.265 
There are various design issues that need to be addressed, including where the 
emissions should be regulated. It is possible to regulate emissions either ‘upstream’, 
‘downstream’ or on products. Usually emissions are targeted downstream, which 
would involve targeting the emissions, inter alia, of electricity generators.266 Further 
issues relate to establishing a clear regulatory framework, establishing an overall 
emissions cap and the process for allocating emission quotas, timing issues such as 
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determining the duration of the trading system, and establishing accurate methods to 
measure emissions.267  
As noted above, the South African government is considering the 
implementation of a carbon trading system. However, the National Treasury has 
stated that ‘[c]reating the necessary market conditions for open trade will be difficult 
in South Africa because many industries are still largely oligopolistic and dominated 
by a small number of large firms’.268 As also noted above, the South African 
government currently considers a carbon tax to be preferable to emissions trading.269 
 
4.6  Concluding remarks 
This chapter has discussed the difference between traditional command-and-control 
instruments and MBIs, as well as the reasons for the increasing prominence of MBIs. 
It has considered specific MBIs that could be used to promote renewable energy in 
order to ascertain the relative advantages and disadvantages of each of the 
instruments considered.  
A significant principle that has emerged is the importance of providing certainty 
and stability, which consequently reduces the risk for prospective renewable energy 
investors. Indeed, it has been argued that the most important factor for renewable 
energy developers is the stability provided by the relevant instrument 
implemented,270 and it has been seen that the feed-in tariff is considered to provide 
the most stability.271 It is also considered to be the most effective instrument in 
promoting renewable energy to date. It was noted that a FIT could be viable in the 
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South African context.272 Thus, Chapter 8 considers the implementation of a feed-in 
tariff policy in South Africa with reference to the international examples discussed in 
the next chapter. 
While the MBIs discussed above have been considered separately, various 
authors have pointed to the possibility of combining instruments, or at least 
combining the positive aspects of different instruments273 and the possibility is noted 
that different situations may call for different policy instruments.274  This research 
does not specifically consider how different MBIs might be combined, but does not 
rule out this possibility. 
Chapter 5 now considers the implementation of the feed-in tariff internationally. 
Thereafter, Chapter 6 considers South Africa’s policy documents and legislation that 
are relevant to renewable energy. Chapter 7 outlines the MBIs that have been 
implemented in South Africa.  
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The implementation of the feed-in tariff 
internationally 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Amongst other things, this chapter is concerned with identifying the elements of an 
effective feed-in tariff policy. It has been acknowledged above that Germany’s feed-
in tariff (FIT) is considered to have been the most successful in promoting renewable 
energy worldwide. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is on Germany’s FIT, which is 
considered as a best practice example. Thereafter, this chapter outlines the FIT 
policy that has been implemented in Spain, which is considered to have been the 
most effective after Germany in promoting renewable energy through the FIT.1 The 
FIT policy of Spain is outlined in order to highlight the different ways in which feed-in 
tariffs can be implemented. The chapter goes on to briefly consider how the lessons 
learned from these two countries might be relevant to South Africa. It also outlines 
the FIT policies of two developing countries – China and India. The examples of 
India and China are described briefly to highlight the endeavours of other developing 
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5.2     Germany 
 
5.2.1  Introduction2 
In 2012 Germany’s total primary energy supply consisted of 87.4 per cent of non-
renewable sources including oil, coal, natural gas and nuclear and 12.6 per cent of 
renewable energy.3  Germany is ranked first in the world in terms of renewable 
energy capacity on a per capita basis (excluding hydro power), followed by Sweden, 
Spain, Italy and Canada respectively.4 
As a member of the European Union (EU), Germany has obligations with regard 
to the promotion of electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E), 
and by 2010 was required to achieve the penetration of 12.5 per cent of RES-E.5 
Germany exceeded its 2010 target, and by 2008 had already implemented 15.4 per 
cent of RES-E.6 Germany is also required, in terms of its EU obligations, to increase 
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the contribution of renewable energy to total energy supply to 18 per cent by 2020.7 
By 2012, Germany had implemented 12.6 per cent of renewable energy.8  
Although Germany’s electricity supply is dominated by non-renewable sources, 
the contribution of renewable sources has been increasing steadily from 3.1 per cent 
in 1990, to 6.4 per cent in 2000 and to 22.9 per cent in 2012.9 While wind energy is 
dominant, other renewable energy technologies (RETs) make an important 
contribution to the overall supply of RES-E, which is reflected in Figure 5.1 
  
Figure 5.1 RES-E in Germany10 
 
The contribution of solar photovoltaic (PV) has increased rapidly, from only 64 
gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2000 to 28 000 GWh by the end of 2012.11 While Germany 
cannot be considered to be rich in solar resources, it is ranked first in the world in 
terms of PV capacity and by the end of 2012 had 32 per cent of the world’s installed 
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PV capacity.12 This is in part due to the generous tariffs that are offered for solar PV, 
which are discussed further below.13  
While other instruments and policies relevant to renewable energy have been 
introduced in Germany, the feed-in tariff is considered to have been the most 
significant in promoting RES-E.14  
The Act on Renewable Electricity Fed into the Grid was introduced in 1991, and 
is discussed in 5.2.3. For various reasons (discussed in 5.2.3) this Act was replaced 
by the Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2000, which is set out in 5.2.4. First, 
institutional and operational aspects are briefly outlined. 
 
5.2.2  Institutional and operational aspects  
The Renewable Energy Sources Act15 is administered by the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). Other relevant actors 
include the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), the German 
parliament,16 the Federal Environmental Agency and the German Energy Agency.17 
In terms of electricity generation and transmission, generators of RES-E are 
connected to the distribution network operators (DNOs) (which are referred to in the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act as grid system operators), and tariffs are paid to 
RES-E generators by the DNO to whose grid the RES-E plant is physically 
connected. The German transmission grid is divided into four regions, which are run 
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by different operators,18 referred to as transmission systems operators (TSOs). 
DNOs are connected to the TSOs and the DNOs transfer electricity to the respective 
TSOs at the fixed price. The TSOs are responsible for transforming ‘the load 
fluctuating profiles to a standard load profile [which] …are sold to all utilities that 
deliver electricity to final consumers. The utilities charge the average tariff to their 
customers’.19 Large wind parks sometimes connect and sell directly to the TSO.20 
 
5.2.3  Act on Renewable Electricity Fed into the Grid  
The Act on Renewable Electricity Fed into the Grid (Stromeinspeisegesetz or 
StrEG)21 came into effect in 1991 and applied in respect of hydropower, wind energy, 
solar energy, landfill gas, sewage gas and biomass.22 Utilities larger than 5 
megawatts (MW) were excluded.23 The StrEG obliged electricity utilities (grid 
operators) to pay renewable energy generators in ‘their supply area’ for RES-E fed 
into the grid.24  
Grid operators were required to pay renewable energy generators a fixed rate, 
which was calculated as a percentage of the retail price for electricity and, which 
ranged from 65-90 per cent of the average electricity retail prices paid by final 
customers.25 This was a premium that was added to the market price of electricity.26 
The tariff was set at 80 per cent for small hydro, sewage gas, landfill gas and 
biomass of less than 500 kilowatts (kW) and 65 per cent for installations of 500kW-
                                                          
18
 O Langniβ, J Diekmann and U Lehr ‘Advanced Mechanisms for the Promotion of Renewable 
Energy – Models for the Future Evolution of the German Renewable Energy Act’ 2009 (37) Energy 
Policy 1289-1297, 1290. 
19
 C Klessmann, C Nabe and K Burges ‘Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market 
Risks – A comparison of the market integration approaches in Germany, Spain and the UK’ 2008 (36) 




 Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (BGBI. I S. 2663) (Act on Renewable Energy Fed into the Grid) Unofficial 
translation available at http://wind-works.org/FeedLaws/Germany/ARTsDE.html [accessed 9 May 
2012] (the StrEG). 
22
 Ibid, Section 1. 
23
 Laird and Stefes ‘The Diverging Paths of Germany and US Policies for Renewable Energy (n16) 
2622. 
24
 StrEG (n21) Section 2. 
25
 Lipp ‘Lessons for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy’ (n2) 5488.  
26
 C Mitchell, D Bauknecht and PM Connor ‘Effectiveness through Risk Reduction: A comparison of 
the renewable obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany’ 2006 (34) Energy 
Policy 297-305, 298. 
138 
 
5MW. The tariff was set at 90 per cent for wind and solar energy.27 The intention was 
to ‘create a level playing field between [RES-E] and conventional electricity 
generation’.28  
Between 1990 and 2000, wind energy increased from 68 MW to more than 6000 
MW.29 However, other types of renewable energy, such as solar energy, did not fare 
as well. This is because the rates included under the StrEG were not sufficient to 
promote large-scale investment in other renewable energy sources especially 
biomass and PV.30 Furthermore, the StrEG did not provide security regarding the 
duration of contracts,31 as there was no obligation regarding the length of time for 
which the tariffs had to be paid. 
Even though the costs of renewable energy decreased after the StrEG was 
adopted, the premium tariffs were not reduced correspondingly.32 Opposition to the 
StrEG increased further when the amount of renewable energy increased in certain 
areas (and led to increasing costs for grid operators, and thus, consumers) but costs 
were not distributed evenly across the country.33  
This led to a ‘hardship clause’ being introduced, which served to exempt ‘utilities 
from their purchase obligation if it would put an undue economic, technical or legal 
burden on them’.34 This clause was ‘redefined’ in 1998,35 to provide that grid 
operators were only required to purchase renewable energy amounting to not more 
than five per cent of the total amount of electricity that they sold in one year.36 Once 
this five per cent limit was reached, an ‘upstream system operator’ was obliged to 
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compensate the relevant grid operator for the additional costs incurred due to the 
five per cent limit being exceeded,37 until the upstream operator had also reached its 
five percent threshold.38 Thereafter, the grid operator was no longer obliged to 
purchase renewable energy.39  
This hardship clause was introduced in order to reduce the burden on grid 
operators in windy regions. However, it has been argued that this led to inefficiency, 
as it led to less windy locations being preferred over windier locations if the threshold 
had not yet been reached in the less windy locations.40 
Because the tariff was linked to the price of electricity, when electricity prices 
decreased, this led to renewable energy generators losing revenue.41 Even though 
electricity generated from renewable sources increased from 17 086 GWh in 1990 to 
37 218 GWh in 2000,42 in light of the problems identified above, the StrEG was 
replaced in 2000 by the Renewable Energy Sources Act in order to streamline the 
promotion of RES-E. 
 
5.2.4  Renewable Energy Sources Act  
 
5.2.4.1  Overview 
The Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz or EEG),43 
came into effect in 2000. The EEG was significant in that it ‘dramatically increased 
the importance of other renewable energy sources’.44  
The EEG has been amended several times since its introduction, with the 
amendments coming into effect in 2004, 2009 and in 2012.45 Due to the excessive 
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uptake of solar PV the EEG was amended again in 2012 by the ‘Act to Amend the 
Legal Framework for Electricity Generated from Solar Radiation and other 
Amendments to the Law on Renewable Energy Sources’,46 which was agreed to at 
the end of June 2012 but was applicable from 1 April 2012.47 
With each amendment, a new Act has been produced, and the EEG has evolved 
from a relatively basic Act of only 12 sections to a far more nuanced Act of 66 
sections in its current form. The approach taken here is to discuss the latest version 
of the Act, but to also highlight amendments or developments where these are 
considered significant or for illustrative purposes.   
  
5.2.4.2  Objective and scope of application 
The EEG is intended to  
‘facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the sake 
of protecting our climate and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy 
supply to the national economy, also by incorporating external long-term 
effects, to conserve fossil fuels and to promote the further development of 
technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources’.48 
The Act applies to:  
- priority connection to the grid ‘for general electricity supply of 
installations generating electricity from renewable energy sources and 
from mine gas’ within Germany and its exclusive economic zone;49  
- ‘the priority purchase, transmission, distribution of and payment for 
such electricity by the grid system operations’ as well as electricity 
generated from combined heat and power;50 as well as  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
45
 The original EEG Act is referred to as ‘Original EEG’. The amendments that came into effect in 
2004, 2009 and 2012 are referred to herein as the ‘EEG of 2004’, the ‘EEG of 2009’ and the ‘EEG of 
1 January 2012’ respectively.  
46
 Gesetz zur Änderung des Rechtsrahmens für Strom aus solarer Strahlungsenergie und weiteren 
Änderungen in Recht der erneuerbaren Energien. This Act (in German) is available at http://www.eeg-
kwk.net/de/file/BGBl_1754_120823.pdf [accessed 14 November 2013]. 
47
 The latest amendment of the EEG is referred to as the ‘EEG as amended’, ‘EEG of 1 April 2012’, 
‘the current version of the EEG’, or simply ‘the EEG’. EEG of 1 April 2012, Preamble. 
48
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 1(1). 
49
 Ibid, section 2(1). 
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- the ‘nationwide equalisation scheme’,51 dealt with in 5.2.4.10.  
While previous versions of the EEG excluded from their application installations 
that were part-owned by the German government,52 the current version of the EEG 
does not appear to contain similar provisions. Presumably then, government-owned 
installations would also qualify for tariffs under the EEG.   
 
5.2.4.3  Definitions  
The EEG defines ‘renewable energy sources’ as  
‘hydropower, including wave power, tidal power, salt gradient and flow energy, 
wind energy, solar radiation, geothermal energy, energy from biomass, including 
biogas, biomethane, landfill gas and sewage treatment gas, as well as the 
biodegradable fraction of municipal waste and industrial waste’.53  
An ‘installation’ refers to ‘any facility generating electricity from renewable energy 
sources or from mine gas…’.54  
An ‘installation operator’ refers to ‘anyone, irrespective of the issue of ownership, 
who uses the installation to generate electricity from renewable energy sources or 
from mine gas’55 (i.e. the renewable energy generator).  
‘Grid system operators’ are defined as ‘the operators of grid systems of all 
voltages for general electricity supply’.56  
‘Transmission system operators’ refer to ‘the system balancing grid operators of 
high-voltage and extra-high voltage grid systems which are used for the 
supraregional transmission of electricity to downstream grid systems’.57 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
50
 Ibid, section 2(2). 
51
 Ibid, section 2(3). 
52
 See for example Gesetz fur den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
BGBI. I S. 2074) (Renewable Energy Sources Act) (EEG of 2009) Section 66(3). 
53
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 3(3). 
54
 Ibid, section 3(1). While not defined in the Act, mine gas refers to gas that is released during the 
mining process and consists primarily of methane.  
55
 Ibid, section 3(2). 
56
 Ibid, section 3(8). 
57




5.2.4.4  Targets 
One of the objectives of the original EEG was to  
‘achieve a substantial increase in the percentage contribution made by 
renewable energy sources to power supply in order at least to double the share 
of renewable energy sources in total energy consumption by the year 2010’.58  
The EEG of 2004 introduced the specific target of increasing the percentage of 
electricity generated from renewable sources to at least 12.5 per cent by 2010 and to 
at least 20 per cent by 2020.59 The 2010 target was in accordance with Germany’s 
EU obligation with regard to the promotion of RES-E.60 This target was increased in 
the EEG of 2009 to at least 30 per cent by 2020 ‘and to continuously increase … 
thereafter’.61  
The level of ambition was increased further in the EEG of 1 January 2012, which 
put in place successive targets to achieve the Act’s purpose, namely by ‘increas[ing] 
the share of renewable energy sources in [the] electricity supply to at least: 
1. 35 percent by no later than 2020; 
2.  50 percent by no later than 2030; 
3. 65 percent by no later than 2040; and 
4. 80 percent by no later than 2050’.62  
These targets have been retained in the current version of the EEG. Achieving 
the goal (for 2020) is intended to result in renewable energy sources accounting for 
18 per cent of total energy consumption by 2020.63 As noted above, this is in 
                                                          
58
 Original EEG (n30) section 1.  
59
 Gesetz fur den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, BGBI. I S. 1918) 
(Renewable Energy Sources Act) (EEG of 2004) Article 1(2). 
60
 In terms of EU ‘Directive 2001/77/EC’ (n5). As noted above Germany exceeded this target, and by 
2008 had already implemented 15.4 per cent of RES-E. BMU Renewable Energy Sources in Figures 
(n6) 67. 
61
 EEG of 2009 (n52) Section 1(2). 
62
 Gesetz fur den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, BGBI. I S. 1634) 
(Renewable Energy Sources Act) (EEG of 1 January 2012) section 1(2). 
63
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 1(3). 
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accordance with Germany’s EU obligation with regard to promoting the overall share 
of renewable energy.64 
 
5.2.4.5  Obligations relating to connection, purchase and upgrading 
In the first place, an obligation is imposed on grid system operators to  
‘immediately and as a priority connect installations generating electricity from 
renewable energy sources and from mine gas to that point in their grid system 
(grid connection point) which is suitable in terms of the voltage and which is at 
the shortest linear distance from the location of the installation if no other grid 
system has a technically and economically more favourable grid connection 
point’65 (own emphasis).  
The EEG makes provision for the expeditious connection of installation operators 
to grid systems and obliges grid system operators to inter alia provide those wishing 
to feed electricity into the grid with a timetable regarding the procedural steps 
involved, as well as the information that must be submitted and an estimation of the 
costs involved.66  
Grid system operators are furthermore obliged to ‘immediately and as a priority 
purchase, transmit and distribute the entire available quantity of electricity from 
renewable energy sources and from mine gas’67 (own emphasis). Installation 
operators and grid system operators may agree, in certain circumstances, to deviate 
from this obligation of priority purchase.68 
Grid system operators are also obliged, upon request from those wishing to feed 
electricity into the grid, to  
‘immediately optimise, strengthen and expand their grid systems in accordance 
with the best available technology in order to guarantee the purchase, 
                                                          
64
 In terms of EU ‘Directive 2009/28/EC’ (n7). 
65
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 5(1). 
66
 Ibid, section 5(5) and (6). 
67
 Ibid, section 8(1). 
68
 Ibid, section 8(3a). 
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transmission and distribution of the electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources or from mine gas’69 (own emphasis).  
This is essentially an obligation imposed on grid system operators to upgrade 
their grids. This obligation may also apply where the installation is not directly 
connected to the relevant grid system provided certain conditions are met.70 Those 
wishing to feed electricity into the grid may demand compensation if grid system 
operators violate the obligation to ‘immediately optimise, strengthen and expand their 
grid systems’.71 However, the grid system operator is not obliged to upgrade the grid 
system if this is ‘economically unreasonable’.72  
Installation operators who claim payment of the relevant tariffs are required to 
make the entire amount of electricity generated from that installation available to the 
grid operator.73 Grid system operators are prohibited from making the performance 
of their obligations under the EEG ‘conditional upon the conclusion of a contract’.74  
Importantly, the EEG does not impose an overall capacity limit.75 The EEG 
prohibits electricity generated from renewable energy sources, mine gas, landfill gas 
or sewage treatment gas from being sold more than once.76 
 
5.2.4.6  Obligation on renewable energy generators to install 
 facilities to reduce output 
The EEG of 2009 introduced an obligation on installation operators to provide a 
facility that can ‘reduce output by remote means in the event of grid overload’77 in 
certain circumstances, which is maintained in the current version of the EEG.78  
                                                          
69




 Ibid, section 10(1) read with section 9(1). 
72
 Ibid, section 9(3). 
73
 Ibid, section 16(3). 
74
 Ibid, section 4(1). 
75
 Mitchell et al ‘Effectiveness Through Risk Reduction’ (n26) 298. It should be noted however, that 
due to the increasing costs arising due to the EEG and the consequent public resistance, capacity 
caps have recently been introduced in respect of solar PV. This is discussed in 5.2.4.8 below. 
76
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 56(1).  
77
 EEG of 2009 (n52) Section 6(1). 
78
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 6. 
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Installation operators and operators of combined heat and power (CHP) are 
required to install technical facilities if their installations have an installed capacity of 
more than 100 kilowatts, to ensure that at any time the grid system operator can 
‘reduce output by remote means in the event of grid overload’ and ‘call up the current 
electricity feed-in at any given point in time’.79 The same obligation is imposed on 
operators of solar radiation installations in respect of installations that have an 
installed capacity of between 30kW and 100kW.80 Contravention of these provisions 
may result in the forfeit of payment for as long as the contravention continues.81  
Grid system operators are empowered to ‘assume technical control over 
installations’ and CHP installations connected to their grid system, in order to reduce 
output where a grid overload arises, provided certain conditions are present, 
including where ‘a grid bottleneck would otherwise arise in the respective grid 
system area’.82  
This provision was previously problematic and it led to some renewable energy 
generators losing revenue.83 However, this has been rectified and the EEG now 
includes a ‘hardship clause’, which provides for the compensation of operators who 
are affected by this measure.84 
 
5.2.4.7  Costs of connection and upgrading 
Installation operators are responsible for the costs associated with connecting their 
installations and metering devices to the relevant grid connection point;85 and grid 
system operators are responsible for the costs of ‘optimising, strengthening and 
expanding the grid system’.86  
                                                          
79
 Ibid, section 6(1). 
80
 Ibid, section 6(2). 
81
 Ibid, section 6(6) read with section 17(1). 
82
 Ibid, section 11(1)1. 
83
  Klessmann et al ‘Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks’ (n19) 3651. 
84
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 12(1). This hardship clause was introduced by the EEG of 1 
January 2012 (n62). 
85
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 13(1). 
86
 Ibid, section 14. 
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The costs of upgrading may be passed on to consumers. However, the costs of 
upgrading may not be included in the equalisation scheme (which is dealt with 
below).87 
 
5.2.4.8  Tariffs 
The tariffs and bonuses set out in the current version of the EEG applied in respect 
of electricity from installations commissioned before 1 January 2013, after which the 
annual rates of reduction or degression apply.88  The tariffs and bonuses that apply 
as at the date of commissioning of the relevant installation apply for the entire 
contract period.89 Therefore, tariffs do not decrease during the contract period of an 
existing installation, but only decrease for installations built in later years.90  
The tariffs are only payable when electricity is generated entirely from renewable 
energy sources or mine gas, and this electricity has been fed into the grid system.91 
Tariffs are payable for 20 years.92 The additional costs, i.e. the ‘price difference 
between feed-in tariffs and market prices’, are ultimately paid for by the final 
consumers.93 
The EEG makes provision for the entitlement to the payment of tariffs to be 
reduced to zero or to the ‘actual monthly average of the market value of the specific 
energy source’ if certain sections of the Act are contravened.94 
The tariffs that were paid to renewable energy generators under the original EEG 
are set out in Table 5.1 below. These tariffs are included in order to provide a point 
of comparison for the current tariffs, and also because it is considered that this initial 
system of tariffs would be more relevant in the South African context, compared to 
                                                          
87
 Klessmann et al ‘Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks’ (n19) footnote 
5, 3651. 
88
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 20(1) and (2). 
89
 Ibid, section 20(1). 
90
 See M Weitzel ‘Comment on “Comparing the Feed-In Tariff Incentives for Renewable Electricity in 
Ontario and Germany” by Mabee, Mannion, and Carpenter’ 2012 (44) Energy Policy 485-486, 485 
and W Mabee and T Carpenter ‘Response to Weitzel on our Paper “Comparing the Feed-In Tariff 
Incentives for Renewable Electricity in Ontario and Germany” by Mabee, Mannion, and Carpenter’ 
2012 (44) Energy Policy 487-488, 488. 
91
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 21(1). 
92
 Ibid, section 21(2). 
93
 Klessmann et al ‘Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks’ (n19) 3650. 
94
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 17(1), (2) and (3). 
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the complex system of tariffs and disaggregated rates that exists today, and which is 
reflected in Table 5.2 further below. 
  
Table 5.1   Tariffs paid to renewable energy generators in terms of the 
original EEG95 




























Biomass less than 
500kW 














up to 20 MW 








First 5 years 










                                                          
95
 Original EEG (n30). 
96
 The equivalent tariff in Euro cents has been obtained from Table 2 in Agnolucci ‘Use of Economic 
Instruments in the German Renewable Electricity Policy’ (n14) 3540. 
97
 Note: The EEG makes provision for different remuneration depending on wind conditions. Thus, if 
an installation attains 150 per cent of the reference yield (calculated for a reference installation) within 
five years, the remuneration is only 12.1 Pf/kWh. However, the period of five years is extended by two 
months for every 0.75 per cent that the renewable energy generated is kept below 150 per cent of the 
reference yield. Section 7(1). At inland sites, the rate is 17.3 Pf/kWh. Where wind conditions are 
average, the rate is 16.4 Pf/kWh and where wind conditions are good, rates are reduced to 13.5 
Pf/kWh. See Original EEG (n30) Explanatory Memorandum: B. Special Provisions; Section 7. 
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Solar energy98  99 50.62 5% 
 
These tariffs were valid for 20 years except in respect of hydropower,99  for 
which tariffs were granted for even longer.100 The high tariff for solar PV (compared 
to under the StrEG) resulted in a ‘boom’ in the solar PV market in 2000.101 The tariff 
for solar was also increased significantly in 2004, due to the ending of the ‘100 000 
roofs programme’ (which promoted solar energy and is discussed further in 
5.2.5.5).102 
Table 5.1 shows that there is a substantial difference between the tariffs for solar 
energy and the other RETs. These price differences have already been discussed in 
Chapter 3 above, and are due to the fact that solar energy is not yet a mature 
technology compared to the other RETs, and has not yet achieved the necessary 
economies of scale that will lead to prices decreasing substantially. 
The current version of the EEG establishes a more complex system of tariffs, 
and while often providing for a basic tariff for a specific technology, many variations 
are included. The approach taken here is to reflect as far as possible the basic tariff, 






                                                          
98
 Note: The obligation to pay this tariff ceased in respect of installations that were commissioned after 
31 December of the year following the year in which energy generated from eligible photovoltaic 
installations reached a total installed capacity of 350MW. The EEG noted that the German Bundestag 
(Parliament) would implement a ‘follow-up compensation scheme’ after the discontinuation of this 
obligation. 
99
 Original EEG (n30) section 9(1). 
100
 Agnolucci ‘Use of Economic Instruments in the German Renewable Electricity Policy’ (n14) 3540. 
101
 Ibid, 3545. 
102
 Held et al Feed-In Systems in Germany, Spain and Slovenia (n17) 4. 
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Table 5.2 Tariffs to be paid to renewable energy generators in terms of 
the current version of the EEG103  





Up to 500 kilowatts 12.7  
 
1 per cent per 
year from 2013 
500 kW – 2 MW 8.30 
2 – 5 MW 6.30 
5 – 10 MW 5.50 
10 – 20 MW 5.30 
20 – 50 MW 4.20 
Over 50 MW 3.40 
Landfill gas 
(section 24) 
Up to 500 kW 8.60  
 
 
1.5 per cent 
from 2013 




Up to 500 kW 6.79 
500 kW – 5 MW 5.89 
Mine gas 
(section 26) 
Up to 1 MW 6.84 
1 – 5 MW 4.93 




Up to 150 kW 14.3  
2 per cent from 
2013 
150 – 500 kW 12.3 
500 – 5 MW 11.0 




Up to 500 kW 16.0  
 
2 per cent from 
500 kW – 20 MW 14.0 
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 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15). 
104
 Provision is made for the increase of these rates if the substances listed in Annexes 2 and 3 of the 
Biomass Ordinance are used. EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 27(2). Furthermore, it is required that 
certain percentages of the electricity generated be from combined heat and power in certain 
circumstances. Section 27(4). 
105
 Installations for biowaste fermentation (section 27a) commissioned after 31 December 2013 are 
only entitled to the above tariffs if the installation’s capacity does not exceed 750kW. EEG of 1 April 
2012, section 27a(2). This would presumably have provided an incentive to commission large 










No limit 25.0  


























No limit 15.0 3.5 7 per cent from 
2018 
 
It can be seen that tariffs are differentiated in respect of the different RETs. 
Furthermore, the EEG establishes higher tariffs for smaller installations, and tariffs 
decrease as the size of installations increases. This takes into account the fact that 
larger installations are able to generate energy more cheaply than smaller 
installations. Furthermore, different degression rates are established for the different 
RETs. 
Interestingly, the EEG provides for the extension of the initial (higher) tariff for 
wind energy when the yield of an installation is less than 150 per cent of the 
‘reference yield’.106 This serves to ensure that installations with lower yields (i.e. in 
less windy areas) are entitled to a higher tariff for a longer period of time. This 
provides an incentive to renewable energy generators to distribute the construction 
of installations, rather than to flock to the areas where the resource is the strongest. 
                                                          
106
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 29(2). The reference yield is calculated in accordance with 
Annex 3 of the Act. See section 29(2). This was introduced with the EEG of 2009 (n52). 
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The EEG also deems that installations of less than 50 kW have a yield of 60 per cent 
of the reference yield.107  
The initial tariff for wind energy may be increased in certain circumstances, 
including where new installations are permanent replacements for existing 
installations and inter alia have two and half times the capacity of the installations 
they replace.108 This provides an incentive to upgrade facilities so that they become 
more efficient.  
In respect of offshore wind energy, provision is made for the initial tariff to be 
extended in certain circumstances. The length of time for which the initial tariff may 
be extended is determined with reference to the distance of the installation from the 
coastline and the depth of the installation.109 
There has been such interest in solar PV from around 2010 (which has led to 
increased costs for consumers),110 that the basic tariffs for solar radiation were 
decreased from between 31.94 €cents/kWh and 43.01 €cents/kWh in the EEG of 
2009 to between 21.11 €cents/kWh and 28.74 €cents/kWh in the EEG of 1 January 
2012,111 and a complex system of degression was established. A basic degression 
rate of 9 per cent per year applied.112 Depending on the amount of capacity that was 
installed in the previous year, the degression level could be adjusted up or down.113 
Thus, if the uptake of solar PV exceeded 3500 MW in a single year the degression 
rate would be increased and thus tariffs (for future installations) would decrease 
                                                          
107
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 29(3). See also See also Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Tariffs, degression and sample calculations pursuant to the 
new Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz – EEG) of 4 August 2011 (‘EEG 
2012’) available at 
http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/eeg_2012_verguetungsdegression_en_bf.pdf 
[accessed 21 June 2012] 12. Under the EEG of 2004 (n59), it was required that wind plants were 
commissioned that they could achieve at least 60 per cent of the reference yield (in terms of article 
10(4)), in order to ensure that wind plants were not constructed in areas that were not windy. This 
provision was maintained in the 2009 amendment, in respect of installations greater than 50kW (EEG 
of 2009 (n52) Section 29(3)). 
108
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 30(1). See also section 29(2) read with section 6(5), which 
establish a system services bonus. 
109
 Ibid, section 31(2). These tariffs may not be applied in respect of installations that are built in a part 
of Germany’s exclusive economic zone or coastal waters that has ‘been declared a protected part of 
nature and landscape’. See section 31(5). 
110
 C Leepa and M Unfried ‘Effects of a Cut-off in Feed-in Tariffs on Photovoltaic Capacity: Evidence 
from Germany’ 2013 (56) Energy Policy 536-542, 536-537.  
111
 See sections 31 and 32 of the EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15).  
112
 Ibid, section 20a(2). 
113
 Ibid, section 20a(3) and (4). 
152 
 
further. However, if the uptake of solar PV fell below 2500 MW the degression rate 
would be decreased and thus tariffs (for future installations) would not decrease as 
much.114 The effect of this was to attempt to ensure that the uptake of solar PV fell 
within a specific desired range, i.e. between 2500 MW and 3500 MW per year.115 
However, following continued interest in solar radiation (7500 MW of solar PV 
was reportedly installed in 2011116), the EEG was amended again in 2012. The EEG 
of 1 April 2012 explicitly specifies a ‘capacity expansion target’ of between 2500 MW 
and 3500 MW per year.117 It also places an obligation on the Federal Network 
Agency to publish on its website, every month, detailed information regarding the 
new and current capacity levels of solar radiation.118 Furthermore, the basic tariffs for 
solar radiation have been reduced to between 13.5 cents/kWh and 19.5 
cents/kWh.119 The basic tariffs are reflected in Table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.3  Tariffs for solar radiation in the EEG of 1 April 2012120 
Technology Capacity Tariff (in € cents/kWh) 
Solar radiation (section 
32(1)) 
Up to 10 MW 13.5 
Solar radiation 
exclusively in, attached 
to or on top of a building 
or noise protection wall 
(section 32(2)) 
Up to 10 kW 19.5 
10 kW – 40 kW 18.5 
40 kW – 1 MW 16.5 
1 MW – 10 MW 13.5 
 
                                                          
114
 See section 20a(3) and (4). 
115
 This is essentially flexible or responsive degression, which is discussed further in Chapter 8 below. 
116
 See P Donahue ‘Deal reached on German feed-in tariff’ RenewableEnergyWorld.com (28 June 
2012) available at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/06/deal-reached-on-
german-feed-in-tariff [accessed 31 July 2012]. See also Leepa and Unfried ‘Effects of a Cut-off in 
Feed-in Tariffs on Photovoltaic Capacity’ (n110) 537. 
117
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 20a(1). 
118
 Ibid, section 20a(2) and (3). 
119
 Ibid, section 32(1) and (2). 
120
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15). 
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Provision is also made for the tariffs of installations with an installed capacity of 
between 10 kW and up to 1 MW to be limited ‘to 90 percent of the total quantity of 
electricity generated in the installation in that calendar year’.121 
An even more complex system of degression has been established in the current 
version of the EEG. A basic degression rate of 1 per cent per month has been 
introduced,122 which may be increased up (up to 2.8 per cent) or down (to zero) 
depending on the amount of solar radiation installed in a specific period.123  
Importantly the current version of the EEG establishes a total cap for solar PV of 
52 GW. Once this cap is reached, tariffs for solar radiation ‘shall be reduced to 
zero’.124 It has been reported that thereafter ‘a new formula will be found’.125 It has 
been projected that the cap of 52 GW will be reached by 2017 or 2018.126 
These drastic cuts in the tariffs for solar have been criticised, and it has been 
suggested that the tariff cuts as well as the hard caps on installed capacity that have 
been implemented in Germany, Spain and Australia  
‘raise the question of whether sometimes the cuts to FIT rates are partly a 
response to lobbying by incumbent fossil fuel energy generators to ensure that 
the renewable energy revolution does not proceed too quickly because it will 
continue to erode their market share and/or reduce peak electricity prices’.127  
 
5.2.4.9  Direct selling 
The EEG of 2009 introduced the option of direct selling, and this has been 
maintained in the current version of the EEG, albeit in more detailed terms.128 The 
EEG currently provides for installation operators to claim a market premium from the 
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 Ibid, section 33(1). 
122
 Ibid, section 20b(1). 
123
 Ibid, section 20b(2)-(9). 
124
 Ibid, section 20b(9a). 
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 Donahue ‘Deal reached on German feed-in tariff’ (n116). 
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 AFP ‘Germany pulls plug on solar subsidies’ News24 (8 July 2013) available at 
http://www.news24.com/Green/News/Germany-pulls-plug-on-solar-subsidies-20130708 [accessed 9 
July 2013]. 
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 J Prest ‘The Future of Feed-in Tariffs: Capacity caps, scheme closures and looming grid parity’ 
2012 (1) Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 25-41, 40. 
128
 Direct selling is dealt with in EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) sections 33a to 33f. 
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grid operator in respect of electricity (from renewable energy sources or mine gas) 
that they sell directly to third parties, on condition that the electricity ‘has actually 
been fed into the grid system and purchased by a third party’.129 The EEG also sets 
out how the market premium must be calculated.130 Provision is also made for 
installation operators that generate electricity from biogas to claim a flexibility 
premium if certain conditions have been met.131  
Direct selling is an alternative to claiming the tariffs that have been set out 
above.132 It appears to be possible to alternate between claiming tariffs under the 
EEG and selling directly, and the EEG requires that installation operators notify grid 
operators beforehand ‘of any switch’.133   
 
5.2.4.10 Equalisation scheme 
An equalisation scheme was introduced in the original EEG, in terms of which grid 
operators were obliged to record the amount of renewable energy purchased, for the 
purpose of ensuring that the costs of renewable energy were equalised amongst all 
grid operators (across the country),134 so as to ameliorate the competitive 
disadvantage experienced by those network operators that had a lot of ‘green’ 
electricity in their grids compared to those that had none.135  
The EEG currently provides for equalisation between grid system operators and 
transmission system operators (TSOs), and places an obligation on grid system 
operators to ‘immediately deliver to the upstream transmission system operator the 
electricity for which tariffs are paid in accordance with section 16’136 and obliges 
                                                          
129
 Ibid, section 33g(1). 
130
 Ibid, section 33g(2) and section 33h. 
131
 Ibid, section 33i. 
132
 Ibid, section 33e. 
133
 Ibid, section 33d(2). The impacts of these provisions are discussed in E Gawel and A Purkus 
‘Promoting the Market and System Integration of Renewable Energies through Premium Schemes – 
A case study of the German market premium’ 2013 (61) Energy Policy 599-609. 
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 See Original EEG (n30) section 11(1) and (2). 
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 M Ringel ‘Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The race between 
feed-in tariffs and green certificates’ 2006 (31) Renewable Energy 1-17, 16. 
136
 EEG of 1 April 2012 (n15) section 34. 
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upstream TSOs to pay the specified tariffs in respect of the ‘quantity of electricity for 
which grid system operators have paid tariffs in accordance with section 16’.137  
The Act also provides for equalisation amongst TSOs, and TSOs are inter alia 
required to: record the amount of electricity for which tariffs have been paid; record 
the payment of tariffs and premiums (for the purpose of determining the average 
share); provisionally equalise the amounts of electricity that have been purchased; 
‘make monthly advance payments of an appropriate amount for the payments 
[made]’; and settle such accounts.138  
TSOs that have purchased electricity in excess of the average share may sell 
the excess electricity to other transmission system operators until their share is equal 
to the average share.139 
TSOs may require electricity suppliers that deliver electricity to the final 
consumers to pay a share of ‘the necessary expenditure’ in proportion to the 
electricity they have delivered to final consumers, which is referred to as the EEG 
surcharge. The EEG surcharge, is ‘determined in such a way that each electricity 
supplier bears the same costs for each kilowatt-hour of electricity delivered by it to a 
final consumer’.140  
TSOs are not entitled to this EEG surcharge in instances where a final consumer 
generates and consumes its own electricity, provided that the electricity is ‘not 
transmitted via a grid system; or … is used in the vicinity of the electricity generating 
installation’.141 
 
5.2.4.11 Special equalisation scheme 
A special equalisation scheme was introduced in 2004 in respect of manufacturing 
enterprises or rail operators.142 The current version of the EEG provides that 
electricity-intensive enterprises and rail operators that are final consumers may 
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 Ibid, section 35(1) 
138
 Ibid, section 36(1). 
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 Ibid, section 36(3). 
140
 Ibid, section 37(2). 
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 Ibid, section 37(3). 
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 EEG of 2004 (n59) Article 16(1). 
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request that the EEG surcharge be limited for a delivery point. The purpose of the 
limitation is to  
‘reduce the electricity costs for these enterprises and thereby maintain their 
international and intermodal competitiveness, insofar as this is compatible with 
the goals of this Act and the limit imposed is still compatible with the interest of 
the electricity users as a whole’.143 
The EEG provides that a limit may be set only if certain conditions are met. 
Manufacturing enterprises are inter alia required to provide proof that they purchased 
electricity that was at least one GWh at a certain delivery point in the last financial 
year (in contrast to 10 GWh under the EEG of 2009).144 The EEG surcharge for rail 
operators may also be limited to 0.05c/kWh provided certain conditions are met, 
including that the surcharge may only be limited in respect of the amount of 
electricity ‘exceeding 10 percent of the electricity purchased or used by the rail 
operators themselves at the relevant delivery point in the period during which a limit 
applies’.145  
It has recently been reported that these rules will be investigated by the EU as it 
is alleged that they breach competition rules.146 
 
5.2.4.12 Transparency and provision of information 
Those that benefit from the decision to limit the EEG surcharge are required to, upon 
request, provide the BMU ‘with information about all the facts which are necessary 
… to assess whether the objectives under section 40(1) … [relating to the aim to 
reduce the electricity costs of these industries to ensure that their competitiveness is 
not negatively affected] will be met’.147  
The EEG also ensures transparency by requiring installation operators, grid 
system operators and electricity suppliers to make the data relating to the nationwide 
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equalisation scheme available to each other.148 Further requirements regarding the 
provision of information are imposed on installation operators,149 grid system 
operators,150 TSOs,151 and electricity suppliers.152 Grid system operators and 
electricity suppliers are also required to provide certain data to the Federal Network 
Agency.153 Furthermore, grid system operators, electricity suppliers and transmission 
system operators are required to make certain data public via the internet.154 Further 
provision is made for the disclosure of the EEG surcharge to final consumers155 and 
for electricity labelling.156 
 
5.2.4.13  Other provisions 
The EEG deals with legal protection and official procedures including providing for a 
clearing house,157 consumer protection,158 temporary legal protection,159 tasks of the 
Federal Network Agency,160 administrative fines,161 supervision,162 and fees and 
expenses.163 The EEG also sets out the powers of certain government bodies to 
issue ordinances and provides for progress reports and monitoring reports, and sets 
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5.2.5  Impacts of the feed-in tariff 
 
5.2.5.1  Uptake of renewable energy 
As identified above Germany has been very successful in progressively increasing 
the amount of renewable energy in the country’s electricity (and energy) supply, and 
RES-E was increased from just 3.1 per cent in 1990 to 22.9 per cent in 2012.165 
Germany is ranked first in the world in terms of renewable energy capacity on a per 
capita basis (excluding hydro power)166 and relies on a variety of renewable energy 
sources to meet its energy needs. 
 
5.2.5.2  Additional costs  
The additional costs of the EEG were relatively low at the outset. For instance, in 
2002, it was reported that the feed-in tariff had increased the final cost of electricity 
by 0.18 to 0.26 Euro cents per kWh.167 However, by 2010 the German government 
reported that the ‘EEG cost differential for 2010 … [resulted] in an EEG 
apportionment of about 2.3 cents per kilowatt-hour’.168 Thus, the additional cost of 
electricity (directly due to the EEG) was 2.3 €cents/kWh in 2010.169  
As noted above, more recently the costs arising from the EEG have increased 
further. However, this has been due primarily to the great interest in solar PV, which 
has led to caps being imposed on solar PV capacity (as discussed in 5.2.4.8). It has 
been reported that the surcharge for renewable energy is currently 5.3 €cents/kWh 
and will increase to between 6.2 and 6.5 c/kWh in 2014.170 It is clear that it would not 
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be viable to add this amount on to the current price of electricity in South Africa. 
Containing the cost of a FIT policy is discussed in Chapter 8. 
External costs saved by the EEG, relating to climate change and other damage, 
were estimated at €3.4 billion in 2006 and €4 billion in 2007.171 It has been argued 
that ‘the remuneration under [the EEG] … roughly equals the avoided social costs of 
coal-generated electricity, which means that in social terms, the extra cost to society 
appears to be negligible’.172 Another report states that in 2007 additional costs due to 
the FIT was €3.3 billion, while €5 billion in ‘depressed fossil-fuel costs’ was saved.173 
 
5.2.5.3  Carbon emission reductions 
The development of renewable energy has contributed to Germany’s efforts to 
mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions. In 2010, Germany achieved carbon dioxide 
emission savings of 115 million tonnes of CO2, with savings of 54 million tonnes 
being attributed to the EEG.174 
 
5.2.5.4  Economic impacts and employment 
The renewable energy sector has become important to Germany’s economy, and in 
2001 raised revenue of €8.2 billion and created approximately 120 000 direct and 
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indirect jobs.175 Employment in the renewable energy sector has increased further 
and by 2012 it was estimated that 380 000 jobs had been created in the renewable 
energy sector.176  
 
5.2.5.5  General comments 
The success of the FIT has been attributed partly to the long-term security provided 
to investors as well as to the strong subsidy programmes.177 Thus, while the feed-in 
tariff has been the primary driver of renewable energy in Germany, the role of other 
instruments in increasing renewable energy in Germany must also be noted.178  
Such instruments include ‘soft loans’,179 investment incentives,180  the ‘100MW 
wind programme’ that was introduced in 1989 and upgraded to 250MW in 1991181 
and the ‘100 000 roof programme’, which provided favourable loans from 1999 to 
2003 and made solar photovoltaic energy ‘commercially viable for the first time’.182 
 A general observation is that the EEG has become more complex over time. A 
preliminary recommendation for South Africa would be that any feed-in law be 
relatively basic at its inception, and that it become more nuanced over time. Another 
recommendation is that policymakers should consider measures to contain the costs 
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5.3   Spain 
 
5.3.1  Introduction 
Like Germany, Spain is also regarded as a success story with regard to its use of the 
feed-in tariff to promote renewable energy.183 Electricity generated from RES-E 
increased from 980 GWh in 1990 to 32 714 GWh in 2007.184  
In 2012 Spain had 31 GW of renewable power capacity (excluding 17 GW of 
hydropower), which was made up of 23 GW wind power, 1 GW biomass, 5.1 GW 
solar PV, 2 GW concentrating solar power and a nominal amount of ocean (tidal) 
power.185  
It should be noted at the outset that following numerous tariff reductions in 2011, 
a Royal Decree was issued in January 2012, halting all further financial support for 
new renewable energy projects,186 with effect from 1 January 2013.187 Nevertheless, 
the approach taken here is to describe the system that applied before these 
changes. Only the main features of the Spanish FIT are set out.188 Institutional and 
operational aspects are first briefly outlined. 
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5.3.2  Institutional and operational aspects 
Relevant institutions include the General Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Tourism as well as the National Energy Commission. Other roleplayers 
are electricity companies and the transmission system operator, Red Eléctrica.189 
With regard to the integration of RES-E into the market, under the fixed tariff 
option (discussed below) electricity is sold to the utility, which integrates the 
electricity into its portfolio and then sells the electricity directly to its customers.190 
Under the premium tariff option, no particular regulation is required and renewable 
energy generators simply sell their electricity on the electricity market.191  
 
5.3.3  Overview of Spain’s feed-in tariff 
The FIT was introduced through the Electric Power Act 54 of 1997 (Jefatura del 
Estado, 1997) and has been subsequently refined through numerous Royal Decrees. 
The Spanish system is complex and has become more complex with each 
amendment.192 
Like Germany, the Spanish FIT guarantees grid access to renewable energy 
generators,193 and obliges grid operators to enter into a contract of at least five years 
with renewable energy generators.194  
The Spanish system offered the option of either a fixed tariff or a (market-based) 
premium on top of the regular price of electricity from early on.195 However, this was 
changed in 2004 to an option between a tariff as a percentage of the average 
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electricity price and a premium. This was changed back to a choice between a fixed 
tariff and a premium in 2007.196 The choice between a fixed tariff and premium is 
valid for one year at a time.197  
The premium tariff is adjusted according to the time of day.198 Premiums tariffs 
‘remain at a fixed percentage throughout the useful life of the plant’,199 while 
premiums (for new plants) are required to be revised every four years in relation inter 
alia to the development of the market price for electricity.200  
While renewable energy projects are supported throughout their lifetime, support 
decreases after some time depending on the RET, for example, 25 years in the case 
of solar energy. This can be seen more clearly in Table 5.4 below. Furthermore, 
tariffs are revised annually.201 However, it has been noted that annual changes are 
limited and so do not lead to uncertainty.202 Degression only applies in respect of 
solar PV.203  
There is also a forecast obligation and renewable energy generators are 
required to inform the distributor 30 hours in advance regarding the amount of 
electricity that they intend to supply to the grid.204 RES-E generators may correct this 
forecasted amount up to an hour beforehand. This obligation applies under the fixed 
tariff option only in respect of projects that are larger than 10MW, however, applies in 
respect of all projects under the premium tariff option.205 If the forecasts deviate by a 
certain percentage (which differs depending on the RET), renewable energy 
generators are liable to pay an ‘imbalance price’ or a penalty.206 
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It is also possible for renewable energy generators to sell electricity directly on 
the open market. In this case, in addition to the premium, an incentive amount of ‘10 
per cent of the average electricity tariff’ is provided .207 
Following increased costs for consumers and windfall profits for generators 
under the premium option, cap-and-floor prices were introduced in 2007. This was 
done to ensure that generators were guaranteed to a minimum price, but also that 
the prices received were capped at a maximum price, so that generators did not earn 
windfall profits at the expense of consumers.208  
The tariffs that applied in 2010 are reflected in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 shows that higher tariffs are granted during the ‘lifetime’ of an 
installation, after which tariffs are decreased. Furthermore, as in Germany, lower 
tariffs are offered as installation size increases. As noted above, degression only 
applies in respect of solar PV. 
In 2009 the Spanish government introduced capacity limits for wind and solar 
thermal power plants of 1700 MW per year and 500 MW per year respectively.210 In 
2010, following agreements with the wind and solar thermal industry associations, 
tariffs for wind and solar energy were decreased. In the case of wind energy, 
premium tariffs were reduced by 35 per cent, but only if the electricity price exceeded 
€ 45/MWh211 (45€c/kWh). It has been reported that investment in renewable energy 
in Spain ‘slumped’ following the cuts in tariffs for solar energy.212 A limit was also 
placed on the hours for which tariffs would be paid for solar thermal energy.213 
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5.3.4  General comments 
While the Spanish feed-in tariff has been very successful in promoting wind energy 
(and hydro power), it has not been as successful in promoting other RETs. Indeed, 
non-wind and non-hydro sources accounted for only 17 per cent of renewable 
energy capacity in 2012.214 
It is arguable that less certainty has been created under the Spanish FIT than 
under the German FIT, due to the various changes introduced as the feed-in tariff 
developed, such as the removal of the option of a fixed tariff in 2004, only for it to be 
re-introduced in 2007; the introduction of cap-and-floor prices in 2007; significant 
reductions in tariffs in 2010, followed by the temporary suspension of the FIT in 
2012, and its complete suspension in 2013. This drastic measure was taken by the 
Spanish government as one measure to recover an energy tariff deficit of €26 
billion.215  
Spain’s FIT was intended to contribute to achieving the target of 12 per cent of 
renewable energy and 29 per cent of RES-E by 2010.216  However, this target was 
not attained and Spain implemented 11.3 per cent of renewable energy by 2010.217 
The government has reduced the 2020 target for total renewable energy from 22.7 
per cent to 20.8 per cent.218 In light of the suspension of the feed-in tariff system it is 
not clear if the revised target will be attained. 
Key elements of the FIT policies in Germany and Spain are now briefly 
summarised, and some preliminary lessons for South Africa are highlighted. 
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5.4   Discussion of the FIT in Germany and Spain and  
  implications for South Africa 
 
5.4.1  The FIT in Germany and Spain 
In Germany, an obligation is placed on grid operators to connect renewable energy 
installations and to purchase all renewable energy generated. Grid operators are 
also required to upgrade their grids to ensure that all of the electricity generated can 
be fed into the grid, provided that the costs of this are not unreasonable. The costs of 
connection and upgrading are split between installation operators (i.e. RES-E 
generators) and grid operators, with RES-E generators being responsible for the 
costs of connecting and grid operators being responsible for the costs of upgrading. 
The EEG takes account of the fact that grids may become overloaded and makes 
provision for the implementation of facilities to reduce output in the event of a grid 
overload. 
Furthermore, fixed tariffs are guaranteed for 20 years and the tariffs may not be 
reduced during the contract time, which arguably provides security to investors. 
Rates are differentiated according to the renewable energy technology, thus 
acknowledging that some RETs are more expensive than others. Rates are also 
disaggregated, thus acknowledging that larger installations are cheaper to operate 
(on a per kilowatt hour basis) than smaller installations.  
It appears that the level of the tariffs in Germany has generally been appropriate. 
Significant renewable energy investment has been encouraged, yet prices for 
consumers have not increased too significantly. This has most likely been assisted 
by the existence of the equalisation scheme. It appears that the establishment of the 
special equalisation scheme has assisted in ensuring that the competitiveness of 
energy-intensive industries has not been harmed. However, as noted above, prices 
have increased more significantly in the past few years, due to the greater than 
anticipated uptake of solar PV.  
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Importantly, the EEG has established specific renewable energy targets that 
have become more ambitious over time. Thus far, the targets are being met and, 
even exceeded. 
In Spain, an obligation is also placed on grid operators to connect renewable 
energy generators to the grid and to purchase the renewable energy generated. 
While tariffs are ensured for a significant period of time, they may be reviewed 
annually. While this could create uncertainty for investors, it has been noted that the 
changes may only be moderate.219 The annual review takes the place of fixed 
degression rates.  
This is in contrast to Germany’s feed-in tariff, for which annual degression rates 
for new projects are determined in advance, rather than being determined on an 
annual basis. This has allowed the Spanish government to adjust tariffs, if for 
instance, too large a (financial) burden is placed on consumers.220 This also provides 
flexibility as tariffs can potentially be changed with reference to the market.221   
On the other hand, the premium rate in Spain is fixed ‘throughout the useful life 
of the plant’.222 While premium tariffs provide less certainty than fixed tariffs, they 
have proved popular in Spain and have resulted in renewable energy generators 
earning windfall profits at the expense of consumers, which led to the introduction of 
cap-and-floor prices in 2007.  
Spain’s option of a premium tariff was previously a distinguishing factor between 
the German and Spanish FITs. However, Germany has also introduced the more 
market-oriented option of a premium tariff, albeit only in certain circumstances (as 
discussed in 5.2.4.9 above). As the option of a market premium has only been 
relatively recently introduced in Germany, its impacts are not yet entirely clear.223 
A significant difference between the German and Spanish FIT policies is that in 
Spain there is a forecast obligation, which is more onerous for RES-E generators. It 
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has been estimated that under the fixed tariff option, the forecast obligation has 
resulted in an extra cost of €1.5/MWh224 (1.5€c/kWh). 
While the (German) EEG has certainly evolved and the tariffs have become very 
disaggregated, it appears that the general principles of the FIT have not changed too 
much. On the other hand, the Spanish FIT appears to have fluctuated a lot more, 
with the additions of new Royal Decrees. It has been argued that ‘the Spanish 
Government has undermined the stability in the system’,225 which appears to have 
had an impact on renewable energy investment. 
It has been observed that in Germany the focus has been on technology 
development, while in Spain the focus has been on deployment of RES-E.226 
 
5.4.2  Implications for South Africa 
As noted above, a feed-in tariff was already introduced in South Africa in 2009 
(before being replaced by a renewable tendering programme in 2011). At the time, 
the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) stated that the FIT ‘is 
preferred as the most effective means for creating sustainable market conditions for 
the growth of a renewable energy industry’.227  
In considering the implementation of a FIT policy in South Africa in the future, it 
would be important that the general elements of a feed-in tariff, which were 
discussed in Chapter 4 and which are largely present in Germany’s FIT, also be 
present in a recommended FIT policy in South Africa.  
This includes an obligation on grid operators to connect renewable energy 
installations to the grid and to purchase the energy generated. There should also be 
an obligation to upgrade the grid to be able to accommodate the RES-E that is 
generated. This latter obligation would arguably not be problematic in light of the 
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planned expansion of South Africa’s electricity grid from approximately 44.5 GW in 
2010 to approximately 89.5 GW in 2030.228   
A mandatory obligation on grid operators to purchase all of the renewable 
energy fed into the grid might be problematic in South Africa as this could lead to 
significantly increased electricity prices, which would impact negatively on low-
income households and on energy-intensive industries. It would thus be necessary 
to consider ways to address such concerns. This will be taken up further in Chapter 
8. 
It would also be important that tariffs are set at the correct level. In this regard, 
high tariffs are not necessarily an indicator of success. In Italy ‘a tariff more generous 
than the German, introduced in 1992 …, had comparatively little impact on the Italian 
RES-E equipment industry’.229 It is not recommended that Germany or Spain’s highly 
disaggregated systems of tariffs be implemented in South Africa, at least at the 
outset.  
Regarding the option between fixed and premium tariffs, while taken up further in 
Chapter 8, it appears that both options can be effective in promoting RES-E. 
However, fixed tariffs are considered to be more appropriate with regard to 
encouraging the development of less mature RETs and the inclusion of smaller 
investors,230 which would arguably be important in the South African context.  
All of these issues are taken up further in Chapter 8. 
The feed-in tariffs that have been implemented in India and China are now briefly 
outlined. 
 
5.5   The feed-in tariff in India and China 
Feed-in tariff regulations were introduced in India in 2009. In China, the law providing 
for FITs was implemented in 2006. However, in both countries, the actual feed-in 
tariffs have been implemented at different stages and in respect of different RETs. It 
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is therefore relatively early to determine the effectiveness of the feed-in tariffs in 
promoting renewable energy in these countries. Furthermore, in both countries, the 
FIT policies operate alongside the renewable obligation and renewables 
tendering,231 making it additionally difficult to determine the specific impact of the 
feed-in tariff. The FIT policies of India and China are thus merely outlined to illustrate 
the efforts of other developing countries in implementing feed-in laws. 
 
5.5.1  India  
 
5.5.1.1  Introduction 
India’s overall carbon emissions are very high in comparison to the rest of the world 
and were 1745.06 Mt CO2 in 2011. Yet its per capita emissions are very low, and at 
1.41 tCO2/capita are well below the world average of 4.5 tCO2/capita.
232 However, 
India’s carbon emissions have been increasingly rapidly, due to its rapid economic 
expansion. Since about 25 per cent of India’s population had no access to electricity, 
as of 2010,233  it is projected that India needs to more than double its energy 
generation capacity to over 300GW by 2017.234   
It has been reported that  
‘India’s substantial and sustained economic growth is placing enormous 
demand on its energy resources. The demand and supply imbalance in 
energy sources is pervasive requiring serious efforts by [the Government of 
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India] to augment energy supplies. India imports about 80% of its coal… The 
country thus faces possible severe energy supply constraints’.235 
As a result, renewable energy is assuming a more important role in India and will 
play a key role in meeting the country’s energy demands in the future.236  
At the beginning of 2013, India’s electricity capacity was made up of 57.1 per 
cent coal, 18.5 per cent hydro, 8.9 per cent of gas, 0.6 per cent diesel, 12.7 per cent 
renewables and 2.2 per cent nuclear.237 
In 2011, India ranked fifth in the world in terms of investment in new renewable 
energy capacity. Furthermore, with 62 GW of renewable energy in 2011, India was 
ranked fourth or fifth in the world in terms of renewable energy capacity (depending 
on whether or not large hydro is taken into account). About 80 per cent of the non-
hydro portion is supplied by wind power.238 However, it appears that some 
momentum has been lost,239 and investment in renewable energy decreased from 
$13 billion in 2011 to $6.5 billion in 2012.240 
 
5.5.1.2  Institutions 
There are numerous institutions that are involved in renewable energy development 
in India, including the Ministry of Power, the Ministry for New and Renewable Energy 
(MNRE), the (national) Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), (regional) 
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) and the Indian Renewable 
Energy Development Agency (IREDA). State governments, state nodal agencies and 
regional electricity corporations also play a role.  
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Furthermore, central or state transmission utilities and regional or load dispatch 
centres and distribution licensees are responsible for transmission, system 
operations and distribution.241 
It has been argued that  
‘[t]he lack of coordination among … [these institutions] leaves critical 
implementation gaps. The Ministry of Power is responsible for national 
electricity policy and national tariff policy, both of which play a key role in 
promoting procurement of renewable energy-based power. The MNRE has a 
direct mandate for renewable energy in all policy and programmatic aspects. 
The SERCs, which have the most direct impact on feed-in tariffs, RPOs [which 
are ROs], and open-access charges, are loosely bound by the directives and 
guidelines of the CERC. All central agencies have a state counterpart, which 
has the final say on how renewable energy projects are developed’.242 
The roles of the various institutions thus appear quite confused, and it seems 
that better coordination is required. 
 
5.5.1.3  Policies relating to the feed-in tariff specifically  
India’s Electricity Act 36 of 2003 (the Electricity Act) makes provision for the 
establishment of a renewable obligation (RO), and the ‘determination of preferential 
feed-in tariffs’.243  
The Electricity Act provides that  
‘[t]he Appropriate Commission shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, -
specify the terms and conditions for the determination of tariff [sic], and in doing 
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so, shall be guided by the following, namely:- … the promotion of co-generation 
and generation of electricity from renewable sources of energy’.244  
It has been argued that this empowers the CERC to establish preferential tariffs 
(or feed-in tariffs) for renewable energy.245  
Furthermore, SERCs are inter alia charged with 
‘[promoting cogeneration] and generation of electricity from renewable sources 
of energy by providing suitable measures for connectivity with the grid and sale 
of electricity to any person, and also specify[ing], for purchase of electricity from 
such sources, a percentage of the total consumption of electricity in the area of 
a distribution licence’.246  
This provides for the establishment of a RO. 
The Tariff Policy247 was published in terms of the Electricity Act in 2006. It 
provides that the Appropriate Commission  
‘shall fix a minimum percentage for purchase of energy from such sources 
taking into account availability of such resources in the region and its impact on 
retail tariffs’.248  
This also provides for a RO. It furthermore provided that this should be 
determined by 1 April 2006.249 It was subsequently recommended in the National 
Action Plan on Climate Change (discussed below) that the percentage should be set 
at five per cent starting in 2009, increasing by one per cent per year for ten years; 
and it was provided that SERCs may set higher targets.250  
The Tariff Policy also provides that due to the time necessary for non-
conventional energy sources to compete with conventional sources, that 
‘procurement by distribution companies shall be done at preferential tariffs 
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determined by the Appropriate Commission’.251 This clearly provides for preferential 
tariffs or feed-in tariffs for renewable energy.  
The Tariff Policy also provides that as far as possible, Distribution Licences for 
future requirements should be awarded through a ‘competitive bidding process’ in 
respect of non-conventional sources.252 This appears to provide for a renewables 
tendering process. 
By 2010, 18 of India’s 28 states had implemented ROs ranging from one per 
cent to 15 per cent.253 Furthermore, a tradable renewable energy certificate system 
(TREC) was announced in 2010.254  
National feed-in tariff regulations were promulgated in 2009,255 and were 
amended in 2012.256 The regulations apply to wind power, small hydro, certain 
biomass projects, co-generation projects (non-fossil fuel-based), solar PV and solar 
thermal, biomass gasifier-based projects and biogas-based projects.257  
For each RET, the regulations provide various guidelines regarding inter alia the 
capital cost, capital utilisation factor and operation and maintenance expenses.258 
While these regulations establish ‘a uniform feed-in tariff determination methodology 
for each renewable energy technology’,259 it is left to the individual states to 
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determine the actual tariffs based on these factors.260 Thus, while guidelines for 
feed-in tariffs are designed and developed by the CERC at the national level, feed-in 
tariff methodologies for different renewable energy technologies are developed at the 
state level by the SERCs.261 Therefore, the SERCs ‘which have the most direct 
impact on feed-in tariffs … are loosely bound by the directives and guidelines of the 
CERC’,262 and it has been argued that the tariffs implemented in different states do 
not comply with the tariff regulations of the CERC.263 
The regulations do not appear to establish fixed degression rates. However, they 
do provide for a review period, and provide that the benchmark capital cost of solar 
PV and solar thermal projects may be reviewed annually and that the price for 
biomass may be reviewed after three years.264 
Different tariff periods are set for the different technologies. The tariff period for 
small hydro (below 5MW) is 35 years. The tariff period for solar PV and solar thermal 
is 25 years. The tariff period for biomass gasifier and biogas is 20 years. The tariff 
periods for the remaining technologies are not less than 13 years.265  
States have taken different approaches in implementing feed-in tariffs, often 
implementing tariffs for only one renewable energy technology (RET) at a time. As of 
2012, about half of the Indian states had implemented FITs.266 Furthermore, tariff 
conditions vary across states. In regard to wind energy, some states provide for fixed 
tariffs for a certain length of time, while in other states tariffs may be decreased or 
increased. Various states have also imposed caps for wind energy ranging from 
50MW to 500MW.267  
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Furthermore, in 2009 the MNRE approved a (national) generation-based 
incentive (GBI) for wind energy that provided an ‘incentive tariff’ of INR 0.50/kWh 
(US$ 0.01/kWh), in respect of projects commissioned before the end of March 
2012.268 This was in addition to state-level FITs. However, because of the deadline, 
this did not provide an ongoing incentive.269 In respect of the actual tariffs, in 2010, 
tariffs for wind energy ranged from INR 3.14/kWh (US$ 0.057/kWh) to INR 4.08/kWh 
(US$ 0.073/kWh).270  
In 2010 the CERC announced a tariff of INR 17.91/kWh (US$ 0.36/kWh) in 
respect of solar PV and INR 15.31/kWh (US$ 0.31/kWh) in respect of concentrating 
solar power (CSP),271 to support the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission 
(JNNSM). The object of the JNNSM is to ‘establish India as a global leader in solar 
energy’, and it sets the target of 20 000 MW (20 GW) of solar energy by 2022, to be 
implemented in three stages.272 Power purchase agreements must be entered into 
for 25 years and tariffs are to be revised every year.273   
It was decided that 500 MW would be implemented in the first phase of the 
JNNSM, from 2010-2013, and the 500 MW was allocated in two rounds, with 150 
MW being allocated in the first round and 350 MW being allocated in the second 
round.274 However, it was also decided that tendering would apply if applications 
exceeded these capacity caps.275 In both cases applications exceeded the capacity 
caps and bidding took place. It appears that almost all of the projects selected in the 
first bidding round have secured financing. However, it is not clear how many of 
these projects have actually been implemented.276  
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The CERC has established preferential tariffs for small hydro that range from 
INR 3.35/kWh (US$ 0.07/kWh) to INR 4.62/kWh (US$ 0.09/kWh). The CERC has 
also established preferential tariffs for biomass ranging from INR 3.35/kWh (US$ 
0.07/kWh) to INR 4.62/kWh (US$ 0.09/kWh).277 
It should be noted that these tariffs generally appear to be very low 
comparatively. For example, the CERC rates for biomass (when converted to Euros) 
range from € 0.05/kWh to € 0.067/kWh, compared to Germany’s rates for biomass, 
which range from € 0.06/kWh to € 0.14/kWh.  
 
5.5.1.4  General renewable energy-related policies 
The Indian government has implemented a number of laws and policies that are 
relevant to renewable energy in the past decade. These include the National 
Electricity Policy that was approved in 2005;278 the 12th Five Year Plan of the 
Planning Commission (for the years 2012-2017);279 and the National Action Plan on 
Climate Change,280 which is based on eight ‘national missions’. One of these is the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission,281 which was launched in 2010.282 As 
identified above, the CERC approved tariffs for solar PV and solar thermal in 2010 to 
support the JNNSM. The JNNSM has been described as ‘India’s most ambitious 
renewable energy initiative’.283 It foresees that solar energy will reach grid parity by 
2022.284 
In addition, the MNRE published the Strategic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy for the Period 2011-17 (the ‘Strategic Plan’) in 2011.285 The Strategic Plan is 
concerned with solar, wind, biomass and small hydro power and establishes targets 
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for each of these technologies and aims to install a total of 41 400 MW (41.4 GW) of 
renewable energy by 2017.286 However, the aim of the government is for renewable 
energy to contribute only six per cent to the total energy mix by 2022.287 While the 
Strategic Plan represents the government’s future plans, it does not reflect much on 
the implementation of current policies and measures, and therefore does not deal 
with the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the FIT. 
 
5.5.1.5  General comments 
India has a number of polices and instruments in place that are relevant to promoting 
renewable energy. However, there is no overarching law or policy that deals with the 
development of renewable energy, and it has been argued that policies ‘have been 
issued as and when necessary’ and are not integrated with other legislation.288  
Furthermore, it is difficult to precisely identify the feed-in tariffs that have been 
implemented, as these differ across India’s states, at least in those states that have 
actually implemented FITs. It has also been reported that ‘[e]ven basic data on the 
actual generation volume of renewable energy by technologies are not available in 
the public domain’.289 
Furthermore, there is not much information – official or academic – regarding the 
actual impact of the FIT. It has however been reported that ‘[f]or specific 
technologies, central government policies and guidelines have been implemented to 
different degrees by individual states, which can result in inconsistencies between 
states’.290  Furthermore, one study found that there was ‘no significant positive 
correlation between the introduction of preferential feed-in tariffs and the 
development of [renewable energy]’.291 
                                                          
286
 Ibid, Table 4, at 19. 
287
 Ibid, 16. 
288
 M Gulati and P Tiwari ‘Development of Renewable Energy in India: Role and effectiveness of 
electricity regulators’ 2011 (2) Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 107-119, 111. 
289
 Sargsyan et al Unleashing the Potential of Renewable Energy in India (n242) 41. 
290
 Arora et al Indian Renewable Energy Status Report (n234) 24. 
291
 Schmid ‘The Development of Renewable Energy Power in India’ (n241) 323-324. In contrast, 
various studies have considered the effectiveness thus far of the renewable obligation and the 
renewable energy certificate system in India. See for example Shereef and Khaparde ‘Current Status 
of REC Mechanism in India’ (n237); Kumar and Agarwala ‘Renewable Energy Certificate and Perform, 
181 
 
While the national FIT regulations did commence relatively recently and it is 
perhaps too early to conclusively determine the impacts of the feed-in tariff, it has 
been noted that a more coordinated approach is required with regard to renewable 
energy policy in general. Furthermore, it has been stated that  
‘India offers every possible type of incentive, including feed-in tariffs; 
generation-based incentives; RPOs; central, state, and regional capital 
subsidies; accelerated depreciation; and tax incentives… The effect is 
unintended overlaps, reduced transparency and fiscal discipline, unnecessary 
complexity in claiming subsidies, and ineffective leverage for the amount spent 
on renewable energy development. An integrated and coordinated approach for 
financial incentives is urgently needed’.292 
 
5.5.2  China 
 
5.5.2.1  Introduction 
China’s greenhouse gas emissions are increasingly rapidly and, with 7954.55 Mt 
CO2 emitted in 2011, China is the world’s largest emitter. Its per capita emissions, 
which were previously very low are also rising and were 5.92 tCO2/capita in 2011,
293 
thereby significantly surpassing the per capita emissions of other developing 
countries (apart from South Africa).  
Its electricity mix is made up of 73.6 per cent fossil fuels, 22 per cent hydro, 
three per cent wind, one per cent of nuclear and 0.1 per cent of solar power.294  
Renewable energy capacity is increasing and China is currently the world leader 
with regard to total renewable energy capacity. In 2004 China had 37 GW of 
renewable energy (including hydro), but only 3 GW of renewable energy excluding 
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hydro.295 This has increased rapidly to 90 GW by 2012 (excluding hydropower of 229 
GW). The non-hydro contribution is made up of 8 GW biomass, 7 GW solar PV and 
75 GW wind power.296 Therefore, excluding hydropower, most of China’s RES-E 
capacity is comprised of wind energy. In 2009, renewable energy (including large 
hydropower) accounted for 17 per cent of national electricity production.297  
Furthermore, about 1.6 million jobs had been created in the renewable energy sector 
by 2009.298 
There were various barriers facing renewable energy in China. These included 
the high costs of renewable energy, problems with connecting to the grid, and 
fragmentation due to the fact that responsibility for renewable energy policy 
formulation was spread over a number of different institutions.299 The Chinese 
government did attempt to address these problems. For example, regulations were 
issued in 1994 and 1999 requiring grid operators to connect wind generators to the 
grid and purchase the electricity. However, these were not effective in practice as 
grid operators struggled to ‘gain approval from Government for the increase in sales 
price corresponding to the higher cost of renewable energy’.300 The Renewable 
Energy Law, discussed in 5.5.2.3, was intended to address these barriers.301 First, 
China’s relevant institutions are briefly outlined. 
 
5.5.2.2  Institutions 
There are many institutions involved in regulating China’s energy sector, including 
the State Council, the National People’s Congress, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), 
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the National Energy Bureau (NEB), the State Environment Protection Bureau 
(SEPB) and the National Energy Commission (NEC).  
The State Council has overall control over the development and operation of the 
energy sector. The SERC is empowered by the State Council to supervise the 
electricity sector. Furthermore, the NDRC is inter alia responsible for matters related 
to approving and setting electricity tariffs.302 There are also central power plants and 
local power plants, and there are differences in the tariffs of these power plants.303 In 
addition, China’s electricity grid is ‘fragmented into six regional power grid clusters, 
all of which operate rather independently’.304 Electricity companies are state-
owned.305 
 
5.5.2.3  Policies relating to the feed-in tariff specifically 
The Renewable Energy Law came into effect in 2006,306 and was amended in 
2010.307 It defines renewable energy as ‘non-fossil energy of wind energy, solar 
energy, water energy, biomass energy, geothermal energy, and ocean energy, 
etc’.308  
The Act refers to a ‘middle and long-term total volume target of renewable 
energy’ and requires that energy authorities prepare a ‘national renewable energy 
development and utilization plan’, on the basis of such targets.309 Energy authorities 
at the provincial and municipal levels are also required to develop ‘renewable energy 
development and utilization plans’ based on the national plan and the relevant 
targets.310 It has been argued that this ‘provides the basis for implementation of a 
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[renewable obligation]’.311 The Act furthermore requires appropriate departments of 
the State Council to establish plans concerned with realising this target.312  
The Renewable Energy Law itself does not contain any medium- or long-term 
targets. Rather, these are set out in the Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan 
for Renewable Energy, which is dealt with further below.  
The Renewable Energy Law states that ‘Government encourages and supports 
various types of grid-connected renewable power generation’313 and appears to 
provide for both tendering and a FIT. It does this by providing that renewable energy 
power generation projects may only be constructed after obtaining the necessary 
licence. However, ‘if there is more than one applicant for [a] project license, the 
licensee shall be determined through a tender’314 and it is the ‘bid-winning price’ that 
will be implemented.315 The Act provides that in other cases the price of renewable 
energy must be determined by the ‘price authorities of the State Council’, which price 
must be made public.316 The former provisions thus appear to provide for tendering, 
while it has been argued that the latter provisions imply a feed-in tariff.317  
The Act provides for ‘a system of safeguards for the purchase of the full amount 
of power generated from renewable energy’318 and provides that once an 
administrative licence has been obtained, grid operators must enter into a grid 
connection agreement with the relevant licensee and ‘purchase the total amount of 
grid-connected electricity from renewable energy generation projects which are 
within their power-grid coverage area and which conform to grid-connection technical 
standards’.319 Grid operators are also obliged to strengthen their grids and inter alia 
‘raise capacity to absorb renewable energy electric power’.320  
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If a grid operator fails to enter into a grid connection agreement with a renewable 
energy generator and buy the total amount of renewable energy available, which 
causes economic loss to the renewable energy generator, such grid operator ‘shall 
be liable for compensation’.321 
Furthermore, an obligation is imposed on the relevant authorities to  
‘ensure that renewable energy targets as a proportion of the total amount of 
electric power generation shall be reached; and establish specific measures for 
power-grid enterprises to prioritize dispatching and fully purchase power 
generated from renewable energy’.322  
Importantly, the Act provides that the additional renewable energy costs are 
‘compensated by a nationwide levy on the sale of electricity’.323 Furthermore, 
expenses relating to grid connection and other reasonable expenses paid for by grid 
operators may be added to the selling price.324  
The Act creates a renewable energy development fund,325 and if grid operators 
are not able to recover grid connection and other related expenses through the sale 
of energy, they may apply for subsidisation from this fund.326  
While the Renewable Energy Law is a framework law, the details regarding 
implementation are provided in ministerial regulations and other measures.327 Such 
regulations inter alia provide for an obligation to connect renewable energy 
installations to the grid, a cost-sharing mechanism in terms of which ‘the additional 
costs of renewable electricity generation [are to] be shared by the end-users of 
electricity nationwide’, and the establishment of a Renewable Energy Development 
Fund.328  
As highlighted above, the Renewable Energy Law makes provision for the 
establishment of three renewable energy support instruments and a number of 
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renewable energy technologies (RETs) have actually gone through complete 
changes of financial support instruments.  
Initially a tendering system was in place for wind power. However, the tariffs 
offered by the winning tenders were too low and not viable. Thereafter the rules were 
modified, but this did not resolve the problem. It has been reported that most of the 
tenders were won by the country’s five largest power companies, ‘which use[d] the 
profits made in coal-fired power generation to subsidize their wind power projects – 
with some winning bids setting a tariff price lower than the cost of generation’.329 It is 
also significant that the tendering programme included local content requirements of 
50 per cent, which increased to 70 per cent, but which were later removed as they 
was considered to breach the rules of the World Trade Organisation.330 
The tender system was subsequently replaced by FITs for onshore wind energy, 
in terms of the Improvement of Wind Power Tariff Regulations, which were issued in 
2009.331 Under this policy, the country was divided into four regions and ‘benchmark 
prices’ were set for each region.332 It should be noted that these prices were derived 
through a system of competitive bidding.333 In 2009 the fixed tariffs ranged from RMB 
0.51 (US$ 0.074) per kilowatt hour to RMB 0.61/kWh (US$ 0.089/kWh).334 While 
these tariffs were determined through competitive bidding, once set, they ‘effectively 
function like FITs elsewhere in the world’.335 It has been argued that the adoption of 
tariffs simplified the pricing and approval processes, which was ‘likely to further 
stimulate developers’ interests in exploiting wind power resources’.336  
In respect of solar PV, before 2009, there was an approved FIT rate that ranged 
from US$0.58/kWh to US$1.32/kWh (RMB 4-9/kWh). However, this was replaced by 
                                                          
329
 Mendonça Feed-In Tariffs (n1) 83 
330
 Y Song and N Berrah China: East or West Wind: Getting the Incentives Right (Policy Research 
Working paper 6486) (The World Bank) available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6486  [accessed 19 September 2013] 3. 
331
 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21
st
 Century (REN21) Recommendations for Improving 
the Effectiveness of Renewable Energy Policies in China 2009 available at 
www.ren21.net/portals/97/documents/Publications/Recommendations_for_RE_Policies_in_China.pdf 
[accessed 29 May 2011] 10. 
332
 Ibid.  
333
 See C Kreycik, TD Couture and KS Cory Innovative Feed-In Tariff Designs that Limit Policy Costs 
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory: Technical Report NREL/TP-6A20-50225) 2011 available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/50225.pdf [accessed 8 April 2013] 30. 
334
 REN21 Recommendations for Improving the Effectiveness of Renewable Energy Policies in China 
(n331) 22. 
335
 Kreycik et al Innovative Feed-In Tariff Designs that Limit Policy Costs (n333) 30. 
336
 Ma ‘On-Grid Electricity Tariffs in China’ (n302) 2643. 
187 
 
a bidding programme in the Dunhuang region in 2009. The first round of bidding 
resulted in a price of US$0.16/kWh (RMB 1.09/kWh).337 This is notably lower than 
the tariffs for solar PV in other jurisdictions, such as Germany, which had a basic 
rate of €0.32/kWh in 2009, and Spain, which had an average initial rate of 
€0.34927/kWh in 2010. It has been noted that while these auctions resulted in a low 
price for solar PV, ‘[i]ncomplete installations of low quality were the frequent outcome 
of projects appointed according to auctions’.338  
In late 2011 a national feed-in tariff of about US$0.15/kWh was introduced for 
solar energy.339 However, this FIT has also been criticised including because the 
tariff is considered to be too low for the less sunny parts of the country, there is a 
lack of investment certainty due to there being no guaranteed tariff duration, and 
because ‘the low tariff rate tends to attract low quality installations, which are mostly 
produced by state-owned enterprises’.340 
The justification provided by the NDRC for moving to a system of fixed tariffs in 
respect of certain technologies, such as wind and solar PV, was that this ‘would 
change current inconsistent pricing, foster clear expectations and facilitate 
investments in the sector’.341 
A premium tariff of US$ 0.051 (RMB 0.35) per kilowatt hour was in place for 
biomass.342 This was subsequently changed to a fixed tariff of US$ 0.11 (RMB 0.75) 
per kilowatt hour in 2010.343 In contrast, coal-generated electricity costs about 
US$0.05 (RMB 0.35) per kilowatt hour.344 Hydropower is actually cheaper than coal-
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generated electricity and cost about US$ 0.04 (RMB 0.27) per kilowatt hour in 
2008.345 
As highlighted above, the Renewable Energy Law provides for a levy to be 
imposed on electricity to cover the costs of renewable energy. The levy was 
introduced at a rate of RMB 0.001/kWh (US$ 0.0001) in 2006 and has been 
increased incrementally and was most recently set at RMB 0.008/kWh (US$ 0.001) 
in 2011. This levy has not been sufficient to cover the costs of renewable energy 
generation and there were shortfalls of RMB 1.4 billion (US$ 0.2 billion) and RMB 22 
billion (US$ 3.1 billion) in 2010 and 2011 respectively.346 
 
5.5.2.4  General renewable energy-related policies 
In 2007 the NDRC published the Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy in China347 (the Development Plan). The Development Plan, 
together with the Renewable Energy Law, have been attributed for the significant 
growth in China’s ‘renewable energy industry and its domestic market’.348 The 
guiding principles of the plan include the implementation of the Renewable Energy 
Law as well as to ‘continuously increase the share of renewable energy in China’s 
overall energy consumption mix’.349  
The Development Plan sets out the overall objectives for China’s renewable 
energy development for the following 15 years, which are to: 
‘increase the proportion of renewable energy in total energy consumption, to 
resolve the problem of lack of electricity of people living in remote off-grid areas 
and the shortage of fuel for daily life needs in rural areas, to stimulate the 
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utilization of organic wastes for energy, and to promote the development of 
renewable energy industries’.350  
It also establishes specific objectives, including to increase the share of 
renewable energy in the total primary energy supply to ten per cent by 2010 and to 
15 per cent by 2020.351 Specific targets are also established for various RETs 
including wind energy, solar energy, biomass and hydropower.352 For example, a 
target was set of 5 GW wind energy by 2010.353 This target was increased to 10 GW 
in 2008 and was exceeded. Indeed, by the end of 2008, 12 GW of capacity had been 
installed.354 The Development Plan also sets out policies and measures including 
setting ‘mandated market share’ policies (MMS) (which is effectively the RO) which 
establish the amount of energy that must be generated from renewable sources 
(excluding hydropower).355   
Furthermore, China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) sees wind power 
increasing by 70 GW and solar PV increasing by 5 GW (and hydropower increasing 
by 12 GW) by 2015.356 
 
5.5.2.5  General comments 
Renewable energy (primarily wind energy) has increased significantly in China. The 
Renewable Energy Law has been described as ‘serv[ing] as a milestone for 
elevating renewables to a strategic position in China, and provid[ing] the framework 
for legislative initiatives designed to secure the development of renewable energy’.357 
However, while the Renewable Energy Law was intended to address previous 
barriers, various problems remain. For example, the Act makes provision for the 
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implementation of three instruments, namely the FIT, RO and tendering, but does 
not specify how these should be combined.358  
The Renewable Energy Law also does not provide for a decrease in tariffs over 
time.359 Nevertheless, it should be noted that prices have decreased. For example, in 
2008 the price of solar PV halved from RMB 3/kWh to RMB 1.5/kWh (US$0.44/kWh 
to US$0.22/kWh).360  
While there has been rapid growth in wind energy, grid capacity has not been 
developed sufficiently, which has resulted in problems with congestion and grid 
integration, and consequent efficiency losses.361 Furthermore, in 2011 the rate of 
wind energy curtailed, or not taken up, due to electricity supply being greater than 
demand ranged from one per cent to 25 per cent in ten different provinces, which 
resulted in lost revenue for wind energy generators.362  
China’s feed-in tariff has also been criticised on the basis that it is ‘too 
complicated and it takes considerable time for investors, especially international and 
small private investors to understand how it works’.363 Furthermore, while a penalty 
is provided for in the event of the failure of a grid operator to purchase the full 
amount of renewable energy, this is ‘relatively weak’.364 It has also been argued that 
the new regulator, the SERC, ‘lacks the independence and power necessary to 
maintain a fair and transparent system’.365  
Although not a result of the renewable energy laws, it has been noted that 
electricity prices are heavily subsidised and that there is thus little incentive to save 
electricity.366 Furthermore, there is a ‘disconnect between pricing and demand’ with 
regard to coal-generated energy.367 Indeed, ‘electricity prices are kept low by 
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government … [which] often forces utilities to incur considerable costs’.368 Another 
problem is enforcement and some generators have struggled to gain access to the 
grid and obtain a ‘government-approved price’.369  
It has also been acknowledged that China’s energy sector requires reform,370 
clear guidance is lacking, and that ‘the multiplicity of actors on the regulatory side 
has made reforms in the power sector uneasy and slow’.371 Furthermore, clear 
targets are required from government to provide long-term confidence and 
certainty.372 
With regard to the feed-in tariff specifically, it has been recommended that 
‘policymakers in China [should] improve the renewable energy price structure and 
clarify the feed-in tariff system. The most effective solution would be to establish a 
fixed-price structure for each technology based on its specific characteristics’.373 
 
5.5.3  Discussion of the FIT in India and China 
In general, it has emerged that both India and China are experiencing problems with 
regard to institutional control and administration, such as uncoordinated policies or 
overlapping capacities or mandates of different institutions. While renewable energy 
capacity is increasing rapidly in both India and China, it appears that both countries 
have been going through a ‘trial and error’ approach and that changes have been 
made to the feed-in tariff policies as problems arose.  
With regard to India, its national FIT regulations provide for the establishment of 
long-term tariffs, which arguably contributes to certainty. However, as the national 
regulations are only intended to act as guidelines, the actual tariffs differ across 
states. It has also been noted that actual tariff conditions such as duration of tariffs 
vary across states. As highlighted above, the regional SERCs are only ‘loosely 
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bound by the directives and guidelines of the [national] CERC’,374 and it is not clear 
how effective the implementation of the FIT regulations has been in individual states. 
India’s national regulations provide for the review of tariffs, but they do not appear to 
establish an obligation to connect renewable energy installations, nor to purchase 
the renewable energy generated. 
China’s Renewable Energy Law establishes obligations to connect renewable 
energy installations, to purchase all renewable energy generated and to upgrade the 
grid to accommodate the renewable energy capacity. However, it does not provide 
for the establishment of long-term tariffs. Furthermore, China has not introduced 
degression rates for the various renewable energy technologies. Rather, it appears 
that prices are adjusted quite sporadically and various RETs have even undergone 
entire policy changes, for example, from tendering to the FIT, or vice versa. This 
clearly would not promote investor security, in the way that has occurred in 
Germany.  
Another observation is that the tariffs in both China and India appear to be 
relatively low in comparison to Germany and Spain. However, it is not possible to 
conclude that higher tariffs would result in a greater expansion of renewable energy 
in these countries,375 and as highlighted previously, the generous tariffs introduced in 
Italy in 1992 ‘had comparatively little impact on the Italian RES-E equipment 
industry’.376 However, it was observed that unrealistically low tariffs for solar PV in 
China have affected the quality of such installations.  
It is notable that wind energy, which is an intermittent energy source, dominates 
renewable energy capacity in both India and China. However, the feed-in tariffs 
established under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission in India appear 
promising.  
While in Germany, the FIT policy has been in a place for some time and the 
German government has been able to isolate the specific impacts of the EEG, this is 
not yet the case in China and India. In the first place, their feed-in laws have been 
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implemented relatively recently. Secondly, due to the existence of other instruments 
such as the RO or tendering, their governments have either not attempted, or been 
able, to isolate the specific impacts of their feed-in laws. It is thus not possible at this 
stage to determine the actual impact of the feed-in tariffs in China and India. 
However, in light of their experiences with regard to the uncoordinated 
implementation of a number of instruments, a preliminary suggestion would be that 
South Africa does not implement more than one primary financial support instrument 
for renewable energy. 
 
5.6   Concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the feed-in tariff in Germany and has described 
Germany’s feed-in laws in detail. It has also briefly described the feed-in tariff in 
Spain to illustrate that the design of FIT policies may vary. Furthermore, the feed-in 
tariff policies of India and China have been described briefly to illustrate the 
approach being taken in other developing countries.  
Some preliminary suggestions have been made regarding the elements that 
should ideally be present in a FIT policy in South Africa, including a purchase 
obligation, the establishment of appropriate tariffs, the differentiation of tariffs 
according to the type of RET and the adjustment of tariffs in respect of new projects. 
It has also been recommended that the policy should be relatively basic at its 
inception, and furthermore, that it is ideal if policymakers consider cost containment 
mechanisms at the outset. Chapter 8 will expand on the discussions above and 
consider more thoroughly the elements of a feed-in tariff framework in the South 
African context. 
It is first necessary to set out the laws and policies that are relevant to renewable 
energy in South Africa (in Chapter 6) as well as the market-based instruments that 






Policy and legislation relating to 
renewable energy in South Africa 
 
6.1   Introduction 
This chapter discusses South Africa’s energy-related laws and policies as well as 
those that are relevant to climate change, in light of the close link between energy 
generation and climate change discussed in Chapter 3 above.   
This chapter first briefly outlines the relevant institutions (in 6.2). It goes on to set 
out the constitutional and environmental law context (in 6.3). Thereafter, it considers 
energy-related legislation and policies (in 6.4) and climate change-related policies (in 
6.5). It also considers other legislation and policy documents that may be relevant to 
the promotion of renewable energy (in 6.6).  
The approach taken in this chapter is to discuss the relevant legislation and 
policies in chronological order, with no distinction being made between legislation 
and policies in order to illustrate the development of government policy on renewable 
energy. It is strongly emphasised that the legislation and policy documents 
discussed here are, for the most part, only discussed to the extent that they are 
relevant to renewable energy and its promotion, with the overall object being to 
establish the legal and policy basis for promoting renewable energy in South Africa.  
 
6.2   Institutions 
The national Department of Energy is the lead government department with regard 
to energy in South Africa and is responsible for renewable energy policy.1 A Branch 
for Clean and Renewable Energy has been established within the Department of 
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Energy.2 The Department of Energy is also running the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (discussed in 7.4.1.1 below). 
As identified in Chapter 3, state-owned Eskom holds a monopoly with regard to 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, insofar as it generates 95 
per cent of South Africa’s electricity3 (with the remainder being provided by 
independent power producers), and owns the entire transmission infrastructure and 
half of the distribution network (with the other half being owned by municipalities).4 
Eskom is also responsible for the buying and selling of electricity, either to 
municipalities (who then sell to consumers) or directly to end consumers. Eskom has 
thus far shown little interest in promoting renewable energy.5 
With regard to Eskom’s monopoly, the Department of Energy has prepared the 
Independent System and Market Operator Establishment Bill6 (the ISMO Bill), which, 
when it comes into effect, will establish the Independent System and Market 
Operator (ISMO), which would be a separate entity responsible for the buying and 
selling of electricity (currently undertaken by Eskom).7 It would inter alia also be 
responsible for the dispatch of electricity through the national transmission system 
and the balancing of electricity generation and demand.8 While the ISMO Bill is not 
discussed fully here, its finalisation is eagerly anticipated as it would inter alia 
promote the entry of independent power producers (IPPs) thus reducing Eskom’s 
monopoly. There have been a number of delays in the approval process9 and it has 
been argued that ‘Eskom, despite its public face, would prefer the status quo and 
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[Minister of Public Enterprises] Gigaba has weighed in behind the scenes’.10 
Parliamentary debate on the ISMO Bill, scheduled for mid-November 2013, was 
postponed thus ruling out its promulgation in 2013.11  
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (the NERSA), established in terms 
of the National Energy Regulator Act,12 also plays an important role. As discussed in 
6.4.4 below, the NERSA is inter alia responsible for the licensing of electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution facilities, the regulation of prices and tariffs, 
as well as issuing rules to implement the government’s electricity policy framework, 
the Integrated Resource Plan (discussed in 6.4.6 below) and the Electricity 
Regulation Act.13  
The Central Energy Fund (CEF) is a private company that was established in 
terms of the Central Energy Fund Act 38 of 1977. Two of the objectives that have 
been identified for the ‘CEF Group’ are to invest in energy efficiency and ‘renewable 
and alternative energy sources’,14 and to reduce environmental impacts and promote 
sustainable development.15 
The South African National Energy Research Institute and the National Energy 
Efficiency Agency, which were initially established as divisions of the CEF, have 
been subsumed by the South African National Energy Development Institute16 
(SANEDI), which is inter alia responsible for promoting energy efficiency as well as 
energy research and development.17  
                                                          
10
 D Pressly ‘Eskom seen as main hurdle as Ismo Bill is stuck in limbo’ Business Report (9 September 
2013) available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/eskom-seen-as-main-hurdle-as-ismo-bill-is-
stuck-in-limbo-1.1574742#.Uu5Uu7S7JUE [accessed 19 November 2013]. 
11
 See ‘Power operator Bill delayed yet again’ Legalbrief Today (14 November 2013) and SAPA 
‘Power bill off debate schedule’ (13 November 2013) available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/power-bill-off-debate-schedule-1.1606703#.UotpTOIw81c 
[accessed 19 November 2013]. 
12
 National Energy Regulator Act 40 of 2004. 
13
 Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006, section 4. 
14
 Department of Energy Revised Strategic Plan 2011/12 – 2015/16 2012 available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/aboutus/DoE_RevisedStrategicPlan_2011_12-2015_16%20.pdf 
[accessed 10 July 2012] 40. 
15
 Ibid. The NERSA and CEF are classified as ‘associated institutions’ by the Department of Energy. 
See Department of Energy Organisational Structure available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/aboutus/Departmental%20Organogram_new1.pdf [accessed 2 
February 2014]. 
16
 National Energy Act 34 of 2008, section 13(2). 
17
 Ibid, section 7(2). 
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The Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office (REFSO) was established by 
the (former) Department of Minerals and Energy in 200518 and is inter alia 
responsible for managing renewable energy subsidies and advising developers on 
renewable energy finance and subsidies.19  Projects that have a minimum generation 
capacity of 1MW and that cost less than R100 million may receive a subsidy of up to 
20 per cent of the project costs.20 The REFSO has not played a very significant role 
in the development of renewable energy and, since its establishment, has only 
provided subsidies to six projects with a total installed capacity of 23.9MW.21 As 
discussed further in 7.4.2.2 below, it appears that no projects have been funded 
since 2009/2010. 
The South Africa Renewables Initiative (SARI) is a partnership between the 
South African government and the governments of Denmark, Germany, Norway and 
the United Kingdom. It is concerned with supporting the rapid promotion of 
renewable energy.22  
Furthermore, a financial bill that inter alia imposes national taxes or levies with 
regard to energy would need to be introduced in Parliament by the Minister of 
Finance.23 
It therefore appears (including from the discussions in Chapter 3) that the main 
roleplayers in South Africa’s energy sector are the Department of Energy, the 
NERSA and Eskom, and that the remaining institutions play a more peripheral role. 
                                                          
18
 H Winkler Cleaner Energy Cooler Climate: Developing Sustainable Energy Solutions for South 
Africa 2009, 20. 
19
 Department of Energy Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/renewables/r_refso.html [accessed 13 March 2013]. 
20
 S Fakir and D Nicol Investigation: Obstacles and Barriers to Renewable Energy in South Africa 
2008 (a study prepared for the National Environmental Advisory Forum, Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism) available at 
http://www.environment.gov.za/Branches/COO/neaf_2005/Documents/Obstacles%20&%20barriers%
20to%20renewable%20energy%20in%20SA.pdf [accessed 12 May 2011] 19. See also Winkler 
Cleaner Energy Cooler Climate (n18) 134. 
21
 Department of Energy REFSO (n19). 
22
 See The South African Renewables Initiative available at 
http://sarenewablesinitiative.wordpress.com/ [accessed 13 March 2013]. 
23
 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 77(1)(b) and National Treasury: Tax 
Policy Chief Directorate Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments 
to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (April 2006) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Draft%20Environmental%20Fiscal%20Reform%20P
olicy%20Paper%206%20April%202006.pdf [accessed 10 May 2009] 31. 
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Once the ISMO is established, it will arguably also be a relatively prominent 
roleplayer. 
 
6.3   The constitutional and environmental law context 
 
6.3.1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) does not 
contain any provisions relating specifically to energy generation nor the promotion of 
renewable energy. The Constitution does, however, enshrine the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to one’s health or well-being, as well as the right to 
‘have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that –  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and  
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development’.24 
The Constitution also contains several socio-economic rights such as the right of 
access to health care services, sufficient food and water and social security,25 as 
well as the right of access to adequate housing.26  
On the other hand, it is significant that no right of access to energy is included, 
especially considering (as noted in Chapter 3) that soon after the end of apartheid 
only 58 per cent of South Africa’s population had access to electricity, with the 
statistics being skewed along racial lines.27  
                                                          
24
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n23) section 24, hereafter referred to as ‘the 
constitutional environmental right’. 
25
 Ibid, section 27. 
26
 Ibid, section 26. 
27
 Indeed, only 25 per cent of non-urban black households were electrified in 1996 compared to 97 
per cent of non-urban white households. B Bekker, A Eberhard, T Gaunt and A Marquard ‘South 
Africa’s Rapid Electrification Programme: Policy, institutional, planning, financing and technical 
innovations’ 2008 (36) Energy Policy 3125-3137, 3125. In Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg 
and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC), the Constitutional Court was concerned (very generally) with the 
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 With regard to legislative competence, ‘energy’ does not fall under Schedules 4 
or 5 of the Constitution, which set out the functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence and the functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence respectively. Therefore, energy is a matter of national 
legislative competence, which means that the national Department of Energy is 
primarily responsible for the passing of energy-related legislation. ‘Electricity and gas 
reticulation’ falls under Part B of Schedule 4, and is thus a matter of local 
government competence.28 
 
6.3.2  Environmental legislation 
There is no environmental legislation that deals specifically with climate change or 
the generation of energy or renewable energy. However, it is clear in light of the 
discussion contained in Chapters 2 and 3 that climate change and energy generation 
are environmental concerns.  
In addition, it is arguable that the constitutional imperative for the state to protect 
the environment through reasonable legislative and other measures that inter alia 
‘prevent pollution and ecological degradation’29 and that ‘secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development’,30 is relevant to the issue of energy generation, 
especially if one considers that the generation of energy from non-renewable fossil 
fuels depletes natural resources and causes pollution. It is thus important that the 
principle of sustainable development (discussed further below) is considered with 
regard to energy generation and decisions relating thereto. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
question of whether the applicants were entitled to procedural fairness before their electricity supply 
was terminated by the second respondent. The Constitutional Court had regard to the duty of 
municipalities to provide basic municipal services, including the provision of electricity, in terms of the 
Constitution and various Acts, and held that the applicants’ receipt of electricity was in terms of their 
‘corresponding public-law right to receive this basic municipal service’ (at para 47). By depriving them 
of this service, which they were ‘receiving as a matter of right’, the second respondent was obliged to 
afford the applicants procedural fairness before making a decision that materially and adversely 
affected this right (at para 47). While significant, it is not clear whether this decision establishes a 
clear right to electricity. 
28
 The Electricity Regulation Act (n13) defines ‘reticulation’ as ‘trading or distribution of electricity and 
includes services associated therewith’. See section 1. 
29
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n23) section 24(b)(i). 
30
 Ibid, section 24(b)(iii). 
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Various environmental laws that are potentially relevant to energy generation are 
considered next. 
 
6.3.2.1  National Environmental Management Act 
The National Environmental Management Act31 (the NEMA) was enacted in 
pursuance of the constitutional environmental right and is South Africa’s framework 
environmental legislation. It does not contain any provisions relating specifically to 
climate change, energy or renewable energy. However, it sets out a number of 
‘national environmental management principles’ (discussed further below), which 
apply to ‘the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the 
environment’32 and which inter alia ‘serve as guidelines by reference to which any 
organ of state must exercise any function when taking any decision in terms of [the 
NEMA]… or any statutory provision concerning the protection of the environment’.33  
The NEMA is underpinned by the principle of sustainable development, which is 
defined as ‘the integration of social, economic and environmental factors into 
planning, implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that development 
serves present and future generations’,34 and requires that development be ‘socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable’.35  
 Section 2(4)(a) states that ‘[s]ustainable development requires the consideration 
of all relevant factors’, including that:  
 ‘pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, where they 
cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied’36 (the 
preventative principle);  
                                                          
31
 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
32
 Ibid, section 2(1). 
33
 Ibid, section 2(1)(c). 
34
 Ibid, section 1. 
35
 Ibid, section 2(3). For further information on the NEMA, see J Glazewski ‘The National 
Enviromental Management Act’ in J Glazewski and L du Toit (eds) Environmental Law in South Africa 
(Loose-Leaf Edition, Issue 1) 2013. 
36
 NEMA (n31) section 2(4)(a)(ii). 
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 ‘the use and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is 
responsible and equitable, and takes into account the consequences of 
the depletion of the resource’;37  
 ‘the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which 
their integrity is jeopardised’;38  
 ‘a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account 
the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and 
actions’39 (the precautionary principle); and  
 ‘negative impacts on the environment and on people's environmental 
rights be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether 
prevented, are minimised and remedied’.40 
The national environmental management principles include that:  
 ‘[e]nvironmental management must be integrated, acknowledging that all 
elements of the environment are linked and interrelated, and it must take 
into account the effects of decisions on all aspects of the environment and 
all people in the environment by pursuing the selection of the best 
practicable environmental option’;41  
 the ‘social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including 
disadvantages and benefits, must be considered, assessed and 
evaluated, and decisions must be appropriate in the light of such 
consideration and assessment’;42  
 ‘[g]lobal and international responsibilities relating to the environment must 
be discharged in the national interest’;43 and  
 the ‘costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and 
consequent adverse health effects and of preventing, controlling or 
minimising further pollution, environmental damage or adverse health 
                                                          
37
 Ibid, section 2(4)(a)(v). 
38
 Ibid, section 2(4)(a)(vi). 
39
 Ibid, section 2(4)(a)(vii). 
40
 Ibid, section 2(4)(a)(viii). 
41
 Ibid, section 2(4)(b). 
42
 Ibid, section 2(4)(i). 
43
 Ibid, section 2(4)(n). 
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effects must be paid for by those responsible for harming the 
environment’44 (the ‘polluter pays’ principle). 
While none of these principles specifically refers to energy generation, actions 
and decisions of decision-makers that may significantly affect the environment would 
need to be considered in light of these principles. In light of the considerable 
environmental and social impacts arising from coal-fired power stations, it is 
arguable that decisions regarding the construction of coal-fired power plants are 
actions that may significantly affect the environment. Thus, it would be necessary to 
ensure compliance with the national environmental principles, including that the use 
and exploitation of coal (a non-renewable natural resource) ‘takes into account the 
consequences of the depletion of the resource’45 and that pollution and 
environmental degradation are, in the first place, avoided and, in the second place, 
minimised and remedied.46  
 
a)  Environmental assessment 
In order to promote integrated environmental management, the NEMA requires that 
the potential environmental impacts of specified activities that are listed in 
regulations under the NEMA47 be ‘considered, investigated, assessed and reported 
on’ before an environmental authorisation can be granted.48 Commencing a listed 
activity without the necessary authorisation is a criminal offence.49  
It is significant that Listing Notice 1 (issued by the Department of Environmental 
Affairs), which lists the activities that require a basic environmental assessment 
                                                          
44
 Ibid, section 2(4)(p). 
45
 In terms of NEMA, section 2(4)(a)(v). 
46
 In terms of NEMA, section 2(4)(a)(ii). 
47
 Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental Management Act (107/1998): Listing 
Notice 1: List of Activities and Competent Authorities identified in terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D GN 
544 in Government Gazette No. 33306 dated 18 June 2010; Department of Environmental Affairs 
National Environmental Management Act (107/1998): Listing Notice 2: List of Activities and 
Competent Authorities identified in terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D GN 545 in Government Gazette 
No. 33306 dated 18 June 2010; Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental 
Management Act (107/1998): Listing Notice 3: List of Activities and Competent Authorities identified in 
terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D GN 546 in Government Gazette No. 33306 dated 18 June 2010. 
48
 NEMA (n31) section 24(1). 
49
 Ibid, section 24F. The environmental impact assessment process is discussed in further detail in J 
Glazewski and S Brownlie ‘Environmental Assessment’ in J Glazewski and L du Toit (eds) 
Environmental Law in South Africa (Loose-Leaf Edition, Issue 1) 2013. 
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before environmental authorisation can be granted, inter alia includes the 
‘construction of facilities or infrastructure for the generation of electricity’ where the 
electricity output is between 10MW and 20MW.50 Listing Notice 2 lists the activities 
that require the more onerous scoping and environmental impact assessment, and 
inter alia includes the ‘construction of facilities or infrastructure for the generation of 
electricity where the electricity output is 20 megawatts or more’.51 
Thus, the construction of a power station (coal-fired and renewable) of 10MW or 
more capacity will require some kind of environmental assessment before such 
activity may commence.52 It should be noted that under the REIPPP Programme 
(discussed in Chapter 7) an environmental impact assessment must be completed in 
respect of all prospective RES-E projects, irrespective of their size. 
 
6.3.2.2  National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 
The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act53 (the NEMAQA) includes 
among its objects the promotion of air quality in South Africa, the prevention of air 
pollution and ecological degradation, securing ‘ecologically sustainable development 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development’, and giving effect to 
the constitutional environmental right ‘in order to enhance the quality of ambient air 
for the sake of securing an environment that is not harmful to the health and well-
being of people’.54 
The NEMAQA puts in place various measures to achieve the Act’s objects, 
including a national framework,55 and national, provincial and local standards for 
                                                          
50
 NEMA Listing Notice 1 (n47) Appendix 1, Activity number 1. See also Appendix 1, Activity number 
10. 
51
 NEMA Listing Notice 2 (n47) Appendix 1, Activity number 1. See also Appendix 1, Activity number 
8. 
52
 Interestingly, the environmental authorisation issued in respect of the imminent (coal-fired) Kusile 
power plant includes a specific condition that requires the Kusile power plant to be ‘carbon capture 
ready’, meaning that the Kusile plant must include measures to capture carbon dioxide and store it 
underground. See J Glazewski, A Gilder and E Swanepoel Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS): 
Towards a Regulatory and Legal Regime in South Africa 2012 (Institute of Marine and Environmental 
Law and African Climate and Development Initiative, University of Cape Town). 
53
 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004. 
54
 Ibid, section 2. 
55
 Ibid, section 7. 
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ambient air quality or emissions,56 as well as the declaration of an area as a priority 
area by the Minister or MEC if certain requirements are met, including that the 
Minister or MEC believes that ‘ambient air quality standards are being, or may be 
exceeded in the area, or any other situation exists which is causing, or may cause, a 
significant negative impact on air quality in the area’.57 As noted in Chapter 2, it is 
significant that the Highveld Priority Area, which was declared under the NEMAQA in 
2007,58 occupies roughly the same geographical area as the area where most of 
Eskom’s coal power plants are located.59 
The Minister and MEC are also empowered to publish a list of activities that 
result in atmospheric emissions and that are reasonably believed to have or 
potentially have ‘a significant detrimental effect on the environment, including health, 
social conditions, economic conditions, ecological conditions or cultural heritage’,60 
for which an atmospheric emission licence is required before such an activity may be 
carried out.61 
While the NEMAQA notes that ‘atmospheric emissions of ozone-depleting 
substances, greenhouse gases and other substances have deleterious effects on the 
environment both locally and globally’62 and defines ‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG) to 
include carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide,63 it is not actually concerned with 
regulating these GHGs. It does however, establish national ambient air quality 
standards for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, ozone, benzene, 
lead and carbon monoxide.64  
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 Ibid, sections 9-11. 
57
 Ibid, section 18(1)(a). See also section 18(1)(b). 
58
 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Environmental Management: Air Quality 
Act, 2004 (Act No. 39 of 2004): Declaration of the Highveld as a Priority Area in terms of Section 
18(1) of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 2004 (Act No. 39 of 2004) GN 1123 
in Government Gazette No. 30518 dated 23 November 2007. 
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 Ibid. See also and Eskom Integrated Report 2011 available at 
http://financialresults.co.za/2011/eskom_ar2011/downloads/eskom-ar2011.pdf [accessed 15 January 
2013] 5. 
60
 NEMAQA (n53) section 21(1)(a). Such a list of activities has been published in terms of GN 893 in 
Government Gazette No. 37054 dated 22 November 2013. 
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 NEMAQA (n53) section 22. 
62
 Ibid, Preamble. 
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 Ibid, section 1(1). 
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 Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 
(39/2004): National Ambient Air Quality Standards GN 1210 in Government Gazette No. 32816 dated 
24 December 2009. 
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While a case could be made for using the NEMAQA to regulate climate change 
and carbon emissions, this approach has not been taken by government. Rather, 
climate change responses have been left to separate devices such as the 
preparation of the National Climate Change Response White Paper.65 
  
6.3.2.3  Other environmental legislation 
Other environmental legislation may be indirectly relevant to energy generation, 
including the National Environmental Management: Waste Act,66 which is concerned 
with managing (primarily solid) waste in South Africa, and the National Water Act.67 
Indeed, it has been noted that ‘any hydropower development will require 
authorisation in terms of the National Water Act’.68 Other environmental legislation 
would potentially also need to be complied with. However, as such Acts are not 
directly relevant, they are not considered further. 
The next section considers energy-related legislation and policy documents, to 
the extent that they are relevant to the promotion of renewable energy. As noted 
above, these are discussed in chronological order to illustrate the development of 
government policy on renewable energy. 
 
6.4   Energy-related legislation and policy documents 
 
6.4.1  White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of 
 South Africa (1998) 
The White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa69 (the EWP) 
was published by the (former) Department of Minerals and Energy well over a 
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 This is discussed in 6.5.5 below. 
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 National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. 
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 National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
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 Renewable Energy White Paper (n1) 37. 
69
 Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South 
Africa in GN 3007 in Government Gazette No. 19606 dated 17 December 1998. 
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decade ago (before the load-shedding of 2007/2008, which was discussed in 
3.3.1.2) in order to ‘clarify government policy regarding the supply and consumption 
of energy for the next decade’.70 It was drafted from the point of view of 
Government’s ‘main goal’ being the ‘socio-economic development of all our 
people’.71 While it has been overtaken by more recent events and policy documents, 
it is described as the ‘premier policy document which guides all subsequent policies, 
strategies and legislation within the energy sector’.72 
The EWP sets out five energy sector policy objectives, namely to increase 
access to affordable energy services, improve energy governance, stimulate 
economic development, manage energy-related environmental and health impacts 
and secure supply through diversity.73  
With regard to renewable energy, the EWP recognises the potential role for 
renewable energy and states that renewable energy sources  
‘can increasingly contribute towards a long-term sustainable energy future. The 
development of government’s renewable energy policy is guided by a rationale 
that South Africa disposes of very attractive renewable resources, particularly 
solar and wind and that renewable applications are in fact the least cost energy 
service in many cases; more so when social and environmental costs are taken 
into account’.74  
The EWP also notes the perception that renewable energy in South Africa is only 
suitable in respect of small-scale applications, where it would be cheaper than 
conventional sources of energy, and states that ‘[c]losed mind-sets are therefore a 
barrier to the adoption of renewable energy technologies’.75 
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 Ibid, 3. 
71
 Ibid, 4. 
72
 Department of Energy Draft 2012 Integrated Energy Planning Report in GN 513 in Government 
Gazette No. 36690 dated 24 July 2013, 45. 
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 Energy White Paper (n69) 8-9. 
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6.4.2  Integrated Energy Plan (2003) 
The purpose of the Integrated Energy Plan for the Republic of South Africa76 (the 
IEP), which was published by the (former) Department of Minerals and Energy, was 
‘to balance energy demand with supply resources in concert with safety, health and 
environmental considerations’77 with the aim of developing a ‘framework within which 
specific energy policy and development decisions can be made’.78  
The IEP considers four different scenarios and maps electricity and oil capacity 
expansion plans under each of these scenarios.79 With regard to renewable energy 
specifically, while the IEP notes that it is important to promote renewable energy for 
‘environmental reasons and for diversification of supply’,80 it places much emphasis 
on the higher initial costs of renewable energy and the fact that wind and solar 
energy are intermittent energy sources with the result that additional storage 
becomes necessary, thus increasing costs. On the other hand, the IEP considers 
biomass to be an ‘economic’ renewable energy source.81 
While the IEP is still in place, since it was published a decade ago it has been 
overtaken by more recent government publications including the Integrated 
Resource Plan 2010-2030 (discussed in 6.4.6 below). It should also be noted that 
the National Energy Act 34 of 2008 (discussed in 6.4.5 below) requires the 
publication of an Integrated Energy Plan. While this has not yet been done, the 
Department of Energy has published a draft Integrated Energy Planning Report,82 
which forms part of the process of preparing a final Integrated Energy Plan, which is 
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 Department of Minerals and Energy Integrated Energy Plan for the Republic of South Africa 2003 
available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=124574 [accessed 30 October 2012]. 
77
 Ibid, 5. 
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 Ibid, 25. 
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 Ibid, 25-26. 
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 Ibid, 25. 
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 Ibid 25. 
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expected to be completed in 2014.83 The IRP 2010-2030 will reportedly ‘be updated 
in parallel’.84  
 
6.4.3  White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the 
 Republic of South Africa (2004) 
The (former) Department of Minerals and Energy published the White Paper on the 
Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa85 (the REWP) in 2004. It is 
still relevant today. The REWP sets out Government’s vision with regard to 
renewable energy, namely ‘[a]n energy economy in which modern renewable energy 
increases its share of energy consumed and provides affordable access to energy 
throughout South Africa, thus contributing to sustainable development and 
environmental conservation’.86  
It also sets out government’s long-term goal in regard to renewable energy, 
namely  
‘the establishment of a sustainable renewable energy industry with an equitable 
BEE [black economic empowerment] share and job market that will offer in future 
years a fully sustainable, non-subsidised alternative to fossil fuel dependence’.87 
The REWP also considers the promotion of renewable energy as a response to 
climate change and states that ‘alternative means of producing energy such as 
renewable energy sources, which have less impact on the environment compared to 
fossil fuels have to be considered’.88  
Significantly, the REWP establishes the target of  
                                                          
83
 In the Draft Integrated Energy Planning Report it is noted that the draft report ‘does not provide 
recommendations but presents model output from the Base Case and various Test Cases. 
This output gives insight on the possible implications of pursuing alternative energy policy 
options… final recommendations will be made in the form of the Final IEP Report’. At 43. 
84
 See T Creamer ‘Draft energy roadmap to be released for public comment this month’ Engineering 
News (2 July 2013) available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/draft-energy-roadmap-to-
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‘10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe [million tonnes of oil equivalent]) renewable energy 
contribution to final energy consumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from 
biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro. The renewable energy is to be 
utilised for power generation and non-electric technologies such as solar water 
heating and bio-fuels. This is approximately 4% (1667 MW) of the projected 
electricity demand for 2013 (41539 MW).’89 
At the time of writing, this target had not yet been achieved. 
The REWP acknowledges the cost barrier to renewable energy and states that 
there is a need  
‘for Government to create an enabling environment through the introduction of 
fiscal and financial support mechanisms within an appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework to allow renewable energy technologies to compete with 
fossil-based technologies… Market conditions for renewable energy generation 
can be optimised by reducing the barriers to the increased production of 
electricity from this source through the development and implementation of an 
appropriate financial and legislative framework. There is a need for Government 
support for renewable energy to help establish initial market share and 
demonstrate the viability of renewable sources, after which economies of scale 
and technological development take over’.90  
The REWP identifies four key strategic areas with regard to promoting 
renewable energy including financial instruments and legal instruments.91 It notes 
that financial instruments need to be developed essentially in order to ‘facilitate the 
creation of an investment climate for the development of the renewable energy 
sector, which will attract foreign and local investors’.92 With regard to legal 
instruments, the REWP inter alia identifies the need to ‘develop, implement, maintain 
and continuously improve an effective legislative system to promote the 
implementation of renewable energy’.93 
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It is significant that the South African government identified ‘the establishment of 
a sustainable renewable energy industry’ as part of its long-term goal for renewable 
energy. 94 It is also notable that government identified the financial barrier to 
renewable energy a decade ago as well as the need for financial and legal 
instruments to promote renewable energy.  
 
6.4.4  Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006  
The Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (the Electricity Regulation Act) is concerned 
with regulating the electricity supply industry and includes among its objects the 
‘efficient, effective, sustainable and orderly development and operation of electricity 
supply infrastructure in South Africa’,95 ensuring that ‘the interests and needs of 
present and future electricity customers and end users are safeguarded and met’ 
inter alia having regard to the ‘long-term sustainability of the electricity supply 
industry’,96 facilitating ‘universal access to electricity’,97 promoting ‘the use of diverse 
energy sources and energy efficiency’98 and promoting ‘competitiveness and 
customer and end user choice’.99 
The NERSA (discussed in 6.2 above) is appointed as the ‘custodian and enforcer 
of the regulatory framework’ established under the Electricity Regulation Act.100 It is 
charged with various responsibilities including: considering applications for, and 
issuing, licences inter alia for the ‘operation of generation, transmission or 
distribution facilities’ and the import and export of electricity;101 regulating prices and 
tariffs;102 and issuing rules to implement the government’s electricity policy 
framework, the Integrated Resource Plan (discussed in 6.4.6 below) and the 
Electricity Regulation Act.103  
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One may only operate a generation, transmission or distribution facility, import or 
export electricity or trade electricity if one is in possession of a licence issued by the 
NERSA,104 except in certain specified circumstances.105 The NERSA is empowered 
to make any licence subject to various conditions, including regarding ‘the types of 
energy sources from which electricity must or may be generated, bought or sold’.106 
A licence condition that relates to ‘the setting or approval of prices, charges and 
tariffs …must enable an efficient licensee to recover the full cost of its licensed 
activities, including a reasonable margin or return’.107 
Most relevant to the present topic, the Electricity Regulation Act empowers the 
Minister of Energy, in consultation with the NERSA, to determine that new 
generation capacity is required ‘to ensure the continued uninterrupted supply of 
electricity’,108 and to ‘determine the types of energy sources from which electricity 
must be generated, and the percentages of electricity that must be generated from 
such sources’,109 and to make regulations in this regard.110 Such regulations were 
made when the Minister of Energy published the Integrated Resource Plan 
(discussed in 6.4.6 below). 
The Minister is also empowered to determine that the generation capacity must 
‘be established through a tendering process which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective’.111 The Electricity Regulation Act sets out the powers 
of the Minister in regard to the tendering process, including entering into the 
necessary contracts to ‘facilitate the tendering process’,112 applying inter alia for 
permits under the NEMA or other relevant laws, and transfering such permits etc. to 
successful tenderers.113 It appears that the current renewable energy tendering 
programme (discussed in detail in Chapter 7) is authorised in terms of these 
provisions.  
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Various regulations have been made under the Electricity Regulation Act, 
including the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030, which is discussed further in 
6.4.6. 
 
6.4.5  National Energy Act 34 of 2008 
The National Energy Act 34 of 2008 (the Energy Act) is South Africa’s framework 
legislation regulating energy supply in South Africa (while the Electricity Regulation 
Act is only concerned with the regulation of electricity). It includes among its objects 
ensuring ‘uninterrupted supply of energy’ in South Africa,114 promoting ‘diversity of 
supply of energy and its sources’,115 facilitating ‘effective management of energy 
demand and its conservation’,116 promoting energy research,117 providing for ‘certain 
safety, health and environment matters that pertain to energy’,118 facilitating ‘energy 
access for improvement of the quality of life’,119 and contributing to ‘sustainable 
development of South Africa’s economy’.120 
It defines ‘renewable energy’ as ‘energy generated from natural non-depleting 
resources including solar energy, wind energy, biomass energy, biological waste 
energy, hydro energy, geothermal energy and ocean and tidal energy’.121 The 
Energy Act does not establish any concrete obligations regarding the promotion of 
renewable energy. 
The Energy Act requires the Minister of Energy to adopt measures to ensure 
‘universal access to appropriate forms of energy or energy services … at affordable 
prices’.122 Such measures must inter alia take into account ‘the safety, health and 
environmental suitability of such energy’,123 ‘the availability of energy resources’,124 
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‘the sustainability of the energy provision’,125 affordability and cost-effectiveness,126 
and ‘the State’s commitment to provide free basic electricity to poor households’.127 
The Minister is also required to develop an Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), which 
must be reviewed and published annually. The IEP must ‘deal with issues relating to 
the supply, transformation, transport, storage of and demand for energy’ so as to 
inter alia take account of security of supply,128 affordability, universal access to 
electricity and free basic electricity,129 the environment,130 international 
commitments,131 the ‘contribution of energy supply to socio-economic 
development’,132 as well as plans relating to the mitigation of GHGs in the energy 
sector.133 The IEP must also take account of ‘all viable energy supply options’.134  
As noted above, an Integrated Energy Plan was prepared in 2003. However, this 
was not done in terms of the present legislation and it is outdated. As also noted, the 
Department of Energy is in the process of preparing a new Integrated Energy 
Plan,135 which is expected to be published in 2014. Presumably the final Integrated 
Energy Plan will replace the 2003 IEP. 
The Energy Act also establishes the SANEDI,136 which as noted in 6.2 above, is 
inter alia responsible for promoting energy efficiency as well as energy research and 
development.137 The South African National Energy Research Institute and the 
National Energy Efficiency Agency, which existed before the commencement of the 
Energy Act as divisions of the Central Energy Fund, are subsumed by the 
SANEDI.138  
The Energy Act empowers the Minister to make regulations regarding various 
matters including ‘minimum contributions to national energy supply from renewable 
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energy sources’139 and ‘the nature of the sources that may be used for renewable 
energy contributions to the national energy supply’,140 as well as ‘measures and 
incentives designed to promote the production, consumption, investment, research 
and development of renewable energy’.141 Such regulations have not been made.  
It could be argued that the Integrated Resource Plan (dealt with in 6.4.6) 
effectively establishes minimum contributions of renewable energy. However, it is 
submitted that the Integrated Resource Plan, which is concerned with setting out 
South Africa’s electricity capacity expansion programme until 2030, does not hold 
quite the same weight as the establishment of minimum contributions of renewable 
energy under the National Energy Act, which would presumably be binding. 
South Africa’s framework energy legislation thus does not contain any provisions 
that make the promotion of renewable energy compulsory. Rather, this is left to the 
Minister’s discretion.  
 
6.4.6  The Integrated Resource Plan 1 (2010) and Integrated 
 Resource Plan 2 (2011) 
The Integrated Resource Plan 1 (IRP 1) was published in 2010 when the Minister of 
Energy determined that new generation was required in terms of section 34 of the 
Electricity Regulation Act.142 As noted in Chapter 3, this followed the load-shedding 
that occurred in 2007/2008. 
The IRP 1 aimed to give effect to the 10 000 GWh renewable energy target and 
to provide for energy efficiency as well as the installation of one million solar water 
heaters.143 The IRP 1 intended that the renewable energy target would be met 
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through the implementation of the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (discussed in 
Chapter 7) and several other projects, which together would provide renewable 
energy capacity of 1595 MW.144 
The IRP 1 was overtaken by the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030145 (IRP 
2010-2030), which was published in 2011. The IRP 2010-2030 considers a range of 
scenarios in relation to the ‘base case’ (‘business as usual’) scenario and endorses 
the ‘policy adjusted scenario’, which envisages that the national electricity grid will be 
expanded from the 2010 level of 44 535 megawatts (MW) to 89 532 MW by 2030.146 
The IRP 2010-2030 sets out the capacity that has been allocated to different 
electricity technologies, which is reflected in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1   New capacity (uncommitted) to be added from 2010 to 
2030147 
Electricity technology Capacity to be added from 2010 to 2030 
 MW % of total new capacity 
Coal 6250 14.7 
OCGT (open cycle gas 
turbine) 
2910 9.2 
CCGT (combined cycle 
gas turbine) 
2370 5.6 
Pumped storage 0 0 
Nuclear 9600 22.6 
Hydro 2609 6.1 
Wind 8400 19.7 
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CSP 1000 2.4 
Solar PV 8400 19.7 
Other 0 0 
Total 42539 100 
 
New renewable energy will thus amount to 42 per cent of total new capacity. The 
IRP 2010-2030 envisages that 30 per cent of the new capacity will be provided by 
independent power producers.148 This electricity capacity expansion programme will 
result in total capacity of 21 per cent renewables and about 46 per cent of coal by 
2030, which is reflected in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2   Total (electricity) capacity in 2030149 
Electricity technology Total capacity in 2030 
 MW % of total capacity 
Coal 41071 45.9 
OCGT  7330 8.2 
CCGT  2370 2.6 
Pumped storage 2912 3.3 
Nuclear 11400 12.7 
Hydro 4759 5.3 
Wind 9200 10.3 
CSP 1200 1.3 
Solar PV 8400 9.4 
Other 890 1 
Total 89532 100 
 
As argued in 6.4.5 above, the establishment of an electricity capacity expansion 
plan in terms of the IRP 2010-2030 does not hold the same weight as the setting of 
targets or minimum contributions for renewable energy, as provided for by the 
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National Energy Act. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘minimum contributions’ 
implies that this is the amount of renewable energy that will actually be generated or 
supplied to the grid, which is distinct from merely specifying the amount of renewable 
energy capacity that should be available, as provided for by the IRP 2010-2030. This 
distinction between supply and capacity was discussed in 3.2.1 above. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the IRP 2010-2030 envisages that the contribution 
(or supply) of coal will decrease from about 90 per cent presently to about 65 per 
cent in 2030. However, it appears that the shortfall will, for the most part, simply be 
made up by nuclear power. All renewables together (excluding hydro) will only 
contribute 9 per cent to total electricity supply by 2030.  
The IRP 2010-2030 also provides that  
‘[n]et metering, which allows for consumers to feed energy they produce into the 
grid and offset this energy against consumed energy, should be considered for 
all consumers (including residential and commercial consumers) in order to 
realise the benefits of distributed generation’.150  
It also states that ‘the IRP should not be restrictive in terms of own 
generation’.151 It has however been reported that municipalities, which are 
responsible for selling electricity to consumers, are strongly opposed to net metering 
due to the fact that ‘selling electricity is one of the major sources of income for 
municipalities’, which income is used to cross-subsidise other services provided by 
municipalities.152  
It has been reported that the implementation of the IRP 2010-2030 will result in 
emissions in the electricity sector being reduced by 19 per cent below the baseline 
(or ‘business as usual’ levels) by 2025,153 while total emission reductions will only 
amount to 8.6 per cent.154 This therefore falls well below the Copenhagen 
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commitment target of 34 per cent below business as usual levels by 2025.155 On the 
other hand, it has been reported that the supply of 27 per cent of renewable energy 
(RES-E) by 2030, as opposed to just 9 per cent, is required in order to attain the 
emission trajectory endorsed by Government.156  
The IRP 2010-2030 also calculates the projected costs of the different scenarios 
modelled. However, the costs of externalities have not been included in the cost 
calculations, and the IRP 2010-2030 notes that ‘[i]dentifying the externalities and 
associated costs should be the subject of future research for future iterations’.157 
A report commissioned by the National Planning Commission (NPC), and which 
was published in 2013, states that electricity demand is not developing as projected 
in the IRP 2010-2030, and that the projection of electricity demand of about 89 GW 
by 2030 will actually be closer to about 61 GW, due inter alia to the decreased use of 
electricity as a result of increasing electricity prices.158 The report states that due to 
the lower than expected electricity growth and the increased costs of nuclear energy, 
there is no reason to invest in costly nuclear energy for the next 15 to 25 years, and 
that other options should be explored first. The report furthermore states that, if 
investment decisions continue to be based on the current IRP 2010-2030, this ‘will 
result in a sub-optimal mix of generation plants, and higher electricity prices. It is 
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therefore critical that the IRP assumptions are revised and that a new plan is 
developed’.159  
In accordance with the requirement to revise the IRP,160 the Department of 
Energy has started to review the IRP 2010-2030161 and in November 2013 published 
an Update to the IRP 2010-2030. As the IRP 2010-2030 ‘remains the official 
government plan for new generation capacity until replaced by a full iteration’,162 the 
focus here remains on the IRP 2010-2030. Nevertheless, the Update ‘is intended to 
provide insight into critical changes for consideration on key decisions in the 
interim’.163 The Update projects that electricity demand in 2030 will range between 
345 and 416 TWh (81.4 GW) as opposed to the 454 TWh (89.5 GW) projected in the 
IRP 2010-2030.164 A new IRP will be finalised following the finalisation of the 
Integrated Energy Plan.165 
 
6.4.7  Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity 
 (2010-2012) 
The Minister of Energy published Electricity Regulations on New Generation 
Capacity under the Electricity Regulation Act in 2010,166 which inter alia set out the 
procedure with regard to developing the Integrated Resource Plan,167 procuring new 
generation capacity under an Independent Power Producer (IPP) bid programme168 
and procuring new generation capacity under the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
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(REFIT) programme.169 Further regulations on new generation capacity were made 
in 2011,170 which inter alia deal with the development of the integrated resource 
plan,171 the procurement process under the IPP procurement programme172 and the 
conclusion of the power purchase agreement.173 
In terms of the 2011 Regulations and section 34(1) of the Electricity Regulation 
Act, the Minister of Energy in consultation with the NERSA, determined in 2012 that 
additional renewable energy capacity was required in order to ‘contribute towards 
energy security and to facilitate [the] achievement of the renewable energy targets of 
the Republic of South Africa’,174 and as noted in Chapter 3, determined that an 
additional 3200 MW of renewable energy should be procured.175 This additional 
3200 MW will also be procured through the REIPPP Programme.176 The regulations 
allocate this renewable energy capacity as follows: 
 
Table 6.3   Additional renewable energy capacity to be procured 
through tendering177 
Technology Additional capacity (MW) 
Onshore wind 1470 
Concentrated solar power 400 
Solar PV 1075 
Small hydro (≤ 40MW) 60 
Biomass 47.5 
Biogas 47.5 
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Small projects 100 
Total 3200 
 
It should be noted that the ‘additional’ renewable energy capacity allocated is in 
accordance with the renewable energy capacity that was allocated under the IRP 
2010-2030 (as set out in Table 6.1), and the ‘additional’ renewable energy capacity 
allocated simply relates to the fact that more renewable energy is to be procured 
through the tendering (REIPPP) programme.178 The procurer is the Department of 
Energy, which is charged with conducting the procurement programme, and the 
electricity is to be purchased from IPPs by Eskom.179 The REIPPP Programme is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
6.4.8  General comments 
The preceding discussion has provided an overview of relevant legislation and policy 
documents with the object of establishing the legal and policy basis for promoting 
renewable energy. It is clear from the above that renewable energy has moved up 
higher on government’s agenda from 1998 to the present day. Nevertheless, some 
points of discussion emerge. 
It is significant that South Africa’s framework law regulating energy, the National 
Energy Act, does not contain more stringent provisions regarding the uptake of 
renewable energy. This is in contrast to the National Energy Bill that was published 
for comment in 2004,180 which included a section devoted entirely to renewable 
energy that specifically provided that the Minister ‘must optimise the contribution of 
renewable energy to the national energy supply’181 and furthermore that the Minister 
‘must establish a national programme to promote renewable energy’.182 It is thus 
arguable that more stringent provisions could have been included under the National 
Energy Act regarding the uptake of renewable energy. 
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The IRP 2010-2030 is important in that it sees an increased role for renewable 
energy. However, the contribution of 9 per cent renewable energy to electricity 
supply is arguably not very significant, especially in light of the studies discussed in 
Chapter 3. It was seen in Chapter 3 that one study considered that achieving 15 per 
cent RES-E by 2030 ‘is possible with hardly any change in public and private 
investments’.183 This therefore runs counter to the argument that a greater 
contribution of renewable energy in South Africa (than provided for in the IRP 2010-
2030) would be too expensive.  
It was also noted in 6.4.6 above that the IRP 2010-2030 is not aligned with the 
emission trajectory endorsed by government and that the costs of externalities were 
not included in the modelling. However, it could have been instructive to have 
included the externality costs in the modelling exercises, especially in light of the 
argument that renewable energy is costly. 
While South Africa is a developing country with numerous pressing priorities, in 
light of the above, it is arguable that government could take stronger action to 
promote renewable energy in order to achieve the establishment of a sustainable 
renewable energy industry (as set out in the REWP).  
 
6.5   Climate change-related policies 
Due to the close link between energy generation and climate change, climate 
change-related policies will have implications for energy policy in South Africa and 
vice versa. Climate change-related policies are discussed below in chronological 
order in order to illustrate the development of government policy on climate change. 
These policy documents are not binding and are discussed only to the extent that 
they are relevant to renewable energy. 
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6.5.1  Initial National Communication under the United Nations 
 Framework Convention on Climate Change (2000) 
South Africa’s Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change184 (the Initial Communication) was prepared by the 
(former) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in terms of Article 12 of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and was 
South Africa’s first official publication dealing specifically with climate change. 
At the time that the Initial Communication was drafted, it was considered that the 
approach to GHG mitigation was ‘only at an exploratory phase’ due to other national 
priorities such as poverty alleviation and ‘providing access to basic facilities’.185 The 
Initial Communication did nevertheless consider two potential scenarios to mitigate 
GHG emissions, namely increased demand side management (DSM), i.e. reducing 
energy demand, and using more efficient energy technologies, which envisaged the 
increased role of nuclear energy, gas, hydropower and renewable sources. 
However, this scenario envisaged that renewable energy would only contribute one 
per cent to electricity supply by 2025.186 
 
6.5.2  National Climate Change Response Strategy (2004) 
The National Climate Change Response Strategy187 (the Climate Change Response 
Strategy) was published in 2004 by the (former) Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism. At this time, climate change was still not high on the agenda. Indeed, 
the Climate Change Response Strategy emphasises the national position of viewing 
the climate change response as an opportunity to promote government priorities, 
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including the provision of basic services and housing, infrastructure development 
and the alleviation of poverty.188  
The Climate Change Response Strategy also emphasises that South Africa is 
not bound to reduce its GHG emissions (due to its developing country status), but 
considers mitigation options that could be implemented in the future.189 It 
acknowledges that introducing renewable energy could play a role in mitigating GHG 
emissions.190 However, this idea was not taken further and the Climate Change 
Response Strategy argues that the ‘burden of proof’ with regard to proving that 
renewable energy and energy efficiency programmes ‘would be successful on a 
large scale rests with the proponents of such schemes’.191 
 
6.5.3  Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for 
 South Africa (2007) 
The Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for South Africa192 (LTMS) 
was published by the (former) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 
2007. The aim in commissioning the LTMS was to produce a document that would 
enable Cabinet to ‘draw up a long-term climate policy’ and to inform South Africa’s 
climate change negotiating position.193  
The LTMS is more pertinent than previous policy documents on climate change. 
Instead of being a vision document that simply sets out actions that could be taken 
by government, it is a study that, through modelling, determines strategies that would 
need to be implemented if South Africa were to reduce its GHG emissions by 30 to 
40 per cent below 2003 levels by 2050. This is referred to as the ‘Required by 
Science Scenario’ (RBS), and it sees South Africa join ‘the world community in 
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taking action to stabilise GHG concentrations, and negotiate… a target as its fair 
contribution to this shared vision’.194  
The RBS Scenario is considered to be more ‘robust’ and ‘compelling’ than the 
‘Growth without Constraints Scenario’ scenario (GWC), which ‘presents an economy 
and society based very much on the patterns and dynamics that dominate South 
Africa today’ and sees GHG emissions increasing fourfold by 2050.195 In order to 
achieve the RBS Scenario, the LTMS recommends the implementation of four 
strategies, namely ‘Start Now’, ‘Scale Up’, ‘Use the Market’ and ‘Reach for the Goal’, 
and specific actions are recommended in respect of each of these strategies.  
With regard to renewable energy specifically, the LTMS recommends that there 
be ‘a move away from coal-fired electricity, with renewables, nuclear and cleaner 
coal each providing 27% of electricity generated by 2050’196 (under ‘Start Now’). In 
the ‘Scale Up’ strategy, which requires the expansion of the actions under ‘Start 
Now’, renewable energy and nuclear power each supply 50 per cent of electricity by 
2050.197  The ‘key driver’ of the ‘Use the Market’ strategy is a carbon tax that starts 
at R100 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2eq) and increases to 
R750/tCO2e.
198 The revenue generated by the tax could be used to provide 
incentives, for example for solar water heaters and RES-E, and results in RES-E 
becoming cheaper.199 These three strategic options lead to emission reductions of 
76 per cent below 2003 levels.200 
The fourth strategy, Reach for the Goal, would serve to close this gap and 
requires the implementation of measures that are not yet known such as investing in 
new technologies and incentivising behaviour change.201 
The scenarios and strategic options presented in the LTMS are considered to be 
‘positive and ambitious but realistic pathways which can meet the expected demands 
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of multinational negotiations’.202 The LTMS continues to inform government policy on 
climate change.203  
 
6.5.4  The ‘Copenhagen commitment’ (2009) 
At the 15th Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC (and the 5th Conference of 
the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol), 
President Jacob Zuma committed to reducing GHG emissions in South Africa by 34 
per cent below ‘business as usual’ (BAU) levels by 2020 and by 42 per cent below 
BAU levels by 2025. However, this is not binding and, as noted in Chapter 2, is 
subject to the receipt of financial support from developed country parties.204  
 
6.5.5  National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) 
The National Climate Change Response White Paper205 (the Climate Change White 
Paper) was published by the Department of Environmental Affairs in 2011, following 
the publication of the National Climate Change Response Green Paper in 2010.206 
Since the former represents government’s more recent position on climate change, 
only the Climate Change White Paper is discussed here. 
The Climate Change White Paper sets out South Africa’s two climate change 
objectives, namely to: 
 ‘Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through interventions 
that build and sustain South Africa’s social, economic and environmental 
resilience and emergency response capacity [and] 
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 Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise … [GHG] 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a timeframe that 
enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner’.207 
The achievement of these objectives is to be guided by various principles 
including the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities’, the equity principle, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays 
principle, and the principle of sustainable development.208 
The Climate Change White Paper states that mitigation is a national priority.209 In 
line with the commitment to ‘contributing its fair share to global GHG mitigation 
efforts in order to keep the temperature increase well below 2°C’,210 the Climate 
Change White Paper reiterates the commitment made at Copenhagen to reduce 
emissions by 34 per cent below business as usual levels by 2020 and by 42 per cent 
by 2025.211 However, this is subject to the receipt of financial and other support from 
developed country parties.212 
In light of the fact that most of South Africa’s GHG emissions are generated by 
the energy sector, the Climate Change White Paper recognises that ‘large mitigation 
contributions will have to come from reduced emissions from energy generation and 
use’,213 and states that ‘the most promising mitigation options are primarily energy 
efficiency and demand side management, coupled with increasing investment in a 
renewable energy programme in the electricity sector’.214  
This language is weaker than that contained in the Climate Change Green 
Paper, in which it was explicitly acknowledged that  
‘it is clear that successful climate change mitigation in South Africa must focus 
on the energy sector. In this regard, energy efficiency measures, the roll out of 
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renewable forms of energy and also a nuclear energy roll out would result in the 
largest emission reductions’.215 
The Climate Change White Paper endorses the ‘benchmark national GHG 
emissions trajectory range’, which represents South Africa’s emission trajectory until 
2050. This is the ‘Peak, Plateau and Decline trajectory’ (reflected in Figure 6.1 
below), which sees GHG emissions peaking between 2020 and 2025, plateauing 
until 2035 and thereafter declining until 2050.216 
 
Figure 6.1  The desired South African climate change mitigation 
outcome – the ‘Peak, Plateau and Decline’ (PPD) greenhouse 
gas emission trajectory217 
 
The Climate Change White Paper also endorses a ‘carbon budget approach’, in 
order to provide a flexible approach to mitigation. In terms of this approach ‘carbon 
budgets’, which are in line with the emissions trajectory, would be prepared for the 
relevant economic sectors within two years of the publication of the Climate Change 
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White Paper,218 i.e. by October 2013. Thus, the entire GHG emissions allowance in 
terms of the emissions trajectory will be divided up and allocated amongst the 
different sectors. At the time of writing no carbon budgets had yet been established. 
The Climate Change White Paper establishes a number of ‘Near-term Priority 
Flagship Programmes’, including the Climate Change Response Public Works 
Flagship Programme and the Renewable Energy Flagship Programme.219 The 
Renewable Energy Flagship Programme includes the expanded renewable energy 
programme based on the IRP 2010-2030 and could rely on the SARI (referred to in 
6.2 above).220 Frameworks for the various programmes are to be established by the 
relevant Ministers.221 It does not appear that a framework has yet been established 
for the Renewable Energy Flagship Programme. 
The Climate Change White Paper also considers carbon pricing (discussed more 
fully in Chapter 7) and discusses the factors that need to be considered in designing 
the carbon tax, such as the tax level, distributional impacts and competitiveness.222 
However, it does not establish any concrete principles or policies.  
With regard to financial incentives, the Climate Change White Paper states that  
‘Government recognises the important role of market-based instruments that 
create fiscal incentives and disincentives to support climate change policy 
objectives. Thus, South Africa will employ market-based instruments as part of a 
suite of policy interventions to support the transition to a lower-carbon 
economy’.223 
It has been argued that while the Climate Change White Paper ‘provides a high-
level mitigation policy direction, … much of the detail on the instrument interaction 
and implementation remains to be developed’.224 It has also been noted that the 
carbon budget approach would impose a limit on total emissions, as opposed to the 
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carbon tax approach, in which the price (rather than quantity) is established; and that 
the Climate Change White Paper does not clarify ‘[h]ow these two instruments are 
intended to interact’.225 
 
6.5.6  Second National Communication under the UNFCCC 
 (2011) 
The Second National Communication under the UNFCCC226 (the Second National 
Communication) was published by the Department of Environmental Affairs just 
ahead of the 17th Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC, which was held in 
Durban, South Africa, at the end of 2011.  
The Second National Communication sets out South Africa’s climate change 
response objectives, namely to: 
 Contribute to the global goal of stabilising GHG emissions ‘at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’; and 
 Effectively adapt to ‘already unavoidable and potential projected climate 
change impacts through interventions that build and sustain South Africa’s 
social, economic, and environmental resilience and emergency response 
capacity’.227 
With regard to climate change mitigation, the Second National Communication 
notes that  
‘[g]iven that 79% of South Africa’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are 
attributable to energy supply and use; the focus of the tension between national 
development and climate change mitigation objectives is therefore the energy 
system, and this is the point at which this tension can be resolved through 
innovative policies and measures’.228  
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The Second National Communication highlights mitigation measures that have 
been formulated and focuses on measures in the energy sector and notes that 
‘[d]evelopments in two areas of energy policy are particularly significant – measures 
to promote renewable energy, and [the] promotion of energy efficiency’.229  
The Second National Communication briefly discusses the REWP, the National 
Industrial Biofuels Strategy230 and the National Energy Efficiency Strategy.231 The 
focus however, is on the LTMS, which is described as ‘one of the key documents on 
which national climate policy and strategies are based’.232 It is interesting to note that 
the Second National Communication, the only South African policy document on 
climate change to be submitted to the international community (apart from the Initial 
National Communication), does not specifically endorse the ‘Copenhagen 
commitment’. 
 
6.5.7  General comments  
The preceding discussion illustrates a shift in government’s thinking, from the 
position where government was primarily concerned with addressing the adverse 
climate change impacts that would be felt by South Africa, to the position where it 
has assumed more responsibility with regard to the country’s high levels of GHG 
emissions. Government has more deliberately considered how South Africa can 
‘[m]ake a fair contribution to the global effort’ to stabilise GHG emissions,233 while 
also taking account of South Africa’s developing country status and the important 
objective of managing, and adapting to, the adverse impacts of climate change.  
The LTMS is especially promising in that it modelled the measures necessary to 
achieve relatively substantial emission reductions by 2050, one of which was the 
contribution of 27 per cent RES-E by 2050 (under the ‘Start Now’ strategy) and the 
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contribution of 50 per cent RES-E by 2050 (under the ‘Scale Up’ strategy). As noted 
above, these measures, along with all options presented in the LTMS, were 
considered to be ambitious but realistic. 
The Climate Change White Paper is ambitious with regard to action on climate 
change, especially with regard to its endorsement of the Peak, Plateau and Decline 
trajectory and the proposed introduction of a carbon budget approach and Flagship 
Programmes, including the Renewable Energy Flagship Programme. However, 
implementation will be key and as has been noted, carbon budgets and a framework 
for the Renewable Energy Flagship Programme are yet to be established. 
 
6.6   Other legislation and policy documents 
 
6.6.1  Legislation 
6.6.1.1  Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 
Section 217(1) of the Constitution states that  
‘[w]hen an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of  
government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for 
goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective’. 
Section 217(2) of the Constitution provides that this does not prevent the 
relevant organs of state or institutions from implementing a procurement policy that 
provides for ‘categories of preference in the allocation of contracts’,234 and ‘the 
protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination’.235 
The Constitution furthermore provides for the enactment of national legislation 
that prescribes a framework within which this procurement policy must be 
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implemented.236 As a result, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act237 
(the PPPF Act) was enacted.  
The PPPF Act provides for organs of state to determine their own preferential 
procurement policy, which is implemented within the framework set out in the Act. 
Firstly, a ‘preference point system’ must be followed. In respect of contracts that 
have a Rand value above a prescribed amount, ‘a maximum of 10 points may be 
allocated for specific goals [such as contracting with historically disadvantaged 
persons] … provided that the lowest acceptable tender scores 90 points for price’.238 
In respect of contracts ‘with a Rand Value equal to or below a prescribed amount a 
maximum of 20 points may be allocated for specific goals … [such as contracting 
with historically disadvantaged persons] provided that the lowest acceptable tender 
scores 80 points for price’.239 
An ‘acceptable tender’240 that has a higher price will score fewer points in 
comparison to the lowest acceptable tender. This is calculated on a pro rata basis 
and according to a prescribed formula.241 Specific goals in respect of which points 
may be awarded must have been ‘clearly specified in the invitation to submit a 
tender’.242 The tenderer that has scored the highest points will be awarded the 
relevant contract, unless there are other ‘objective criteria … [that] justify the award 
to another tenderer’.243 It thus appears that price is the most important criterion and 
counts for 80 or 90 per cent of the total score, while other factors count for the 
remaining 20 or 10 per cent.  
                                                          
236
 Ibid, section 217(3). 
237
 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000. 
238
 Ibid, section 2(1)(b)(i) read with section 2(d)(i). 
239
 Ibid, section 2(1)(b)(ii). It should be noted that the Minister of Finance has published regulations in 
terms of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act in Government Gazette No. 34350 dated 
8 June 2011 and in Government Gazette No. 34832 dated 7 December 2011. The Preferential 
Procurement Regulations, 2011 in GN R. 502 in Government Gazette No. 34350 dated 8 June 2011 
provide that in respect of tenders that have a value of between R 30 000 and R 1 million, the 80/20 
preference point system is applicable; and in respect of tenders that have a value of above R 1 
million, the 90/10 preference point system is applicable. See Regulations 5 and 6. 
240
 An ‘acceptable tender’ is defined as a tender ‘which, in all respects, complies with the 
specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender document’. See section 1 of the Act. 
241
 PPPF Act (n237) section 2(1)(c). 
242
 Ibid, section 2(1)(e). 
243
 Ibid, section 2(1)(f). 
234 
 
Provision is made for the Minister of Finance to exempt an organ of state from 
the Act’s provisions, including if ‘the likely tenderers are international suppliers’,244 or 
if ‘it is in the public interest’.245 
As discussed further in Chapter 7, one of the reasons provided for the 
abandonment of the REFIT in 2011 was that it did not comply with South Africa’s 
‘preferential procurement policy rules’.246 While there are differing views regarding 
the legality of this decision, this is taken up further in Chapter 7. 
 
6.6.2  Policy documents 
6.6.2.1  The New Growth Path (2010) 
The New Growth Path was published by government in 2010. It provides a 
framework for economic development and job creation in South Africa, and 
considers the role of ‘green growth’ in this regard. It envisages the creation of 
‘300 000 additional direct jobs by 2020 to green the economy, with 80 000 in 
manufacturing and the rest in construction, operations and maintenance of new 
environmentally friendly infrastructure’.247 It furthermore notes that the targets for 
renewable energy set out in the IRP 2010-2030 provide important opportunities in 
regard to investment and job creation in manufacturing and construction.248 
 
6.6.2.2  National Development Plan (2011) 
The National Development Plan249 (NDP), which was prepared by the National 
Planning Commission, sets out government’s vision for South Africa’s development 
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until 2030. It acknowledges the risks posed by climate change250 and promotes the 
development of a ‘green economy’, which is defined as  
‘a system of economic activities related to the production, distribution and 
consumption of goods and services that result in improved human well-being 
over the long-term, while not exposing future generations to significant 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities’.251  
The NDP specifically considers the energy sector and notes that  
‘[u]ltimately, South Africa’s electricity plan needs to balance decarbonisation of 
the power sector and increased use of new and renewable energy technologies 
(alongside their associated higher investment costs) with established, cheaper 
energy sources that offer proven security of supply’.252 
The NDP sets out potential mitigation responses, including an ‘expanded 
renewable energy programme’.253 Proposed mitigation instruments include the 
carbon-budget approach (discussed in 6.5.5 above), committing to a ‘domestically 
established mitigation target’ – a target that is not conditional, but binding 
domestically – and carbon pricing.254 However, no concrete steps are proposed in 
the NDP. 
 
6.6.2.3  Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 
The Industrial Policy Action Plan 2,255 published by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, is a ‘“living document” that outlines a range and combination of industrial 
policy interventions and instruments to address the critical challenges of our 
economy’.256  It is prepared for three years at a time, but is updated annually. The 
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Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 (IPAP 2) was last revised in 2013, and it is only the 
current formulation that is considered here. 
The IPAP 2 explicitly acknowledges the threats posed by climate change and the 
move worldwide to ‘going green’.257 The IPAP 2 sets out measures that have been 
taken by the South African government to respond to climate change, including the 
publication of various policy documents. It also highlights the role of renewable 
energy in the IRP 2010-2030 as well as the roll-out of renewable energy under the 
REIPPPP. The IPAP 2 identifies a number of Key Action Programmes across 
various sectors, including the ‘adaptation of South Africa’s GHG emission 
commitments’258 and the revision of the ‘minimum local content requirements for the 
REIPPP and small-scale programmes’.259  
 
6.7   Concluding remarks 
While a right of access to energy has not been specifically included in the 
Constitution, the Constitution guarantees the right to a healthy environment and 
legislation has been enacted to give effect to this right.260 Even though there is no 
environmental legislation that is directly applicable to energy generation and the 
promotion of renewable energy, the national environmental management principles 
contained in the NEMA must be taken into account with regard to all decisions by 
relevant authorities that may significantly affect the environment. In particular, the 
principle of sustainable development is included in the constitutional environmental 
right and also underpins the NEMA.  
It was noted that the Renewable Energy White Paper set (in 2004) the long-term 
goal of ‘the establishment of a sustainable renewable energy industry … that will 
offer in future years a fully sustainable, non-subsidised alternative to fossil fuel 
dependence’.261 While this goal was initially not pursued very forcefully, the 
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discussion of legislation and policy documents in 6.4 to 6.6 above reflects the 
increasing importance attached to renewable energy by government in more recent 
years.  
While it is arguable that stronger action could be taken to promote renewable 
energy, renewable energy has nevertheless moved much higher up on the agenda 
and its various benefits, including reduced greenhouse gas emissions and 
contributing to sustainability, have been explicitly acknowledged. Renewable energy 
policy is reflected most clearly in the IRP 2010-2030, which envisages that nine per 
cent of electricity (i.e. about 41 TWh) will be supplied by renewable energy sources 
by 2030.  
Furthermore, the REIPPPP has been implemented to support the uptake of 
RES-E. The REIPPPP and other market-based instruments that are relevant to 















South Africa’s market-based 
instruments of relevance to renewable 
energy 
 
7.1    Introduction 
Market-based instruments (MBIs) are playing an increasingly important role in South 
Africa’s environmental regulatory framework as government recognises that MBIs 
have certain advantages over, and can complement, command-and-control 
instruments in the environmental context.1  
This was especially evident in National Treasury’s Draft Policy Paper: A 
Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental 
Fiscal Reform in South Africa (the MBI policy paper), which provided a thorough 
consideration of the environmentally-related MBIs that had been implemented in 
South Africa, and discussed options for environmental fiscal reform.2  
This chapter begins by briefly considering the MBI policy paper (in 7.2). It goes 
on to consider the renewable energy feed-in tariff programme (REFIT) that was 
introduced in 2009. Although the REFIT was replaced by a tendering programme in 
2011, due to the advantages of feed-in tariffs and the clear success of feed-in tariffs 
worldwide (as discussed in Chapter 4), it is important to discuss the erstwhile REFIT 
(in 7.3). As noted in Chapter 4, a key aspect of feed-in tariff programmes is that 
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prices are fixed by government, while under a tendering programme prices are 
determined through competitive bidding. 
The chapter then deals with South Africa’s MBIs that are relevant to renewable 
energy. In general, a distinction is made between instruments that have already 
been implemented in South Africa (dealt with in 7.4) and those that have been 
proposed for implementation (dealt with in 7.5).  
With regard to those instruments that have already been implemented, a 
distinction is made between primary instruments for renewable energy promotion, 
namely the tendering programme (dealt with in 7.4.1); and secondary or 
accompanying instruments such as subsidies for solar water heaters and subsidies 
for renewable energy projects (dealt with in 7.4.2). The focus is on the former as 
these are considered to be more significant in deploying large amounts of renewable 
energy.  
Thereafter, the chapter considers the MBIs that have been proposed for 
implementation in South Africa (in 7.5) namely a carbon tax, a tradable renewable 
energy certificate scheme and carbon trading.  
While not all the instruments referred to above are directly concerned with 
promoting renewable energy, as discussed previously it is arguable that an 
instrument that discourages carbon-intensive energy sources will necessarily 







7.2    Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering  
  Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental  
  Fiscal Reform in South Africa 
The MBI policy paper was published in 2006.3 It defines market-based instruments 
as ‘a group of policy instruments that seek to correct environmentally-related market 
failures through the price mechanism’.4  
The object of the MBI policy paper was to  
‘outline the role that market-based instruments, specifically environmentally-
related taxes and charges, could play in supporting sustainable development in 
South Africa, and to outline a framework for considering their potential 
application’.5  
The MBI policy paper acknowledges the economic rationale for MBIs and the 
relationship between market failure and the environment, and states that in the case 
of market failure  
‘there is a strong rationale for some form of government intervention. By 
intervening and influencing the institutions that determine how markets operate, 
government can play an important role in encouraging more efficient resource 
use’.6 
The MBI policy paper is primarily concerned with environmentally-related taxes 
and charges, even though they ‘are only one group of instruments capable of 
achieving environmental outcomes’.7 An environmental tax is described as ‘a tax on 
an environmentally harmful tax base, which includes transport fuels, motor vehicle 
taxes, emissions taxes, landfill taxes and, more broadly, energy taxes’.8 The MBI 
policy paper states that  




 It furthermore recognises that ‘market-based instruments could be more efficient [than command-
and-control instruments] in addressing certain environmental concerns’. Ibid, 2. 
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‘[i]n combination with other measures, such as regulation and voluntary 
approaches [environmentally-related taxes] can play a role in meeting current 
and future environmental challenges. In addition, environmentally-related taxes 
could help to improve the efficiency and equity of the tax system’.9 
The environmentally-related charges and taxes at the time this policy paper was 
published included taxes on transport fuels, vehicle taxation, product taxes, an 
electricity levy and various charges in respect of water.10 Most of these taxes and 
charges were introduced in order to raise revenue and were not concerned with 
‘environmental effects’11 or with influencing people’s behaviour.12 
The MBI policy paper acknowledges the potential of the ‘double dividend 
hypothesis’ (discussed in Chapter 4), namely that ‘taxing bads (such as 
environmental pollution) and reducing taxes on goods (such as labour)’, could lead 
to environmental benefits as well as improvements in economic efficiency and 
employment.13  
Since the publication of the MBI policy paper, the South African government has 
implemented further environmentally-related MBIs, including a tax on the carbon 
dioxide emissions of new passenger vehicles,14 levies on the sale of incandescent 
(non-energy efficient) lightbulbs,15 rebates for the installation of solar water heaters 
(discussed in 7.4.2.1),16 subsidies for renewable energy (discussed in 7.4.2.2), 
special tax treatment for the sale of certified emission reductions obtained from clean 
development mechanism (CDM) projects (discussed in 7.4.2.3),17 a levy on 
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electricity generated from non-renewable sources (discussed in 7.4.2.4),18 lower fuel 
levies on biodiesel as compared to petrol and diesel,19 and the REFIT which was 
replaced by the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
Programme (the REIPPPP) in 2011. The REFIT is discussed first. Thereafter, 
market-based instruments that are currently in effect in South Africa are considered 
(in 7.4). 
 
7.3    The Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
 
7.3.1  Overview 
The REFIT was introduced through Regulatory Guidelines that were published by 
the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (the NERSA) in 2009.20 These 
regulatory guidelines recognised the importance of renewable energy and its 
environmental, social and economic benefits.21 Factors considered in the 
development of the REFIT included achieving the renewable energy target of 10 000 
                                                          
18
 See South African Revenue Service Budget Tax Proposals 2008/2009 available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/guides/Budget%20Proposals%20200
8.pdf [accessed 28 December 2009] 10 and P Gordhan Budget Speech 2011 (23 February 2011) 
available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/budget/speech2011.pdf [accessed 24 February 2011] 
32. 
19
 See further GNR 322 in Government Gazette 32014 of 20 March 2009, which amended Part 5A of 
Schedule 1 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
20
 National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) South Africa Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff 
(REFIT): Regulatory Guidelines in GN 382 of 2009 in Government Gazette 32122 dated 17 April 
2009. The publication of these Regulatory Guidelines was preceded by a consultation process, which 
included the publication of a Consultation Paper in 2008. See National Energy Regulator of South 
Africa NERSA Consultation Paper: Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 2008 available at 
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/Document/Editor/file/NERSA%20REFIT%20%20consultation%20pape
r%2002%20Dec%202008.pdf [accessed 23 April 2013]. Furthermore, the following year the NERSA 
issued rules regarding selection criteria for public comment in terms of Department of Energy 
Electricity Regulation Act (4/2006): Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity GNR. 721 in 
Government Gazette No. 32378 dated 5 August 2009 (which were repealed in 2010). See National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa Rules on Selection Criteria for Renewable Energy Projects under 
the REFIT Programme 2010 available at 
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/Document/Editor/file/Electricity/Legislation/Regulatory%20Rules/RUL
ES%20FOR%20SELECTION%20CRITERIA%2019%20Feb10.pdf [accessed 13 July 2011]. It is not 
clear if these rules were finalised. 
21
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 13. 
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gigawatt hours (GWh) by 2013,22 and the inability of current mechanisms to ‘achieve 
the national renewable energy target’.23  
 
7.3.2  Purpose and objectives of the REFIT 
The purpose of the REFIT Regulatory Guidelines was to ‘set out the regulatory 
framework for initiating tariffs and licensing conditions for a self-sustaining market for 
grid connected renewables in South Africa’.24 The REFIT was also intended to 
support the renewable energy target of 10 000 GWh by 2013.25  
In order to fulfil this purpose, a number of objectives and key principles were 
established, including to ‘create an enabling environment’ for RES-E in South Africa, 
‘establish a guaranteed price for … [RES-E] for a fixed period of time that provides a 
stable income stream and an adequate return on investment’, provide grid access 
and a power purchase obligation, and to ‘establish an equal playing field with 
conventional electricity generation’.26 
 
7.3.3  Definitions 
Renewable energy was defined, as it was in the White Paper on the Renewable 
Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa27 (the REWP), to include ‘naturally 
occurring non-depletable sources of energy, such as solar, wind, biomass, hydro, 
tidal, wave, ocean current and geothermal’.28 Separate and detailed definitions were 
provided for each of the renewable energy sources. 
                                                          
22
 Ibid, 11. 
23
 Ibid, 28.  
24




 Ibid, 14. 
27
 Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic 
of South Africa GN 513 in Government Gazette No. 26169 dated 14 May 2004. 
28
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 7. 
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A ‘distributor’ was defined as ‘a legal entity that owns or operates/distributes 
electricity through a Distribution System. This includes Eskom, municipalities and 
private distributors’.29 
A ‘transmitter’ was defined as ‘a legal entity that owns or operates/distributes 
electricity through a Transmission System. This includes Eskom, municipalities and 
private transmitters’.30 
‘Tariff equalisation’ was defined as the ‘process whereby the amount of financial 
subsidy required for implementation of a feed-in tariff is borne by all Eskom electricity 
customers through existing “pass-through” arrangements which are currently in place 
for IPPs’.31 
A ‘qualifying renewable energy power generator’ was defined as a renewable 
energy generator who makes ‘new investments in electricity generation’ using the 
renewable energy technologies (RETs) qualifying for tariffs32 (discussed in 7.3.6 
below). Installations were also eligible to earn FITs if they had been modernised, 
repowered, or expanded. However, only the extra capacity would qualify to earn a 
tariff.33 
 
7.3.4  Targets 
The REFIT did not establish targets for renewable energy or RES-E but, as noted 
above, was intended to support the 10 000 GWh renewable energy target. 
 
                                                          
29
 Ibid, 6. 
30
 Ibid, 6. 
31
 Ibid, 9. While ‘existing “pass through” arrangements’ are not specifically defined in the Regulatory 
Guidelines, they appear to refer to the arrangements that are currently in place to distribute the costs 
of electricity generation to all consumers. 
32
 Ibid, 15. 
33
 Ibid, 16. 
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7.3.5  Obligations relating to connection and purchase  
RES-E generators were ‘guaranteed access to Distribution and Transmission 
networks’ subject to certain conditions being complied with.34 
The REFIT established a Renewable Energy Purchasing Agency (REPA), which 
was obliged to enter into a power purchase agreement (PPA) with renewable energy 
generators and to buy renewable energy generated ‘subject to the fulfilment of all 
necessary licence conditions’.35 Eskom was appointed as the REPA. Prospective 
renewable energy generators were required to apply to the NERSA in order to 
qualify as such36 and also for a generation licence.37 The NERSA considered that a 
purchase obligation was required in South Africa due to the lack of ‘a fully fledged 
market … for the buying and selling of renewable energy’.38  
The REFIT Regulatory Guidelines took account of the possibility of the 
generation of RES-E being very high and stated that  
‘[s]hould take up of the REFIT be exceptionally high, either overall or in a 
particular technology, the Regulator will be permitted to set a capacity limit on 
each technology to prevent over subscription and therefore avoiding excessive 
consumer price increases’.39 
The costs of connecting to the grid were to be paid by the renewable energy 
generator.40 
 
7.3.6  Tariffs 
In 2009 tariffs were approved for wind, small hydro, landfill gas and concentrated 
solar power (CSP),41 as reflected in Table 7.1. Thereafter further tariffs were 
approved for CSP trough without storage, large-scale grid connected photovoltaic 
                                                          
34
 Ibid, 17. 
35
 Ibid, 15 and 18. 
36
 Ibid, 16. 
37
 Ibid, 15. 
38
 Ibid, 32. 
39
 Ibid, 38-39 and 18.  
40
 Ibid, 17-18. 
41
 Ibid, 38. 
246 
 
(PV) systems, biomass solid, biogas and CSP tower with six hours of storage per 
day.42 These tariffs are also set out in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1  REFIT Tariffs – Phases I and II43 
Technology REFIT (/kWh) 
Wind R1.25 
Small hydro R0.94 
Landfill gas R0.90 
CSP trough plant (with six hours storage) R2.10 
CSP trough without storage R3.14 
Large-scale grid connected PV systems R3.94 
Biomass solid R1.18 
Biogas R0.96 
CSP tower (with six hours storage) R2.31 
 
Tariffs were payable for a period of twenty years44 in respect of RES-E 
generators connected to the grid. Thus, off-grid power was excluded.45 
The REFIT did not make any provision for degression. However, it provided for 
the annual review of tariffs for the first five years of implementation and thereafter 
every three years.46 The resulting tariffs would only apply to new projects and not to 
existing projects, which would be guaranteed the specified tariffs for 20 years.  
 
                                                          
42
 National Energy Regulator of South Africa (2 November 2009) Media Statement: NERSA Decision 
on Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariffs (REFITs) Phase II available at 
http://www.nersa.org.za/UploadedFiles/News/Media%20statement%20NERSA%20Decision%20on%
20REFIT%20Phase%202%20-021109.pdf [accessed 28 December 2009]. 
43
 Data obtained from REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 38 and NERSA REFIT Phase II (n42). 
44
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 22. and NERSA ‘Review of Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariffs’ 




%20page%2025%20has%20been%20updated%29.pdf [accessed 24 March 2011] 15. 
45
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 16. 
46
 Ibid, 17. 
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7.3.7  Direct selling 
RES-E generators were permitted to sell electricity directly to consumers ‘wishing to 
purchase renewable energy outside of the REFIT mechanism, subject to fulfilment of 
necessary licence conditions’.47 
 
7.3.8  Equalisation scheme 
The REPA was obliged to record the total cost of renewable energy purchased under 
the REFIT each year and to calculate the difference between this and the Avoided 
Cost,48 ‘and to pass on this cost to consumers using existing “pass through” 
arrangements’.49 
 
7.3.9  Monitoring, reporting and review 
The NERSA was made responsible for the ‘overall monitoring and review’ of the 
REFIT programme.50 It was also required to publish an annual report regarding inter 
alia progress on the 10 000 GWh renewable energy target as well as future targets 
for renewable energy,51 ‘the market introduction of the qualifying technologies’52 and 
the ‘[f]inancial impacts of the REFIT including the additional overall cost to electricity 
consumers and average percentage increase on electricity prices’.53 
Renewable energy generators were required to submit annual reports regarding 
inter alia the renewable energy supplied.54 
                                                          
47
 Ibid, 15.  
48
 ‘Avoided cost’ is defined as ‘the marginal cost for the same amount of energy acquired through 
another means such as the construction, finance and operation of new efficient generation facility [sic] 
or purchase from an alternate supplier’. Ibid, 5. 
49
 Ibid, 19. As noted above, ‘existing pass through arrangements’ appear to refer to the arrangements 
that are currently in place to distribute the costs of electricity generation to all consumers. 
50
 Ibid, 19. 
51






 Ibid, 20. 
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The REPA (Eskom) was required to monitor and report on electricity generation 
by RES-E generators,55 and to report to the NERSA regarding the total cost of RES-
E purchased under the REFIT.56 
 
7.3.10 A move away from the REFIT  
In 2011, before any PPAs had been entered into, the NERSA proposed reductions of 
between 10 and 42 per cent to the above-mentioned REFIT rates in its Consultation 
Paper entitled ‘Review of Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariffs’.57 These reductions 
were heavily contested by prospective independent power producers and created 
uncertainty.58 This became irrelevant when a few months later the Department of 
Energy announced that the fixed price system of the REFIT did not comply with 
legislation regarding procurement processes, namely the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act59 (the PPPF Act), and that independent power producers 
(IPPs) would now have to participate in a competitive bidding process60 (discussed 
further below). This decision was also contested by prospective IPPs including 
because they had invested significant time and money on the basis of guaranteed 
tariffs.61  






 The Consultation Paper was issued in terms of section 35 of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 
2006. NERSA ‘Review of REFITs’ (n44) Table 5, 25. See also T Creamer ‘Nersa moves to cut Refit 
tariffs just as SA promises to boost renewables’ (22 March 2011) Engineering News available at 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/nersa-moves-to-cut-refit-tariffs-just-as-sa-promises-
to-boost-renewables-2011-03-22 [accessed 22 March 2011].  
58
 See for example I Salgado ‘Nersa cuts proposed renewable energy tariff’ (29 March 2011) 
Business Report, C van der Merwe ‘Renewable energy developers say new tariffs could halt 
investments’ Engineering News (5 May 2011) available at 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/renewable-energy-developers-say-revised-tariffs-could-halt-
investments-2011-05-05 [accessed 6 May 2011] and S Njobeni ‘Energy firms reject tariff reduction’ (6 
May 2011) Business Day available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/content.aspx?id=141900 
[accessed 6 May 2011]. 
59
 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000. This was discussed in 6.6.1.1. 
60
 M Gosling ‘Government’s U-turn on wind energy rates’ (20 June 2011) Cape Times. It was initially 
reported that competitive bidding would only apply in respect of the first 1000 megawatts of renewable 
energy procured and that the REFIT rates will ‘act as a “ceiling” beyond which bids would not be 
considered’. See I Salgado ‘Bidding on cards for green energy’ (15 June 2011) IOL available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/bidding-on-cards-for-green-energy-1.1084140 [accessed 
21 June 2011]. 
61
 See for example T Creamer ‘Govt confirms inclusion of price competition in first renewables round’ 
(4 July 2011) Engineering News Online available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/govt-
confirms-inclusion-of-price-competition-in-first-renewables-round-2011-07-04 [accessed 4 July 2011]. 
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As noted in Chapter 6, the PPPF Act provides that a ‘preference point system’ 
must be followed62 and that the highest points must be awarded to the lowest 
‘acceptable tender’.63 It was also seen that price is the most important criterion under 
this system.  
In the view of government (the Department of Energy) ‘the only possible 
procurement process option … [was] a competitive bidding process’.64 However, 
Wim Trengove SC was reported as stating that the REFIT was not in breach of the 
PPPF Act and that  
‘[t]here does not seem to be any principled distinction between a conventional 
procurement process which determines the product and invites bidders to 
compete on price, on the one hand, and the Refit scheme, which determines the 
price and invites bidders to compete on product, on the other’.65 
It was also reported that government did in fact acknowledge the possibility of 
amending the legislation to allow for a fixed tariff.66  
Furthermore, the PPPF Act empowers the Minister of Finance to exempt organs 
of state, on request, from the provisions of the PPPF Act in certain circumstances 
including if ‘the likely tenderers are international suppliers’67 and if ‘it is in the public 
interest’.68 It is arguable that at least the first ground is applicable in respect of a 
renewable energy procurement programme. Therefore, there is scope for the 
Minister of Finance to exempt the Department of Energy from applying this price-
based system. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the PPPF Act provides for the cost component in 
tenders to score either 80 or 90 per cent in regard to the total scoring. However, 
under the REIPPPP price scores only 70 per cent, which represents a departure 
from the PPPFA. Thus, ‘special dispensation [is required] to depart from 
                                                          
62
 PPPF Act (n59) section 2(1)(a).  
63
 Ibid, section 2(1)(b). An ‘acceptable tender’ is defined as ‘any tender which, in all respects, 
complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender document’. See 
section 1. 
64
 Gosling ‘Government’s U-turn on wind energy rates’ (n60). 
65
 D Pressly ‘Legal advice puts Refit in doubt’ (27 June 2011) Business Report. 
66
 Gosling ‘Government’s U-turn on wind energy rates’ (n60). 
67
 PPPF Act (n59) section 3(b). 
68
 Ibid, section 3(c). 
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government’s preferential procurement rules’.69 It is not clear (from the information 
available) whether this departure has specifically been authorised.  
In its REFIT Regulatory Guidelines the NERSA specifically rejected a 
competitive bidding or tendering system, stating that tendering systems  
‘tend to favour established businesses and can allow existing companies to 
keep potential competitors out of the market by bidding low on projects, 
regardless of whether or not the company has any intention or ability to actually 
build the renewable energy project’.70 
In light of this clear rejection of the tendering system by the NERSA, it is unclear 
why a tendering programme was chosen as the next best option. It is also surprising 
that the alleged non-compliance of the REFIT with South Africa’s procurement laws 
was only realised a few years after the introduction of the REFIT. Comprehensive 
reasons have not been made publicly available, nor have guidelines akin to the 
REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (which were published in the Government Gazette) 
been published. The approach taken in respect of the REIPPPP has thus not been 
very transparent.71 Indeed, access to official documentation can only be obtained 
following the payment of a non-refundable amount of R15 000.  
One possible explanation for the change of direction is that   
‘the policy may have been threatened by its own success. On a technical level, a 
large number of wind power plants with fluctuating energy production could have 
posed challenges to grid stability. On an administrative level, the flood of 
applications may have overwhelmed the understaffed authorities and could have 
led to even longer delays than currently experienced under the bidding process. 
                                                          
69
 T Creamer ‘SA finally sets renewables bidding process in motion’ (31 July 2011) Engineering News 
available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-finally-sets-renewables-bidding-process-in-
motion-2011-07-31 [accessed 4 August 2011]. 
70
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 27. 
71
 Indeed, the process has been described as ‘opaque’. See A Pegels ‘Pitfalls of Policy 
Implementation: The case of the South African feed-in tariff’ 2011 available at http://die-
gdi.academia.edu/AnnaPegels [accessed 24 April 2013] at 5. See also J Nganga, M Wohlert, M 
Woods, C Becker-Birck, S Jackson and W Rickerson (study for the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the 
World Future Council) Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs: Advancing Renewable Energy to Meet 
the Continent’s Electricity Needs 2013 available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Feed_in_Tariff/Powering_Africa_throug
h_Feed-in_Tariffs.pdf [accessed 26 March 2013] at 56, who state that the ‘REIPPPP process lacks 
transparency for all but those project developers who are directly involved’. 
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On a political level, while NERSA may have favoured the REFiT there was less 
support from Eskom and the Department of Energy. Finally, the REFiT’s 
guarantee to buy all electricity – combined with falling prices for solar PV – 
seems to have raised fears in the treasury about an unchecked growth of 
expenses and poor value for money’.72 
However, it has been argued that a FIT policy can ‘function well in both 
developed and developing countries, provided that proper care is taken in the policy 
design and accompanying policies’.73 Specifically, it has been argued that ‘feed-in 
laws have produced the quickest, lowest-cost deployment of renewable energy 
technologies in countries that have implemented them well’.74  
After considering other support options for renewable energy the NERSA 
considered the feed-in tariff to be the best option to increase renewable energy in 
South Africa, specifically stating that  
‘[i]n the South African context, with a lack of competitive markets or established 
renewable industry, the feed-in tariff system is preferred as the most effective 
means for creating sustainable market conditions for the growth of a renewable 
energy industry’.75 
The sudden about-turn of the Department of Energy and the NERSA is therefore 
questionable, especially in light of the lack of clear and compelling reasons given for 
the decision. It has also been noted that the ‘conflicting positions’ of the NERSA, the 
Department of Energy and ‘most notably, the National Treasury … clearly indicate a 
lack of coordination among the departments and government entities involved’.76  
Against this background, the instruments that are currently in effect in South 
Africa will be considered. 
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 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n71) 55-56. It has also been noted that the 
REFIT may only have been feasible with regard to small amounts of renewable energy. See A Pegels 
‘Renewable Energy in South Africa: Potentials, barriers and options for support’ 2010 (38) Energy 
Policy 4945-4954, at 4953. 
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7.4    Instruments that have been implemented in South Africa 
 
7.4.1  Primary instruments 
7.4.1.1  Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
 Procurement Programme 
The decision of the Department of Energy to implement the REIPPP Programme 
required the concurrence of the NERSA, which was provided in August 2011.77 
It was initially reported that the REIPPPP would only apply in respect of the first 
1000 MW of renewable energy procured.78 However, the Department of Energy 
subsequently decided that the REIPPPP would apply in respect of the first 3725 MW 
of renewable energy procured, which is ‘broadly in accordance with the capacity 
allocated to Renewable Energy generation in IRP 2010-2030’.79 The generation 
capacity for each RET has been allocated as indicated in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2  Allocation of generation capacity amongst renewable energy 
technologies80 
Technology Capacity (MW) 
Onshore wind 1850  
Concentrated solar thermal 200  
Solar photovoltaic 1450  
Biomass 12.5  
Biogas 12.5  
                                                          
77
 L Prinsloo ‘Nersa concurs with renewable bidding process’ (10 August 2011) Engineering News 
available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/nersa-concurs-with-renewables-bidding-
process-2011-08-10 [accessed 12 August 2011]. 
78
 Njobeni ‘Energy firms reject tariff reduction’ (n58). 
79
 See Prinsloo ‘Nersa concurs with renewable bidding process’ (n77), T Creamer ‘Glitches and 
pleasant surprises as renewables tender gets under way’ Engineering News Online (3 August 2011) 
available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/glitches-and-pleasant-surprises-as-renewables-
tender-gets-under-way-2011-08-03 [accessed 4 August 2011] and http://www.ipp-renewables.co.za/ 
[last accessed 2 February 2012]. 
80
 Data obtained from http://www.ipp-renewables.co.za/ (n79). 
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Landfill gas 25  
Small hydro 75  
Small projects 100  
Total 3725  
 
The tendering process is relatively onerous and involves two stages.  
In the first stage, bidders are required to meet ‘minimum threshold requirements 
in six areas’, namely environment, land, commercial and legal, economic 
development, financial and technical.81 With regard to ‘economic development’ alone 
bidders for wind projects are required to meet minimum thresholds with regard to 17 
different criteria, including that at least 12 per cent of South Africa-based employees 
must be citizens from local communities, and that at least 12 per cent of the shares 
in the project company must be held by black people.82 It is also required that project 
developers contribute at least one per cent of project revenue to communities.83 
Bidders must show that they ‘have a track-record in raising funds, or sufficient 
financial means at their own disposal to conduct the proposed project’.84 
Furthermore, the technology that prospective IPPs intend using should have been 
used at least twice commercially.85 Bidders are only considered in the second stage 
if these requirements have been met. 
In the second stage, bidders are evaluated on their bid prices and economic 
development objectives, which include factors such as job creation potential, local 
content and socioeconomic development.86 The bid prices and economic 
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 A Eberhard ‘Feed-In Tariffs or Auctions?’ 2013 ViewPoint (Note number 338) available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/fpd/publicpolicyjournal [accessed 20 August 2013] 2. 
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 T Creamer ‘Renewables project developers pore over tender documents’ (4 August 2011) 
Engineering News available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/renewables-project-
developers-pore-over-tender-documents-2011-08-04 [accessed 5 August 2011]. See also Department 
of Energy Renewable Energy IPP Procurement Programme: Window two Preferred Bidders’ 
announcement (21 May 2012) available at www.energy.gov.za [accessed 20 May 2013]. 
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development objectives are weighted 70 per cent and 30 per cent respectively.87 
Government has indicated that the bid price will only be considered if a bidder 
demonstrates that economic development objectives will be met.88 
As noted above, bidders are required to pay a non-refundable amount of R15 
000 simply to have access to the request for proposal (RFP) documents. Thereafter, 
bidders must provide a ‘bid guarantee’ of R100 000 in respect of each megawatt of 
(proposed) installed capacity.89 
The bid prices for the first round of bidding were capped.90 The capped prices 
were ‘not dissimilar to NERSA’s 2009 REFITs’.91 
Five bidding windows were established at the outset: November 2011, March 
2012, August 2012, March 2013 and August 2013.92 However, there have been 
delays in the procurement programme and all the bidding windows have been 
pushed back. Thus, the deadline for the third round of bidding occurred in August 
2013 instead of in August 2012.  
In addition to entering into a PPA with Eskom and an implementation agreement 
with the Department of Energy, bidders are also required to apply to Eskom to be 
connected to the grid.93 Furthermore, a ‘government framework support agreement’ 
must be entered into between Eskom and the government.94 
Capacity has been allocated separately to small projects, as seen in Tables 7.2 
and 6.3 above, and a less complex process has been introduced in respect of 
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 L Steyn ‘A renewed focus on green energy’ (12 August 2011) Mail & Guardian Online available at 
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projects that are less than 5 megawatts.95 The REIPPPP for small projects is running 
separately and has commenced recently.96  
Three rounds of bidding have taken place and capacity has been allocated to 
preferred bidders in respect of wind energy, small hydro, solar PV, CSP, landfill gas, 
and biomass projects.97 The approved projects represent 3916 MW of renewable 
energy capacity.98 The REIPPPP has also resulted in price reductions which are 
reflected in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Average bidding prices under Windows 1, 2 and 3 of the  
  REIPPPP99 
Technology Price (/kWh) 
 Bidding window 1 Bidding window 2 Bidding window 3 
Solar PV R2.758 R1.645 R0.881 
Wind R1.143 R0.897 R0.656 
Small hydro n/a R1.030 n/a 
CSP R2.686 R2.512 R1.460100 
Landfill gas n/a n/a R0.84 
Biomass n/a n/a R1.246 
 
Table 7.3 shows that bidding prices have decreased significantly in respect of 
solar energy and wind energy. 
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As noted in Chapter 6, in 2012 the Minister of Energy has determined that an 
additional 3200 MW of renewable energy should be procured,101 which will also be 
procured through the REIPPP Programme.102  
 
a) Progress made in implementing the REIPPPP thus far 
It remains to be seen how successful the REIPPPP will be. Aside from one solar PV 
project which was very recently connected to the grid,103 most of the first renewable 
energy projects under the programme are only due to come into operation during 
2014. However, some (tentative) lessons have emerged.  
On the one hand, the programme has stimulated significant interest. For 
instance, bids to the value of 3233 MW were submitted for 1044 MW of renewable 
energy capacity procured in the second round.104 It has thus been argued that the 
REIPPPP ‘can be considered a success’,105 which can be attributed to several 
reasons including that the programme was well designed,106 high standards were 
established,107 thresholds and targets for local content objectives have been 
strengthened in subsequent bidding rounds, there has been a positive response from 
the local capital market, and ‘[p]roject bidders are required to incorporate a tax of 1 
percent of project revenues that will go into a government renewable energy fund to 
support subsequent procurement programmes’.108 Furthermore, REIPPPP investors 
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who were interviewed viewed the ‘stringent requirements on financing to ensure 
projects are commissioned’ positively.109 
While transaction costs were initially high, they have decreased in the second 
round and were expected to decrease even more in further rounds.110 Furthermore, 
as noted above, the bidding prices have decreased significantly in a short space of 
time. 
The local content requirements are viewed positively,111 and the percentage of 
local content has increased significantly from the first to the third rounds of 
bidding.112 It has also been reported that there has been ‘progress in the 
establishment of local manufacturing nodes that produce some of the components 
for solar and wind farms’ in South Africa.113 
On the other hand, it has been noted that  
‘cumbersome programme administration has led to serious delays exceeding the 
timelines initially set, forcing investors to extend financial guarantees for the 
project at additional cost, and thus undermining the economic forecasts on which 
the bid succeeded’.114  
It has also been reported that the ‘size and complexity of the REIPPP program 
stretched available legal and financial advisory services to the limit’.115 Transaction 
costs under the REIPPPP have been high for government and for bidders.116 Indeed, 
prospective IPPs under the REIPPPP are required to put up a significant amount of 
money before a tender is even awarded. 
It has been argued that the onerous requirements of the REIPPPP would tend to 
favour larger IPPs, which are able to cover the extra costs, rather than smaller, 
community-run projects.117 Since most projects are likely to have international 
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support, it has been reported that ‘the “added value” (high-tech materials and skilled 
labour) is taking place outside of South Africa through international firms’.118  
REIPPPP investors who were interviewed noted that ‘tender processes can 
result in aggressive bidding and question[ed] whether current bids are 
sustainable’.119 Indeed, even though the object of the REIPPP Programme is to 
reduce prices, ‘projects must still be bankable’.120 
With regard to the local content requirements, the definition of a community as 
being within a 50 kilometer radius has been considered problematic, inter alia 
because beneficiary areas may overlap, leading to benefits being concentrated in 
small areas, rather than being distributed across the country or where they are most 
required.121 It has also been argued that ‘[s]pecifications on what constitutes local 
content could be improved’.122 Nevertheless, some REIPPPP investors expected the 
local content requirements to become restrictive in the future.123 
With regard to black economic empowerment requirements it has been reported 
that, due to the lack of qualified firms, ‘some specialised renewable energy BBBEE 
[broad-based black economic empowerment] companies are being set up by elite 
South Africans to take advantage of the thresholds and therefore benefit from 
involvement in a number of projects’.124 
It has also been argued that, while prices have decreased under the REIPPPP, 
they are still high compared to in other countries, which could perhaps be due to the 
local content and economic development thresholds.125 In this regard it has been 
argued that a balance should ‘be struck between the promotion of economic 
development and prices’.126 Solar energy manufacturers have reportedly called for 
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financial incentives including ‘tax breaks or subsidies, to offset the cost of local-
content requirements’.127  
Other problems have emerged. There has been insufficient transmission grid 
capacity in some areas and there have reportedly been complaints regarding the 
unresponsiveness of Eskom’s transmission planners.128 Lack of transparency 
remains a concern and it has been argued that the REIPPP Programme ‘lacks 
transparency for all but those project developers who are directly involved’.129  
 
b) General comments 
While it appears that the South African government was concerned about the 
potential costs of a FIT programme, which led to the move to the REIPPP 
Programme, it was seen in Chapter 4 that the FIT has emerged internationally as the 
instrument that has led to the greatest uptake of renewable energy and at the lowest 
cost.  
While the bidding prices for some of the RETs under the REIPPPP have 
decreased quite significantly, it was pointed out above that this has raised concerns 
regarding the sustainability of bids. It was also seen in the international context 
(discussed in Chapter 4) that under tendering programmes, bidders often bid too low 
on projects in order to win bids, which has resulted in unviable projects. This was 
also the experience in China (discussed in Chapter 5). Since it is still relatively early 
in the REIPPP Programme, it remains to be seen whether all of the selected projects 
will be commissioned. The only project that has been commissioned thus far is a 
project that was selected in the first round of the REIPPPP, in which the bid prices 
were on par with the REFIT rates.  
While costs are an important consideration, a key object identified in the 
Renewable Energy White Paper was the establishment of a sustainable renewable 
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energy industry in South Africa.130 As discussed in Chapter 4, sustainable markets 
for renewable energy are essential to reduce the costs of renewable energy.131 
On the other hand, the REIPPP Programme has only been implemented in 
respect of a set amount of capacity, i.e. 3725 MW, and thereafter an additional 3200 
MW. This does not indicate a long-term commitment. It only provides an incentive to 
bid to supply RES-E capacity in respect of these relatively minor amounts, and only 
during the established bidding periods (windows). There is no obligation on the grid 
operator (Eskom) to purchase RES-E outside of this. Once the required capacity has 
been taken up, there would be no incentive for RES-E generators to generate more 
RES-E in the absence of preferential tariffs. It is thus arguable that the REIPPPP is 
not supportive of a sustainable renewable energy industry in South Africa. 
Secondary instruments to promote renewable energy are now considered. 
 
7.4.2  Secondary instruments 
7.4.2.1  Rebates for the installation of solar water heaters 
The Eskom Solar Water Heating Programme was launched in 2008 and was 
intended to contribute to achieving government’s renewable energy target of 10 000 
GWh by 2013.132 The Department of Energy launched a mass roll-out of this 
programme in 2010, inter alia to contribute to achieving its target of installing at least 
one million solar water heaters (SWHs) by 2014.133 
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Under this programme, consumers may claim a rebate for the installation of a 
SWH provided that the SWH system and the installer are registered with Eskom.134 
This instrument is aimed at consumers who can afford the cost of installing a SWH 
and is distinct from the programme for the installation of SWHs in low-cost housing 
under the Reconstruction and Development Programme, in terms of which SWHs 
are generally installed free of charge.135 
From April 2010 until the end of December 2010, 26 768 SWHs were installed as 
part of the rebate programme.136 It is not clear how many SWHs have been installed 
as part of the rebate programme to date. However, over 350 000 SWHs had been 
installed under the overarching Solar Water Heating Programme by the first half of 
2013.137 
The National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act138 has also been 
amended and provides that 
‘[a]t least 50% (volume fraction) of the annual average hot water heating 
requirement [of certain buildings] shall be provided by means other than 
electrical resistance heating including but not limited to solar heating, heat 
pumps, heat recovery from other systems or processes and renewable 
combustible fuel’.139 
 
7.4.2.2   Subsidies for renewable energy 
The Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office (REFSO), located within the 
Department of Energy, was established in 2005 to manage renewable energy 
subsidies and to advise ‘developers and other stakeholders on renewable energy 
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finance and subsidies’.140 The subsidies may not exceed 20 per cent of the capital 
cost of the relevant project141 and subsidies are only provided for projects that cost 
less than R100 million.142  
Six projects with a total capacity of 23.9 MW have been implemented since this 
office was established. These projects relate to small-scale hydro, biogas to 
electricity, wind energy and landfill gas to electricity.143 Considering that South Africa 
currently has about 40 gigawatts (GW) of installed capacity, the contribution of 23.9 
MW under the renewable energy subsidy is arguably not very significant. Indeed, 
one of the reasons that it was considered desirable to implement the REFIT was 
because it was questionable ‘whether the current mechanisms [including the 
renewable energy subsidy] are sufficient to achieve the national renewable energy 
target’.144  
Spending on this scheme decreased by half from 2008/2009 to 2009/2010. No 
renewable energy projects were subsidised from April to September 2011, despite a 
target of subsidising three projects for 2011/2012.145 According to the National 
Treasury, the REFSO subsidies and the (former) REFIT could not ‘operate 
concurrently because project developers can be over incentivised, leading to 
excessive profits at the expense of consumers and taxpayers’.146 It is assumed that 
this argument applies equally in respect of the REIPPP Programme. Treasury has 
therefore proposed that the subsidy scheme be changed so that it no longer provides 
‘capital subsidies for the construction of renewable energy generation plants’.147  
 
                                                          
140
 Department of Energy Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/renewables/r_refso.html [accessed 13 March 2013]. 
141
 H Winkler Cleaner Energy Cooler Climate: Developing Sustainable Energy Solutions for South 
Africa 2009 HSRC Press, 134. 
142
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 25-26. 
143
 Department of Energy REFSO (n140).  
144
 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n20) 28. 
145
 National Treasury ‘Vote 29 - Energy’ Medium Term Budget Policy Statements available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2011/ [accessed 24 January 2012] 255-256.  
146





7.4.2.3  Tax treatment of certified emission reductions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, developed country parties may 
implement project activities in developing country parties, which result in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission reductions, and earn (tradable) certified emission reductions 
(CERs). 
In South Africa, the income generated from the sale of CERs earned from clean 
development mechanism (CDM) projects is exempt from normal tax.148 There has 
been a very low uptake of the CDM in South Africa for a number of reasons.149 
Although there is a lot of potential for the CDM, it has been argued that in light of all 
of the barriers facing the CDM, ‘tax exemption is unlikely to be the solution’.150 
 
7.4.2.4  Levy on electricity generated from non-renewable sources 
A levy of 2 cents per kilowatt hour was imposed on electricity generated from non-
renewable sources in July 2009 in light of the electricity shortages that were being 
experienced at the time and in recognition of the contribution of coal-generated 
electricity to climate change.151 It was anticipated that this levy would raise R4 billion 
in revenue per year.152  
This levy was increased to 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour with effect from April 
2011153 and was subsequently increased to 3.5c/kWh with effect from 1 July 2012. It 
is intended that the levy will replace the current mechanism for funding energy 
efficiency projects such as the solar water heater programme.154  
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While this could be considered a carbon tax of sorts, it is not a real carbon tax as 
the amount of the levy bears no relation to the carbon emitted.155 Indeed, it applies to 
all electricity equally, whether generated from coal, nuclear or gas. 
 
7.5   Instruments that have been proposed for    
  implementation in South Africa 
 
7.5.1  Carbon tax 
In 2007 the Scenario Building Team, established by Cabinet, proposed that a carbon 
tax be implemented in South Africa as one measure to reduce South Africa’s GHG 
emissions. In 2010 National Treasury published the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper, 
which thoroughly considers the implementation of a carbon tax in South Africa.156 
Further details on the proposed carbon tax were provided in the Budget Tax 
Proposals of 2012. The process culminated in the publication of the Carbon Tax 
Policy Paper in May 2013, in terms of which a carbon tax will be implemented in 
2015. These policy documents are discussed briefly in 7.5.1.1 to 7.5.1.5 below in 
order to illustrate the development of government policy on carbon taxation.  
No developing country has broad-based carbon pricing in place yet and thus 
there is no (developing country) model to ‘inform the design of a South African 
carbon pricing regime’.157  
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7.5.1.1  Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for South 
 Africa 
As noted in Chapter 6, the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for 
South Africa (LTMS)158 recommended that a carbon tax be implemented159 and that 
it increase from about R100/tCO2e in 2008 to about R750/tCO2e between 2040 and 
2050.160 The LTMS also noted that ‘[t]axes generate revenues … [which] can be 
used to provide incentives’;161 and recommended that in addition to an escalating 
carbon tax, incentives be provided for renewable energy, biofuels and SWHs. The 
importance of revenue recycling (discussed in Chapter 4) was also noted.162 
 
7.5.1.2  Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax 
 Option 
The implementation of a carbon tax was seriously considered by National Treasury 
in its discussion paper entitled ‘Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon 
Tax Option’163 (the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper), which was intended to develop 
the work contained in the MBI policy paper.164  
The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper, having identified carbon taxation and carbon 
trading as two of the main policy instruments for carbon pricing, considers a carbon 
tax to be preferable to emissions trading for various reasons, including the lower 
costs and administration involved in a carbon tax system.165 Determining an 
appropriate price for carbon (the tax level), however, is not a simple matter and 
carbon price estimates in different studies vary substantially.166  
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The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper states that (in South Africa) the object is 
partial rather than full internalisation of externalities.167 It also notes that  
‘a carbon tax set at an appropriate level and phased in over time would provide a 
strong price signal and certainty to both producers and consumers, acting as an 
incentive for more environmentally friendly behaviour over the long term’.168  
There are further issues that must be considered in designing a carbon tax 
(particularly in South Africa), including the tax base and administration,169 the 
distributional effects (impacts on society),170 impacts on competitiveness171 and how 
the tax revenue will be used.172 The Carbon Tax Discussion Paper discusses these 
elements in detail and addresses concerns such as how to reduce the impacts of a 
carbon tax on poor households and on carbon-intensive industries. These are taken 
up further in the Carbon Tax Policy Paper, which represents government’s current 
position on a carbon tax and is discussed in 7.5.1.5 below.  
 
7.5.1.3  National Climate Change Response White Paper 2011 
The National Climate Change Response White Paper173 reiterates the call for the 
implementation of a carbon tax. It deals briefly with the rationale for introducing 
carbon taxes and sets out a number of considerations that must be addressed in 
designing a carbon tax, including the tax rate, technical and administrative feasibility, 
distributional impacts, competitiveness and relief measures.174 As this White Paper 
has been overtaken by more recent developments (discussed immediately below), it 
is not considered further. 
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7.5.1.4  Budget Tax Proposals 2012 
In his 2012 Budget Speech, Finance Minister Gordhan announced that a revised 
policy paper on a carbon tax would be published for further public comment and 
consultation.175 The Budget Tax Proposals for 2012 stated that ‘[f]ollowing public 
consultation, government has revised its concept design for a carbon tax’.176 The 
proposals included percentage-based thresholds for all sectors, below which the 
carbon tax would not be applicable. The carbon tax would only apply above the 
thresholds at a rate of R120/tCO2e from 2013/2014. The Budget Tax Proposals 
provided for additional allowances in respect of trade-exposed sectors.177 These 
elements were considered further in the Carbon Tax Policy Paper (discussed below).  
 
7.5.1.5  Carbon Tax Policy Paper: Reducing greenhouse gas 
 emissions and facilitating the transition to a green economy 
The ‘Carbon Tax Policy Paper: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and facilitating 
the transition to a green economy’178 (the Carbon Tax Policy Paper) was published in 
2013. It sets out various background issues, including the policy steps prior to the 
preparation of the present document,179 the economics of and rationale for carbon 
pricing,180 carbon taxation versus carbon trading,181 international experiences with 
regard to carbon pricing,182 as well as the economic impacts of a carbon tax.183  In 
contrast to previous policy documents, the Carbon Tax Policy Paper provides more 
specificity regarding the design elements of the proposed carbon tax, which are 
discussed below. 
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a)  Tax base 
The carbon tax will apply to Scope 1 emissions, which are emissions that ‘result 
directly from fuel combustion and gasification, as well as from non-energy industrial 
processes’,184 including processes such as electricity generation, coal and gas to 
liquid, crude oil refining, mining, cement, transport and waste.185 The carbon tax will 
apply to carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, 
hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride.186  
While it is preferable to impose the tax on the actual emissions, this can be 
‘administratively complex’,187 and the tax will therefore be imposed indirectly on the 
fuel input, namely the coal, crude oil or natural gas. The taxes for the relevant fuel 
inputs will be determined through the use of ‘emissions factors’, which will be 
prescribed or approved by the Department of Environmental Affairs.188 The Carbon 
Tax Policy Paper notes that ‘emission factors and/or procedures are available to 
quantify CO2-eq emissions with a relatively high level of accuracy for different 
processes and sectors’.189 
 
b)  Tax level 
In principle the carbon tax should be ‘applied at a rate equivalent to the marginal 
social damage costs’.190 However, due to the fact that there is no international 
agreement on global pricing of carbon emissions, and in order to reduce negative 
impacts on the competitiveness of local firms and on households, the tax will be 
introduced at a modest rate of R120/tCO2e from 1 January 2015 and will increase by 
10 per cent each year until 2019 ‘in order to provide a clear long-term price signal’.191  
Tax-free thresholds will also be established, below which the tax will not apply 
during the first phase, i.e. from 2015-2019. These tax-free thresholds are reflected in 
Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4   Tax-free emission thresholds by sector192  
 
It can be seen that all sectors enjoy a basic tax-free threshold of 60 per cent 
during the first phase. Therefore, 60 per cent of the emissions of all firms in the listed 
sectors will be entirely exempt from the carbon tax. Furthermore, sectors that are 
vulnerable to trade exposure, enjoy a further 10 per cent allowance. A further 10 per 
cent allowance is provided for sectors that have limited potential to reduce 
emissions, including iron and steel, glass and ceramics and cement. In addition, all 
sectors are provided with an additional allowance of either 5 or 10 per cent, in the 
form of the use of offsets, i.e. carbon credits.  
Thus, the 60 per cent tax-free threshold may be extended up to 90 per cent 
during the first phase and the effective tax level will range from only R12 to 
R48/tCO2e between 2015 and 2019. The waste and forestry, agriculture and land 
use sectors will be exempt from paying the carbon tax at all during the first phase, 
primarily due to difficulties with measuring emissions in these sectors.193 
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After the first phase, the tax-free thresholds may either be reduced or replaced 
by absolute emissions thresholds.194 The tax-free thresholds should be aligned with 
the carbon budgets that were mooted in the Climate Change Response White 
Paper.195 In addition, there will be an incentive to reduce the carbon intensity of 
products and the basic tax-free threshold may be adjusted with reference to a firm’s 
carbon intensity in comparison to a benchmark.196 The basic tax-free threshold may 
be adjusted up or down by 5 per cent. Firms that are above the benchmark will be 
penalised while those that fall below the benchmark will be rewarded.197  
It is acknowledged that the introduction of a carbon tax even at these modest 
levels would most likely have impacts on households that ‘filter through to higher 
energy prices and electricity, fuel and transport costs’.198 
 
c)  Who is subject to the tax 
In principle, ‘an environmentally effective and efficient carbon tax should aim for 
broad coverage’ with as few exemptions and exclusions as possible.199 As noted 
above, the tax will apply to a number of sectors including electricity, coal and gas to 
liquid, iron and steel, cement, chemicals and paper and pulp.200 However, they will 
enjoy a reduced tax rate in the first phase, and the waste and forestry, agriculture 
and land use sectors will be entirely exempt in the first phase. 
 
d)  Use of the revenue 
To reduce the negative impacts of a carbon tax it is possible to introduce revenue 
recycling (which was discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The Carbon Tax Policy Paper 
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notes that shifting taxes from ‘goods’, such as income, to ‘bads’, such as pollution 
and GHG emissions, could result in environmental and employment benefits.201  
Specific options mooted are tax shifting and rebates for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). It also appears that it is intended to provide support to various 
flagship programmes that were identified in the Climate Change Response White 
Paper, including the Climate Change Response Public Works Flagship Programme, 
the Renewable Energy Flagship Programme and the Energy Efficiency and Energy 
Demand Management Flagship Programme.202 Other support measures include the 
strengthening of the free basic electricity policy, an energy efficiency savings tax 
incentive, and support for the REIPPP Programme primarily in the form of 
concessional loans for small-scale renewable energy projects (of 1-5 MW installed 
capacity). Such measures should be temporary.203 
It has been reported that government expects to raise carbon tax revenue of 
about R15 billion per year.204  
 
e)  Other considerations 
The impacts of the carbon tax on local firms could lead to carbon leakage, which 
occurs when firms move their businesses to countries that do not have carbon 
pricing in place, in order to reduce their costs.205 This could be addressed through 
the imposition of border tax adjustments (BTAs), which are taxes that are imposed 
by a country that has carbon pricing in place (country A) on carbon-intensive goods 
imported into that country from another country (country B) that does not have 
carbon pricing in place.206 This would serve to prevent the ‘leakage’ of carbon 
emissions to country B. It would also serve to protect the competitiveness of local 
firms (in country A) as they would not have to compete against products that are not 
subject to carbon taxation.  
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However, there are ‘significant practical and administrative challenges with this 
approach’.207 In any event, BTAs will not be imposed at the outset but a 10 per cent 
tax-free threshold (as noted in Table 7.4) will be provided to energy- and trade-
intensive sectors.208 The National Treasury considers that these thresholds will 
assist in addressing concerns regarding competitiveness and carbon leakage.209  
The Carbon Tax Policy Paper also discusses the possibility of gradually phasing 
out the levy imposed on electricity generated from non-renewable sources as the 
carbon tax is increased over time in order to avoid the possibility of double 
taxation.210 However, ‘[s]uch restructuring should ensure that all large energy 
intensive users improve their energy efficiency and reduce their emissions, and do 
not escape the impact and intent of an energy and carbon tax through long-term 
pricing agreements’.211 
A carbon tax, if implemented, should comply with the principles of taxation, in 
particular, neutrality, equity and certainty, simplicity and minimising costs.212 
Furthermore, various criteria, such as environmental effectiveness, tax revenue, 
support for the tax, legislative aspects, technical and administrative viability, 
competitiveness effects, distributional impacts and adjoining policy areas,213 must be 
taken into account when considering an environmentally-related tax. While these 
have not been specifically discussed, some of these principles and criteria have 
been touched on in 4.5.1.2 above including neutrality, certainty, simplicity and 
distributional impacts.  
 
7.5.1.6  Viability of a carbon tax in South Africa  
A number of studies have considered the impacts of a carbon tax in South Africa as 
well as the design of the various elements.214 While a carbon tax in the South African 
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context raises a number of issues, various studies consider that it would be possible 
to address these concerns; and it has been argued that ‘[w]ith appropriate design, a 
carbon tax can be a powerful instrument of mitigation in South Africa, and at the 
same time contribute to socio-economic objectives’.215 Importantly, a carbon tax is 
only one option to reduce emissions and it ‘should be considered as part of a 
broader suite of options including regulatory and economic instruments’.216 
Significantly, as noted in Chapter 4, one study found that when various 
environmental taxes – including a direct tax on carbon emissions – were applied in 
conjunction with reduced food prices (a form of revenue recycling), a ‘triple dividend’ 
was yielded.217  
 
7.5.2  Renewable energy certificate trading  
A voluntary tradable renewable energy certificate (TREC) market has been 
introduced in South Africa and the Tradable Renewable Energy Certificate South 
Africa body (TRECSA) was established in 2005.218 As noted in 4.4.1.2, in Europe 
and the USA renewable energy certificate trading is often combined with the 
renewable obligation. Even though the TREC system is technically a current 
instrument, it has not been very successful and government has been considering 
how a more effective system should be developed. It is for this reason included here 
under ‘proposed instruments’. 
In 2007 the (former) Department of Minerals and Energy published the Tradable 
Renewable Energy Certificate report (the TREC report), which considered the 
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establishment of a voluntary TREC system in South Africa. Only the most pertinent 
aspects are highlighted here.  
The TREC report refers to TRECs as ‘electronic records that verify the origin of 
energy from registered renewable energy facilities’.219 Under the TREC system there 
are three different income streams: selling the (renewable) electricity to the grid at 
current electricity prices in terms of a power purchase agreement, generating 
certified emission reductions (CERs) under the Kyoto Protocol and issuing 
TRECs.220 
The TREC report recommends that the European Renewable Energy 
Certification System (RECS) be implemented in South Africa and considers that the 
TREC system should be voluntary.221 It goes on to consider more technical aspects 
of the system, including the adoption of the principles and rules of operation, the 
establishment of the Issuing Body (to issue TRECs) and the issue, transfer and 
redemption of the actual RECS certificates.222  
Since the publication of the TREC report, the (former) Department of Minerals 
and Energy has established the ‘South African National Tradable Renewable Energy 
Certificate Team’ (SANTREC), which has been charged with coordinating the TREC 
system.223 The TRECSA industry participant body has been established as the 
interim Issuing Body (IB),224 charged with the issuing of TRECs. The TREC system 
is administered by zaRECS.225 
By 2010, 121 445 MWh (representing the same number of renewable energy 
certificates) had been issued and 42 349 MWh had been redeemed.226 In the first 
half of 2011/12 no new renewable energy certificates were issued because it was 
decided ‘to put the programme of formalising trading of green certificates on hold’ 
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due to the low levels of renewable energy in South Africa at the time. However, this 
decision was to be reviewed when renewable energy levels had increased.227  
The TREC system has not been very successful. It has been argued that due to 
a lack of government involvement the TREC system is unsustainable,228 and that 
‘further regulatory certainty and the establishment of a suitable TREC system’ are 
required.229 It has also been argued that as voluntary TREC markets do not create 
sufficient demand, mandatory TREC markets are required to promote renewable 
energy.230 
At a local level the City of Cape Town has started to buy ‘green electricity’ from 
the Darling Wind Farm, which it thereafter sells to willing purchasers (mainly 
companies) in the form of ‘green electricity certificates’ (GECs). The ‘green 
electricity’ is not separate from regular coal-generated electricity as it is simply fed 
into the grid. Thus, customers would pay their normal electricity bills and then pay an 
additional amount for the green electricity (beforehand), which in 2012/2013, was 
priced at 25c/kWh (excluding VAT).231  
 
7.5.3  Carbon trading 
As noted above, the South African government considers carbon taxation to be 
preferable to carbon trading and identifies a number of advantages of a carbon tax 
over an emissions trading scheme, including that a carbon tax is easier to 
administer, it could ‘piggyback’ on the current tax administrative system and it 
provides greater price certainty.232 
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Nevertheless, government is considering the implementation of a carbon trading 
system  in South Africa (in addition to the carbon tax) and has briefly considered the 
necessary features of a tradable permit system, including open trade, permits that 
are well defined and that are capable of being banked, and a penalty for violations 
that is far greater than the price of a permit (or certificate).233 However, government 
notes that ensuring open trade  
‘will be difficult in South Africa because many industries are still largely 
oligopolistic and dominated by a small number of large firms … which is likely to 
limit the level of trading, which, in turn will undermine the effectiveness of these 
kind of systems’.234 
On the other hand, the National Climate Change Response White Paper 
identifies a possible role for emission trading schemes in respect of sectors or 
companies that are subject to a carbon budget in terms of the White Paper235 (as 
discussed in Chapter 6). The Carbon Tax Policy Paper states that government will 
investigate the feasibility of introducing an emissions trading scheme to complement 
the carbon tax from around 2025.236 
 
7.6   Concluding remarks 
This chapter has highlighted the increased role that is being played by market-based 
instruments in South Africa and described the MBIs that are currently in place to 
promote renewable energy, including the REIPPP Programme, subsidies for solar 
water heaters and the levy on electricity generated from non-renewable sources. 
Although the REFIT has been replaced by the REIPPPP, due to the advantages of 
the feed-in tariff and its clear success internationally, the REFIT that was introduced 
in 2009 was also outlined. It was noted that the REIPPPP is in place only in respect 
of specific amounts of capacity and, therefore, it is not sufficient to create a 
sustainable renewable energy industry. This also means that the REIPPPP is not in 
place indefinitely and that the REIPPP programme is thus not ‘the last word’. 
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This chapter has also briefly discussed the MBIs that have been considered for 
implementation in South Africa, namely the carbon tax, carbon trading and 
renewable energy certificate trading. 
Renewable energy cannot be promoted in a vacuum, with no attempt to 
transform the carbon-intensive nature of the energy sector. Introducing a carbon tax 
would serve to ‘put a price on carbon’, thereby internalising external environmental 
and social costs, and would arguably discourage the continued reliance on carbon-
intensive energy sources, thus making renewable energy sources more viable. 
Furthermore, a carbon tax would provide a source of revenue that could be used at 
least in part to fund the costs of a feed-in tariff programme. 

















Implementing a feed-in tariff in South 
Africa 
 
8.1   Introduction 
In promoting renewable energy, the aim should not be  
‘simply to install capacity, but to provide the conditions for [the] creation of a 
sustained and profitable industry, which, in turn, will result in increased 
renewable energy capacity and generation, and will drive down costs. To 
achieve this end, a viable, clear and long-term government commitment is 
critical. Also essential are policies that create markets, and ensure a fair rate of 
return for investors’.1 
It has emerged from international experience and from the literature that a 
crucial aspect in promoting renewable energy is to create security for prospective 
renewable energy investors, central to which is a stable policy environment. Indeed, 
it has been noted that 
‘[c]onsistency is critical for ensuring continuous growth and stability in the 
[renewable energy] market, enabling the development of a domestic 
manufacturing industry, reducing the risk of investing in a technology, and 
making it easier to obtain financing. It is also cheaper… With stop-and-go 
policies, each time around the funds must be appropriated, a new program must 
be administered, information must be distributed to stakeholders, and so on. As 
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a result, costs of administering the program could approach those of the 
incentives themselves’.2  
In this research the feed-in tariff (FIT) has emerged as an instrument that has 
achieved wide success in promoting electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E), inter alia due to the ‘overall stability and continuity’ provided by 
this policy framework.3 By early 2013 some form of FIT policy had been implemented 
in 71 countries, including several developing countries such as China, India and 
Kenya.4 However, FIT policies have been implemented in developing countries more 
recently than in developed countries, and it is thus not yet possible to fully gauge 
their success in these developing countries.  
This chapter considers the elements and potential design of a FIT policy in South 
Africa with reference to the principles and country examples that were discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
 
8.2   Feed-in tariff 
 
8.2.1  Overview 
As developed countries generally provide ‘best practice’ examples, account must be 
taken of South Africa’s developing country status in considering the appropriate 
design of a FIT policy here. Even so, it has been argued that although  
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‘Africa faces other social, political and economic challenges than Europe … 
many of the REFiT design principles … remain the same and can be adjusted to 
take account of specific country needs’.5  
Careful consideration of the policy design can help to ensure that RES-E 
develops at the desired scale while avoiding ‘unintended consequences such as 
runaway program cost’.6 It would be particularly important in South Africa that 
government balances the need for low energy prices against the need to offer tariff 
rates that are sufficiently high to attract private investment.7  
In this chapter, relevant institutions are first outlined (in 8.2.2). The specific 
elements of a FIT policy are then considered (in 8.2.3), with a view to considering the 
appropriate design of these elements in the South African context. The design 
elements discussed below are not absolutely clear-cut and may overlap to some 
extent. 
 
8.2.2  Institutions 
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (the NERSA) undertook responsibility 
for the implementation of the REFIT, while responsibility for the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (the REIPPPP) is 
undertaken by the Department of Energy. As the FIT would be a large-scale 
programme (unless limits were placed on its growth), it is submitted that it would be 
appropriate for the Department of Energy to be responsible for its introduction and 
administration.  
However, it would still be necessary for RES-E generators to obtain licences 
from the NERSA, and the NERSA would remain responsible for the regulation of 
tariffs (as discussed in Chapter 6). In addition, it would be appropriate (at least for 
the present) for RES-E generators to enter into power purchase agreements (PPAs) 
with Eskom. While concerns might be raised regarding bias on the part of Eskom, it 
is submitted that such concerns should be allayed if an obligation were placed on 
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Eskom to connect RES-E generators to the grid and to purchase their electricity as a 
priority (as discussed in 8.2.3.5 and 8.2.3.6 below). Once the Independent System 
and Market Operator (the ISMO, which was discussed in 6.2) is established, it would 
be more appropriate for RES-E generators to enter into PPAs with the ISMO. 
In addition, the Department of Environmental Affairs would necessarily be 
involved with regard to the consideration of applications for environmental 
authorisations. 
 
8.2.3  Necessary elements of a feed-in tariff policy in South 
 Africa 
8.2.3.1  Overview 
As seen in Chapter 5, the implementation of FIT policies can differ from country to 
country.8 This is due to the varying policy objectives of different governments,9 which 
will impact on the design of the various elements such as eligibility criteria and 
whether tariffs are differentiated in respect of different renewable energy 
technologies (RETs).10  
The elements that should be included in a FIT policy, which emerged in 
Chapters 4 and 5 above, include a binding renewable energy target, obligations 
relating to connecting to and upgrading of the grid, an obligation relating to the 
purchase of electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E), 
appropriate tariffs, as well as provision for transparency and access to information.11  
At the outset, it is emphasised that, when the feed-in tariff was initially introduced 
in Germany, the relevant legislation was fairly basic. As the feed-in tariff developed, 
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the legislation became more nuanced. It has been recommended that ‘[i]n countries 
with a relatively short history of renewable energy development and those 
establishing a REFiT scheme for the very first time … the support mechanism 
[should be kept] simple at the start’.12 Accordingly, an initial recommendation is that 
any FIT policy in South Africa be relatively simple at the outset and that it be 
developed over time to ensure the continued effectiveness of the policy.  
It is especially important that the FIT policy is designed so as to create long-term 
stability. In particular, ‘[r]apid or unexpected changes in payment levels or policy 
structure can damage investor confidence and significantly impede the pace of 
renewable energy growth’.13 
 
8.2.3.2  A binding renewable energy target 
Targets are important inter alia because they signal ‘long-term commitment to 
investors … [and] indicate that support mechanisms will be in place for a certain 
period of time and they increase the likelihood of tariffs being sufficiently high’.14 It is 
submitted that renewable energy targets should be informed to a large extent by a 
country’s renewable energy potential. For instance, the establishment of ambitious 
RES-E targets in a country that lacks significant renewable energy resources would 
make achieving the target challenging as well as costly. However, South Africa has 
significant renewable energy resources, which means that it would actually be 
cheaper to promote renewable energy in South Africa than in a country like 
Germany.15  
As noted in Chapter 6, the White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the 
Republic of South Africa (the REWP) established a target of 10 000 gigawatt hours 
(GWh) of renewable energy generation by 2013. The Integrated Resource Plan 
2010-2030 (IRP 2010-2030) effectively serves to bolster this target and envisages 
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that renewable energy capacity will amount to 21 per cent of total electricity capacity 
(18.8 GW excluding hydro) by 2030, or 9 per cent (approximately 41 tera watt hours) 
of total electricity supply, by 2030. However, there is no incentive to go beyond 9 per 
cent of RES-E supply by 2030. It is also unlikely that any consequences would 
attach to non-compliance with this ‘target’. 
It was seen in Chapter 3 that targets considered viable (in South Africa) in the 
literature range from 13 per cent of RES-E by 2020,16 to at least 27 per cent RES-E 
by 2030.17 This is significantly more than the target provided for in the IRP 2010-
2030. In light of all of this, an argument could be made for establishing a more 
ambitious target for RES-E. It is arguable that the German approach of using the 
words ‘at least’ to precede the RES-E targets, ensures that the target does not act as 
a cap on the uptake of renewable energy but rather serves as a lower level of 
ambition, which could allow for the uptake of more RES-E. 
Although a binding RES-E target does not necessarily need to be included in the 
feed-in tariff policy, it is important that the FIT policy is linked to existing targets,18 
which can increase investor confidence.19 While it has been argued that linking the 
FIT to renewable energy targets can create more administrative complexity as 
progress in meeting the target has to be monitored,20 it is submitted that this is not a 
disadvantage, especially in light of the poor performance with regard to achieving the 
(unambitious) 2013 renewable energy target. 
In Germany, targets were established for renewable energy and RES-E under 
the Renewable Energy Sources Act (the EEG). The overall renewable energy target 
reflects Germany’s target under the European Union Directive regarding the use of 
                                                          
16
 D Banks and J Schäffler The Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy in South Africa 2006 
(draft update report) (prepared for Sustainable Energy & Climate Change Project and Earthlife Africa) 
available at http://www.nano.co.za/PotentialContributionOfRenewableEnergyInSAFeb06.pdf 
[accessed 18 January 2012] 53. 
17
 M Edkins, A Marquard and H Winkler ‘South Africa’s Renewable Energy Policy Roadmaps’ 2010 
(Final Report for the United Nations Environment Programme Research Programme: Enhancing 
information for renewable energy technology deployment in Brazil, China and South Africa) available 
at http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/10Edkinesetal-Renewables_roadmaps.pdf 
[accessed 27 March 2011]. 
18
 W Rickerson, C Laurent, D Jacobs, C Dietrich and C Hanley Feed-in Tariffs as a Policy Instrument 
for Promoting Renewable Energies and Green Economies in Developing Countries 2012 (United 
Nations Environment Programme) available at www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_FIT_Report_2012F.pdf 
[accessed 28 March 2013] 22. 
19
 Ibid, 23-24. 
20
 Ibid, 24. 
284 
 
energy from renewable sources.21 Spain’s FIT policy did not incorporate targets but 
was intended to contribute to achieving Spain’s renewable energy and RES-E 
targets. In both India and China targets for renewable energy are in place, but the 
FIT policies in these countries do not appear to be linked to these targets. South 
Africa’s Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) was specifically intended to 
support the 10 000 GWh renewable energy target (which is now outdated).  
Thus, if the RES-E target is not specifically included in the FIT policy, the FIT 
policy should at least be linked to the RES-E target; i.e., it should be stated that the 
FIT is intended to contribute to achieving the RES-E target. The target could also be 
established in terms of the National Energy Act,22 which empowers the Minister of 
Energy to make regulations regarding inter alia ‘minimum contributions to national 
energy supply from renewable energy sources’.23 
It has also been recommended that short-, medium- and long-term targets be 
established in order to establish ‘a pathway of how renewables can increasingly 
substitute fossil and nuclear power generation sources’.24 In Germany, the EEG 
establishes RES-E targets for 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
 
8.2.3.3  Definitions 
Renewable energy has been defined in various South African policy documents 
including the REWP and the National Energy Act (discussed in Chapter 3 above). 
The latter defines renewable energy as ‘energy generated from natural non-depleting 
resources including solar energy, wind energy, biomass energy, biological waste 
energy, hydro energy, geothermal energy and ocean and tidal energy’.25 This 
definition is appropriate and if not incorporated directly into the FIT policy, it could be 
stated in the FIT policy that renewable energy has the meaning assigned to it in the 
National Energy Act. RES-E could be defined simply as ‘electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources’. 
                                                          
21
 In terms of European Union ‘Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC’. 
22
 Act 34 of 2008. 
23
 National Energy Act 34 of 2008, section 19(1)(d). 
24
 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 24. 
25
 National Energy Act (n23) section 1. 
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With regard to the purchasing entity, Eskom currently owns most of the 
distribution and transmission infrastructure in South Africa and it would thus be 
practical to specify that Eskom be the purchaser of RES-E. This was indeed the case 
under the REFIT of 2009. However, an independent body – the Independent System 
and Market Operator (ISMO) – will soon be established in terms of the imminent 
Independent System and Market Operator Act to be the buyer and seller of electricity 
in the future.26 Once the ISMO has been established, it would be practical to specify 
the ISMO as the purchasing entity.   
Further technical terms should be defined, including ‘generator’, ‘transmitter’, 
‘distributor’ and ‘customer’. It could be specified that these have the meaning 
assigned to them in the Electricity Regulation Act.27 
 
8.2.3.4 Eligibility criteria 
a)   Eligible technologies 
It is important that the FIT policy should support a number of RETs for various 
reasons. Including a range of RETs ensures that less mature RETs can be 
promoted, thereby assisting them to become more mature. While including less 
mature technologies could result in higher electricity costs for consumers in the short 
term, it can assist in lowering costs in the long term,28 and in achieving the ambitious 
deployment of RES-E.29  
Selecting a range RETs also ensures that intermittent and non-intermittent RETs 
will be included, which is important.30 For example, there would be extremely 
negative consequences if government were to rely only on wind energy, which is an 
intermittent energy source. If wind energy capacity were developed on a large-scale 
and replaced (baseload) coal energy, this could lead to an unstable electricity supply 
                                                          
26
 Department of Energy Independent System and Market Operator Establishment Bill in GN 290 in 
Government Gazette No. 34289 dated 13 May 2011. 
27
 Act 4 of 2006. 
28
 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n3) 69, Nganga et al Powering 
Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 15 and Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs in Developing Countries 
(n18) 26-27. 
29
 Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n2) 52. 
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 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 15. 
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during times of peak electricity demand.31 On the other hand, it has been noted that 
‘a diverse portfolio of renewable energy generators can allow different technologies 
to balance one another’,32 thus leading to a more resilient electricity supply.33 
Therefore, wind energy and solar photovoltaic (PV) (without storage), which are 
intermittent sources, should be balanced with more stable sources such as biomass, 
concentrated solar power (CSP) (with storage) and hydropower34 that can provide 
power on demand. This could assist in ‘lay[ing] the foundation for a 100% 
renewables-based electricity system at an early stage’.35  
The decision regarding eligible technologies would necessarily be informed by 
the availability of the various renewable energy resources, and could be established 
inter alia with reference to tools like wind and solar maps.36 For instance, CSP is not 
included under Germany’s FIT due to the fact that there is not much potential for 
CSP in Germany.37 As seen in Chapter 5, a relatively wide range of RETs is included 
in the FIT policies of Germany and Spain. The RETs that are eligible for tariffs in 
India and China are more limited. 
In South Africa the potential capacity of various RETs has been considered in 
various studies and by government. Furthermore, suitable RETs were identified in 
the REFIT that was introduced in 2009, namely onshore wind energy, solar PV, CSP 
(with and without storage), solid biomass, biogas, landfill gas and small hydro. These 
have remained the same under the REIPPPP, except that there is no differentiation 
between the different types of CSP (i.e. with and without storage). It is submitted that 
a distinction between CSP with and without storage is important, especially in light of 
the fact that a commonly-cited disadvantage of renewable energy is that it is an 
intermittent source. Encouraging CSP with storage would be advantageous as this 
would overcome the problem of intermittency.  
                                                          
31
 See for example Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 55-56, who argue that 
this was one of the concerns of the South African government with regard to the REFIT.  
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 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs  in Developing Countries (n18) 8.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 15. See also Couture et al A 
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There is no reason to diverge from the REFIT in this regard. It is thus submitted 
that the following should be defined as eligible technologies: onshore wind energy, 
solar PV,38 CSP (with and without storage), solid biomass,39 biogas, landfill gas and 
small hydro. With regard to biomass and biogas, it is submitted that the FIT policy 
should specify that these must be produced sustainably, i.e. that the biomass 
product from which energy is generated must be re-grown.  
 
b)  Project age 
Beyond defining the RETs that are eligible, it is also possible to specify the age of 
renewable energy installations that will be included under the FIT.40 The practice is 
for only new plants (and not existing plants) or plants that have been upgraded to be 
eligible. The REFIT also provided that only new investments qualified for tariffs. The 
rationale is that the development of new renewable energy capacity could be 
impeded if existing (RES-E) generators were able to qualify ‘without requiring them 
to repower or modernize’.41 This means that only the latest (and most efficient) 
technologies would qualify. This is unlikely to be problematic in South Africa since 
there are very few RES-E plants currently. However, a project such as the Darling 
Wind Farm would not be eligible, unless the FIT policy provided for upgraded RES-E 
plants to also qualify for tariffs. 
 
c)  Project size 
It should also be decided whether the projects that are eligible to participate in the 
FIT should be restricted on the basis of size.42 In this regard, it is cheaper to produce 
RES-E from larger installations. For instance, large-scale hydro is ‘already slightly 
                                                          
38
 In some advanced FIT systems, a distinction is made between ground-mounted and building-
integrated solar PV. See Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 15. This is indeed 
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more competitive with conventional energy sources even without any financial 
support in areas with large resources’.43 The FIT policy may therefore limit the size of 
projects that are eligible to participate as it is more likely that larger installations 
would not need the financial assistance.  
A disadvantage of restricting the eligibility of RETs by excluding larger 
installations is that this could hamper progress in deploying significant amounts of 
renewable energy. In addition, independent power producers (IPPs) may opt to 
break a larger installation into several smaller installations in order to comply with the 
capacity limit, which would lead to decreasing the ‘cost efficiency’ that is harnessed 
in the case of larger projects.44 Since smaller installations are generally more 
expensive than larger installations, the inclusion of smaller installations would 
increase the costs of the FIT programme. It has been suggested that policymakers 
do not include capacity limits for any RETs except for large-scale hydro.45 It was 
seen with regard to Germany and Spain that project size was limited in respect of 
only a few RETs.46 Under the REFIT, limits were only placed on small hydro power 
plants and large-scale solar PV. 
This decision will depend greatly on the relevant government’s policy goals.47 
While larger projects are more likely to be cost-effective (i.e. a lower cost per kilowatt 
hour (kWh)) they ‘are less likely to be domestically owned and financed’.48 On the 
other hand, while ‘smaller projects tend to be more expensive … [they] are more 
likely to be domestically owned and financed’.49 Encouraging the latter could be 
important in promoting the participation of communities and could contribute to the 
achievement of socio-economic goals. Experience in some developing countries has 
also shown that 
‘some grids cannot support large amounts of renewable energy development 
either because of their size or their relative instability. By restricting project sizes, 
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policy makers can encourage more “manageable” development – particularly 
when program caps that reflect grid limitations are also introduced’.50  
It would be important to establish the amount of RES-E that the South African 
grid could support, and it is relevant that the grid is already in the process of being 
expanded from the 2010 capacity level of approximately 44.5 GW to approximately 
89.5 GW in 2030 (in terms of the IRP 2010-2030). As noted above, it would be 
possible to combine different types of RETs so that some stable RETs operate 
alongside intermittent RETs and contribute to grid stability.  
In light of the disadvantages of placing capacity limits on eligible technologies, it 
is submitted that policymakers should be hesitant to do so, at least at the outset of 
the FIT programme. However, it would be possible to differentiate tariffs according to 
the size of the installation (discussed further in 8.2.3.7), which would involve 
decreasing tariffs within a technology band as the size of an installation increases, 
which is the approach followed in Germany and Spain. This would arguably go some 
way towards ameliorating concerns regarding the costs of the programme.  
 
d)  Ownership 
It should also be determined who is eligible to develop RES-E installations and 
qualify for tariffs under the FIT programme.51 It has been argued that no plants 
should be excluded based on their ownership,52 as having fewer limitations on 
participation can lead to greater penetration of renewable energy as well as broader 
support.53 Furthermore, including utilities could ‘reduce institutional opposition and 
help jurisdictions capture a greater share of domestically available RE potential’.54 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that allowing utilities to participate could 
serve to ‘extend their monopoly status.’55 Another possible drawback is that they 
may be able to limit the access of other players.56 
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In Germany it was previously the position that state-owned installations could not 
participate in the FIT.57 However, this exclusion is not present in the current version 
of the EEG. 
In the South African context, the point of departure is that non-state actors 
should not be prevented in any way from participating in a FIT programme. However, 
the inclusion of state-owned entities such as Eskom, would need to be carefully 
considered. As noted in Chapter 3, Eskom holds a monopoly with regard to 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and it is arguable that it would be 
preferable to exclude Eskom in order to allow IPPs to enter the market. On the other 
hand, it would arguably be beneficial if there was an incentive for Eskom to invest in 
renewable energy rather than being excluded from the FIT programme and 
continuing its investment in coal-generated electricity.  
On balance it is submitted that, at least at the outset, the priority should be to 
increase the number of IPPs. Although the benefits of allowing utilities to participate 
should not be ignored, it would be preferable to reassess the inclusion of state-
owned entities at a later stage.58 
 
8.2.3.5  Obligations relating to connecting to, and upgrading of, the 
 grid 
a)  Overview 
It has been noted that ‘[u]nfair grid access rules are often a barrier in power markets 
where the grid operator itself is engaged in power production’.59 An obligation to 
connect IPPs to the grid is thus important in South Africa in light of Eskom’s 
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 See for example Gesetz fur den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
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monopoly.60 While the REFIT guaranteed renewable energy generators access to 
the grid, an obligation connection was not explicitly included. Thus, including a 
provision in the FIT policy stating that ‘eligible plants must be connected to the grid’61 
would be preferable.  
It has been recommended that, as in Germany, it be specified that RES-E plants 
must be ‘immediately’ connected to the grid in order to prevent delay on the part of 
the grid operator (i.e. Eskom), and that a priority connection must also be specified 
to ensure that RES-E plants are connected to the grid ahead of conventional power 
plants.62  
The relevant FIT policy must also deal with the situation where the grid needs to 
be upgraded in order to be able to take up the additional capacity.63 In Germany and 
China grid operators are required to connect renewable energy generators to the 
grid and to upgrade the grid if required.64 No such obligation was included under the 
REFIT. It is submitted that a FIT policy in South Africa should include an obligation 
(on the grid operator, Eskom) to upgrade the grid.  
 While concerns could be raised regarding the ‘the ability of the grid to absorb 
new generation and/or the technical feasibility (or necessity) of extending the grid to 
accommodate all available renewable resource’,65 it has been noted that government 
plans to double South Africa’s electricity capacity by 2030. Thus, upgrading of the 
grid is in any event required and the implementation of the FIT would complement 
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b)  Costs of connecting to, and upgrading of, the grid  
It is important to determine who will bear the costs of connecting to and upgrading 
the grid.66 There are three primary options. Firstly, the IPP may be held responsible 
for the costs of connecting the installation to the closest grid connection point, while 
the grid operator is held responsible for any costs incurred in upgrading the grid 
(shallow connection charging). Secondly, the IPP may be held responsible for all of 
these costs (deep connection charging). Thirdly, a mixed approach could be adopted 
in terms of which the IPP is responsible for the costs of connection while the IPP and 
grid operator share the costs of upgrading the grid.67  
Each approach has its relative advantages and disadvantages. For instance, an 
advantage of the shallow approach is that it provides for greater transparency 
regarding the relevant costs, which reduces risk. On the other hand, if IPPs are not 
responsible for the costs of upgrading, they would not ‘necessarily consider how to 
site projects in a way that would optimize the use of the existing grid’.68 With regard 
to the deep approach, while renewable energy generators would not have to pay use 
charges (to the grid operator), they are likely to incur much higher costs than under 
the shallow approach.69  
In Germany the costs of connecting to and upgrading the grid are borne by the 
grid operator and independent power producers respectively (the shallow approach). 
In China the Renewable Energy Law specifies that expenses incurred in connecting 
to the grid and ‘other reasonable expenses’ be paid for by grid operators, but 
‘retrieved from the selling price’.70 It is not clear if ‘other reasonable expenses’ would 
include the costs of upgrading the grid.  
In the African context, it has been recommended that either the shallow 
connection charging approach be adopted or that all of these costs are borne by the 
grid operator.71 It is submitted that, as in Germany, the shallow connection charging 
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approach is preferable and that the costs of connection and upgrading should be 
shared by grid operators and RES-E generators. It is most likely however, that the 
additional costs of grid connection and upgrading would form ‘part of the tariff 
calculation methodology’.72 This provides more security to prospective RES-E 
generators,73 as it ensures that their costs will be covered.  
 
8.2.3.6  Obligation relating to the purchase of RES-E 
a)  Overview 
In addition to the obligation placed on the grid operator (Eskom) to connect IPPs to 
the grid, it is crucial that the grid operator is also obliged to purchase electricity from 
RES-E generators and to distribute it. This would ensure that security is provided to 
RES-E developers that their electricity will be bought.74 Indeed, it has been observed 
that  
‘[t]he purchase obligation protects renewable electricity producers in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets where the grid operator might also dispatch 
power generation capacity. When decisions are made about which power 
generation sources to use to meet electricity demand, such grid operators might 
be biased and dispatch power from power plants such as their own plants first’.75   
The purchase obligation is also important with regard to intermittent RETs ‘such 
as wind and solar PV, as the producer cannot control when the electricity will be 
generated’.76 As noted in Chapter 7, a purchase obligation was included under the 
REFIT. 
Obliging the grid operator to purchase and dispatch RES-E as a priority, and 
ahead of conventional (coal-generated) electricity, would result in the displacement 
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of some conventional electricity generated by Eskom. This could have an impact on 
electricity prices,77 as RES-E is (at this stage) generally more expensive than 
conventional electricity. While current electricity prices do not include all the external 
environmental and social costs (discussed in Chapter 3), the increase in electricity 
prices that may result due to the uptake of a significant amount of RES-E cannot be 
ignored.78 
In Germany and Spain there was previously no limit on the uptake of RES-E. It 
has been argued that Germany’s experience ‘has shown that a “cap-less” policy 
environment can create positive results for job creation, manufacturing, export 
market growth, and avoided environmental costs’.79 Furthermore, the cap-less policy 
appears to have resulted in lower prices of RES-E in Germany.80 
However, allowing for limitless RES-E growth would arguably increase the costs 
of the entire programme. In Germany, due to higher than anticipated interest in solar 
PV, capacity limits were introduced (as discussed in Chapter 5). Capacity caps were 
also introduced in Spain in respect of wind and CSP plants and the FIT programme 
was subsequently terminated.81  
Furthermore, the excess generation of RES-E from an intermittent RET, such as 
wind energy, could result in instability in the grid (as discussed in 8.2.3.4 above).82 It 
has also been argued that the purchase obligation would require the grid operator to 
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purchase electricity regardless of demand, which could be considered to be 
‘inconsistent with competitive electricity market structures’.83 
 
b)  Cost containment 
Against the background sketched above it is necessary to look more closely at 
various mechanisms that could be implemented by policymakers to limit the costs of 
a FIT programme.84 While this would introduce some complexity, it has been argued 
that  
‘[i]mplementing cost controls from the outset can avert the need for drastic policy 
corrections and can therefore help projects secure financing and provide greater 
certainty to investors and manufacturers while still enabling RE targets to be met 
on time’.85 
However, revisions to the FIT policy should be implemented in a gradual and 
predictable manner rather than arbitrarily and unpredictably, in order to avoid 
uncertainty.86 The central issue is thus for decision-makers to ensure that investment 




Some countries have set caps to contain the costs of a FIT programme. There are 
various types of caps, including caps on: total programme size (i.e. total capacity); 
the size of individual projects; the total policy costs; or caps with regard to specific 
technologies (i.e. the more expensive RETs).  
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Imposing a cap on the programme size or total capacity can be done on a short-
term basis – for example, by specifying the total amount of RES-E that may be taken 
up per year – or on a longer-term basis, for example, by imposing an overall 
programme cap that would be fulfilled over a number of years.87 
Imposing a cap on the total amount of RES-E that may be taken up would 
provide signals to investors and manufacturers regarding future market growth of the 
different RETs and would ‘also help policymakers control overall policy costs by 
providing firm limits on the amount of renewable energy development’.88 However, 
imposing a cap would limit the amount of RES-E development that can take place 
and may reduce investment stability by creating a stop-and-go investment cycle.89 
Investment stability would be reduced because investors would be ‘unlikely to know 
how quickly the caps will be reached and whether their particular project will make 
the cut before the cap is subscribed’.90  
This can lead to a further, related problem, namely that if investors have to 
‘queue’ their projects, they may enter ‘speculative bids’ for unviable projects simply 
to secure a position in the queue91 and thus take the place of more viable projects.92 
Policymakers have introduced procedures to deal with this, such as requiring the 
payment of application fees or a security deposit linked to development milestones.93  
It has been argued that hard or total capacity caps ‘are a blunt instrument for 
constraining the impact of any FIT law’.94 However, even introducing periodic caps 
could lead to a stop-and-go investment cycle as investors rush to complete projects 
before the deadline, followed by a lull as they wait for the next bidding window. This 
would evidently not promote a sustainable renewable energy industry.95  
                                                          
87
 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n3) 32. 
88
 Ibid, 81. 
89
 M Ragwitz, J Winkler, C Klessmann, M Gephart and G Resch (Fraunhofer ISI, Ecofys and Energy 
Economics Group) Recent Developments of Feed-in Systems in the EU – A research paper for the 
International Feed-In Cooperation 2012 available at http://www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/research/index.php [accessed 28 March 2013] 10. 
90




 Kreycik et al Innovative Feed-In Tariff Designs that Limit Policy Costs (n78) 10. 
93
 Ibid. Queuing is dealt with further at 8.2.3.10 below. 
94
 Prest ‘The Future of Feed-in Tariffs’ (n80) 34. 
95
 Ibid, 34. See also Kreycik et al Innovative Feed-In Tariff Designs that Limit Policy Costs (n78) 9. 
297 
 
It is notable that South Africa’s REIPPPP is based on the announcement of 
once-off bidding windows, which encourages investment in RES-E only for as much 
RES-E capacity is available in a specific bidding window. 
It is also possible to impose a cap on the size of projects, for example, limiting all 
individual projects to 5 megawatts (MW). It is also possible to set different limits in 
respect of different RETs.96 Thus, Ontario has set a limit of 10MW in respect of solar 
PV projects.97 While this can assist in controlling overall policy costs, it can also limit 
renewable energy development and increase the costs of renewable energy as 
smaller projects will not ‘harness economies of scale’.98 This can also lead to large 
projects being divided into smaller projects, which could significantly increase the 
costs of the programme.99 Caps on project size are less effective in limiting costs 
than caps on total programme size.100 
Finally, governments may limit the total amount of money that they wish to spend 
on a programme and thereby impose an ‘upper limit on the total ratepayer impact’.101 
This can be done by awarding a specific amount of money to different RETs based 
on the desired amount of installed capacity.102 While giving policymakers more 
control over the costs of the FIT policy and doing so in a transparent way, this 
approach can lead to limited renewable energy development, queuing challenges, a 
disproportionate focus on costs at the expense of benefits such as job creation and 
reduced emissions, and ‘stop-and-go development, which makes it difficult to 
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(ii) Growth corridors 
It is also possible to control costs by setting ‘growth corridors with continuous 
automatic adjustment of tariffs’.104 A growth corridor has been described as 
‘the amount of renewable capacity a country would like to see installed in a given 
year (e.g. 800-1200 MW, or 1000 MW) or part of a year (e.g. 200-300 MW per 
three month[s]). In case growth is in line with that growth corridor the normal 
tariff degression would apply (e.g. minus 10% per year). In case growth is 
stronger than envisaged, the tariff degression is increased (e.g. minus 1% per 
10% overshoot). In case of less growth than envisaged, tariff degression is 
decreased. The higher the frequency of adjustments (e.g. once in three month[s] 
instead of once a year) and the higher the increase of tariff degression in case of 
overshoot, the higher the control on support cost but the lower the investment 
stability. Germany currently uses this system in the case of photovoltaics, 
whereas Spain applies a fixed cap for the annual installed capacity’.105 
The setting of growth corridors (also referred to as responsive degression) is 
linked to the adjustment of tariff levels, which is discussed further in 8.2.3.7 below. 
The setting of growth corridors with the continuous adjustment of tariffs ‘preserves 
investment stability to a higher degree’106 (than caps). It also ensures that 
governments can adjust the FIT to maintain a predefined level of growth.107 It has 
also been argued that the more ‘a cap resembles the tariff degression approach … 
the more likely it is to represent a reasonable compromise between competing policy 
objectives’.108 On the other hand, the setting of growth corridors may not be as 
effective in containing the costs of the programme.109  
It is debatable which approach would be most suitable to contain costs and 
preserve grid stability in South Africa, and it is arguable that at the outset it may not 
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be necessary to introduce capacity caps.110 Indeed, this would require the least 
administration and regulation.111 On the other hand, an ‘uncapped and unadjusted 
FIT … cannot be controlled’.112 It would thus be advisable to plan for the possibility of 
exceptional growth in RES-E but without introducing hard capacity caps.   
It should be noted that in general the escalating costs of FIT policies have mainly 
been ‘due to the uptake of solar technologies’.113 Indeed, in Germany, a total 
capacity cap has only been introduced in respect of solar PV and certain 
jurisdictions, such as Ontario, have placed a capacity limit on individual solar PV 
projects.114 Therefore, one possibility would be to only introduce an overall capacity 
cap or establish a growth corridor in respect of solar technologies.  
On the other hand, it has been noted that  
‘at least in Australia, the knowledgeable observer can detect a discernable [sic] 
fear on the part of some governments that “too much” PV will be installed… This 
is coupled with an obsession with devising ways of putting the solar genie back 
into the bottle, to exercise “cost containment”’.115   
Whichever policy choices are made, a project registry should be established and 
made publicly available.116 This would enable anyone interested in establishing a 
RES-E plant to easily determine the overall status of RES-E plants in South Africa 
and the status of applications. Due to the lead time of RES-E plants (of about one to 
two years) it would be possible to tell well in advance whether or when any capacity 
caps or growth corridors (if established) will be reached. 
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It is clear from the preceding discussion that the issue of cost containment is a 
complex one.117 It is arguable that it is preferable to avoid capacity caps generally. 
However, a capacity cap, or preferably a growth corridor, could be established in 
respect of solar technologies. This would need to be included or communicated at 
the outset of the programme to avoid such measures being introduced suddenly or 
unpredictably, which as noted above, can threaten investment security. However, 
this is highlighted as an issue for further investigation. 
 
8.2.3.7  Tariffs  
Various decisions must be made with regard to the tariffs that would be paid to RES-
E generators by the grid operator (which are distinct from the electricity prices paid 
by final consumers) including determining the tariff level, the duration of the tariffs, 
whether tariffs should be differentiated and whether tariffs should be adjusted. 
 
a)  Tariff level 
It is important that policymakers ‘get the tariff level right’.118 If tariffs are too low, 
prospective investors would not make much profit and thus would not be incentivised 
to invest in renewable energy; and if tariffs are too high it would result in increased 
electricity prices, which could have severe consequences for low-income households 
and access to energy generally.119 It has been argued that determining the 
appropriate level is one of the main challenges of a successful FIT programme.120 
There are different methods to determine tariff levels, including basing the tariffs 
on avoided costs (i.e. the costs that are avoided by the grid operator by the provision 
of RES-E as opposed to having to build a new power plant to supply the electricity) 
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or on the actual cost of renewable energy generation121 to which a small premium of 
about 5 to 10 per cent of ‘return on investment per year’ is added.122 The latter 
approach has been widely used in the European Union (EU) and has been the most 
effective in promoting renewable energy worldwide.123 In certain jurisdictions this has 
been cheaper than basing tariffs on avoided costs.124  
Determining the actual costs of generation is usually determined through market 
research and analysis of the current costs of renewable energy.125 Various factors 
must be considered, including the investment costs of plants, grid-related and 
administrative costs, operation and maintenance costs, fuel costs, inflation,126 
interest rates and decommissioning costs.127 Once this is all taken into account, a 
tariff level can be set, also having regard to how much electricity is expected to be 
generated and the projected ‘lifetime’ of the installation.128 This is a complex (and 
non-legal) exercise and will not be considered further here. It may be noted, 
however, that such details ‘are typically not incorporated into legislative or regulatory 
language’.129  
As the generation costs of different RETs differ, basing the tariffs on the actual 
cost of generation would necessarily result in tariffs that are differentiated according 
to technology.130 This would not be the case if the tariffs were based on avoided 
costs, which would yield a standard tariff that would apply to all RETs (irrespective of 
their differing costs). Rates based on actual generation can thus be more effective at 
‘achieving portfolio diversity’ than rates based on avoided costs.131 
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Determining tariffs based on the actual costs of generation would be consistent 
with South Africa’s legislation. For example, section 15 of the Electricity Regulation 
Act132 provides that  
‘[a] licence condition determined under section 14 relating to the setting or 
approval of prices, charges and tariffs and the regulation of revenues … must 
enable an efficient licensee to recover the full cost of its licensed activities, 
including a reasonable margin or return’.  
Arguably, this implies that tariffs will be based on the actual cost of generation 
plus a small profit. Similarly, the ‘basic economic principle underpinning the [2009 
REFIT] … [was] the establishment of a tariff (price) that cover[ed]… the cost of 
generation plus a “reasonable profit” to induce developers to invest’.133 It is 
considered that the REFIT was appropriate in this regard. 
Tariffs had already been determined under the REFIT of 2009 and tariffs have 
also been established under the first three bidding windows of the REIPPP 
Programme (discussed in Chapter 7). This would arguably provide some guidance to 
decision-makers regarding the determination of appropriate tariffs.  
 
b)  Duration of tariffs 
It must also be determined how long tariffs will be paid in respect of particular 
projects. The concern has generally been to ensure that tariffs are paid for the 
economic lifetime of the relevant project. Tariffs that are paid over a shorter period of 
time will result in lower policy costs.134 However, a shorter contract time may ‘remove 
the incentive for projects to continue operating over their entire lifetimes’.135 On the 
other hand, tariff payment periods that are too long could hamper technological 
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innovation,136 and contracts that are 25 years or longer may give rise to the 
possibility of overcompensation.137 
FIT contracts usually range between 15 and 25 years.138 In European countries 
that have implemented FIT policies, tariffs are usually paid for between six years and 
20 years.139 In Germany tariffs are generally paid for about 20 years, which is the 
‘average lifetime of many renewable energy plants’.140 This provides security to 
investors as it ensures that they would be able to recover their costs and may also 
translate into greater price stability for customers.141 Under the REFIT it was also 
provided that tariffs would be guaranteed for 20 years.  
There is no reason to diverge from international practice or the REFIT in this 
regard. It is thus recommended that in South Africa tariffs should be guaranteed for 
approximately 20 years, as it is ideal for the guaranteed tariff to cover the average 
economic life of installations.142 
Another consideration, which is more relevant with regard to a longer tariff 
payment period, relates to whether tariffs should be adjusted for inflation.143 It is 
possible to adjust all or part of tariffs for inflation, or simply to include inflation in the 
initial calculation of FIT tariffs, so that there is no explicit adjustment. The latter 
approach is followed in Germany.144 The 2009 REFIT provided that tariffs would be 
adjusted anually on the basis of the consumer price index or another appropriate 
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inflation index.145 It is submitted that such adjustments should be included in the 
initial calculations. 
 
c)  Differentiated (stepped) tariffs 
It is possible to differentiate tariffs according to a number of different factors, 
including the type of technology or fuel used, the size of the installation, and the 
resource quality at the relevant site or location.146  Differentiating tariffs on these 
grounds can assist in limiting the costs of the FIT programme.147 Doing so 
presupposes that tariffs are based on the actual costs of generation. 
 
(i) Type of renewable energy technology or fuel 
Differentiating tariffs according to the type of renewable energy technology or fuel 
takes into account that different RETs are at different stages of maturity or 
development and therefore have differing costs148 (as discussed in Chapter 3). Thus, 
tariffs for wind energy would be lower than tariffs for solar power. Differentiating 
tariffs on this basis thus encourages the development of a wide range of 
technologies, rather than just the most mature and cheapest technologies (if only a 
single tariff level was offered). This ‘ensures that jobs, manufacturing opportunities, 
and associated economic activities are created in several renewable energy 
technology sectors’.149 
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It is also possible to differentiate tariffs for biomass with regard to the type of fuel 
used. For example, fuel produced from fuel crops costs more than fuel produced 
from waste biomass.150 This practice is followed in Germany and in Spain. 
There is no question that tariffs should be differentiated on the basis of RET in 
South Africa. This approach was already followed under the 2009 REFIT as well as 
under the REIPPPP currently. The tariffs for the different RETs were considered in 
Chapter 7. 
 
(ii) Project size 
Differentiating tariffs on the basis of project size takes into account the fact that large 
plants tend to be less expensive151 since economies of scale have been achieved, 
making it cheaper to generate electricity. Differentiating tariffs on this basis also 
reinforces the decision to offer FIT tariffs that are based on the actual costs of 
generation.152 This approach also ensures that developers of different-sized 
installations would achieve a similar profit, despite the different costs associated with 
constructing different renewable energy installations.153 This encourages the 
participation of different sizes of RES-E generators and ensures that it is not only 
profitable to participate on the basis of large installations. Thus, IPPs could range 
from ‘the homeowner seeking to install a PV system on their rooftop, to the 
institutional investor seeking to invest in large, commercial or utility-scale projects’.154  
On the other hand, failure to differentiate tariffs according to project size ‘could 
lead to windfall profits for large projects’, while making it unprofitable to participate 
with smaller projects.155  
Almost all EU countries that have a FIT policy in place differentiate their tariffs 
based on installation size.156 It was seen in the case of the FIT policies in Germany 
and Spain that as the capacity of a plant increases, so the tariff decreases. This 
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does not appear to be the case in India and China. The REFIT also did not provide 
for differentiated tariffs for different project sizes. 
It is submitted that it would be preferable to differentiate tariffs on the basis of 
plant size in a South African FIT policy. However, it would need to be considered 
whether this should be introduced at the outset or whether it would be desirable to 
introduce this at a later stage as the FIT becomes more mature. While this 
differentiation introduces more complexity, not doing so would result in spending 
money unnecessarily on financing larger installations, which can generate RES-E at 
a lower cost than smaller plants. It is thus submitted that a very basic system of 
differentiation based on project size (installed capacity) could be introduced at the 
outset, similar to the approach taken in Germany under the original EEG (as seen in 
Chapter 5 (in Table 5.1)). 
 
(iii) Resource quality or availability 
It is also possible to differentiate tariffs within the same technology band or category 
according to the availability of the resource. As seen in Chapter 5, this practice is 
followed in Germany. With regard to wind energy, for example, a lower tariff can be 
offered in areas where it is very windy where there will be a higher yield of electricity 
and it will therefore cost less to generate;157 and a higher tariff can be paid in respect 
of areas where there is a lower availability of wind energy. On the other hand, 
providing the same standard tariff where energy costs less to produce would result in 
excess profits to RES-E generators to the detriment of consumers, who would bear 
the additional costs unnecessarily.158 Offering a standard tariff could also lead to 
RES-E developers flocking to windy areas, which could give rise to public opposition.  
Providing higher tariffs in less windy areas would thus encourage the 
development of RES-E plants being dispersed, and ensure that the development of 
wind energy would not be restricted to areas with high yields of wind and could also 
be developed at sites with lower yields.159 This could also assist in reducing 
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bottlenecks that could otherwise develop in windier areas160 and reduce windfall 
profits to RES-E generators in those areas.161 However, it would still be important 
that the ‘sites with the most favourable conditions’ are exploited first,162 as this is 
more cost efficient.163  
There are different ways in which to differentiate tariffs according to resource 
quality. As seen in Chapter 5, Germany makes use of the ‘reference turbine’ with 
regard to wind energy. If the output of a particular installation falls below 150 per 
cent of the output of the hypothetical reference turbine after five years, then the initial 
(higher) tariff is extended, whereas, if an installation produces more than 150 per 
cent of the output of the reference turbine after five years, the tariffs are reduced. A 
different approach is followed in France, where reference is made to the ‘actual wind 
resource performance data’ for a particular installation over a ten-year period and the 
tariff level is retained or decreased based on this actual performance.164 As noted in 
Chapter 5, China has been divided into four regions and fixed tariffs for wind energy 
have been set for each region. 
In France tariffs are also differentiated for solar PV in different regions of the 
country.165 It is suggested that this approach ‘could be particularly valuable for large 
countries with a significant disparity in local resource potential’.166 This is especially 
relevant to South Africa where the Northern Cape, for example, has far more solar 
potential than other regions. Under the REFIT no differentiation was made in respect 
of resource quality or availability. 
While this approach would necessarily introduce more complexity, it is submitted 
that this would not be too onerous, especially considering that wind and solar maps 
have been developed for South Africa; and it would arguably not be too complicated 
to develop differentiated tariffs for different areas with reference to the resource 
availability in those areas. Indeed, this would be less complex than the approach 
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followed in Germany and in France where the output of the relevant installations 
must be monitored. 
 
(iv) Location 
It is also possible to differentiate tariffs according to the location of the installation 
without reference to resource availability. Thus, in Germany different tariffs are 
offered for solar energy depending on whether installations are free-standing or 
whether they are attached to, or on top of buildings. This reflects the fact that it is 
more expensive to build solar installations on existing structures. It is also desirable 
to build installations on or attached to existing structures rather than requiring new 
space.167  
Germany also differentiates tariffs for wind installations depending on whether 
they are onshore or offshore.168 This reflects the fact that it is more expensive to 
develop wind installations offshore.  
It is not clear that this level of differentiation is necessary in South Africa yet. For 
example, no offshore wind turbines are in the process of being constructed as yet. 
However, the construction of solar plants on existing structures should perhaps be 
encouraged. It would then need to be decided whether this differentiation should be 
introduced at the outset or at a later stage.  
 
(v) Demand orientation 
Electricity demand differs depending on the time of day and the season. Thus, in 
Spain tariffs are differentiated according to the season (winter or summer) as well as 
the time of day (peak or off-peak). Higher tariffs are paid during peak times during 
the day.169 However, such differentiation could only be applied to RETs ‘that can 
                                                          
167
See for example Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n3) 35. See 
also Table 5.3 in Chapter 5 above. 
168
 See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 above. 
169
 Klein et al Evaluation of Different Feed-in Tariff Design Options (n71) 61. 
309 
 
adjust their time of generation’ including biomass, CSP with storage and 
hydropower.170  
This approach increases the market orientation of the FIT programme, and 
ensures that supply is more closely related to demand. This increases the value of 
the RES-E generated,171 which would be more valuable during peak times (when 
there is more demand) than during off-peak times. However, such tariff differentiation 
would increase administrative complexity172 and it is not recommended that a FIT 
policy in South Africa introduce this level of differentiation (at least at the outset). 
 
vi)  Discussion 
Differentiating tariffs on all of the grounds discussed above would introduce more 
complexity to the design of the FIT, which would most likely involve more 
administration and higher costs.173 However, if the policy is well-structured these 
differentiations could increase the cost efficiency of the programme.174 Therefore, 
while it would be desirable to introduce some level of tariff differentiation to achieve 
certain objectives, such as the penetration of a range of RETs, it is submitted that 
there should not be excessive tariff differentiation. It is submitted, for example, that 
the Spanish approach of differentiating tariffs according to demand orientation may 
be too complex in South Africa at the present stage. 
It is notable that the 2009 REFIT Regulatory Guidelines considered the 
differentiation of tariffs and stated that differentiating tariffs inter alia with regard to 
installation size, geographical value and local generation are appropriate in more 
developed energy markets, and recommended that ‘once the first phase of the 
REFIT is up and running, the second phase can begin to address some of these 
issues, building on the lessons learned from the first phase’.175  
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While maintaining simplicity is arguably an important objective, this should be 
within reason and should not lead to RES-E generators earning windfall profits. It is 
thus submitted that the ideal option would be for tariffs to be differentiated (or 
stepped) to some extent. At the very least tariffs should be differentiated on the basis 
of technology, which was already the approach taken under the 2009 REFIT and 
under its successor. Furthermore, it is unlikely that it would be too administratively 
complex or expensive to differentiate tariffs according to the resource availability in 
different regions, with reference to the wind and solar maps for South Africa that 
have already been developed. It may also be possible to include a very basic level of 
differentiation with regard to installation size. Further tariff differentiations could be 
introduced in time and with appropriate notice. 
 
d)  Fixed tariff or premium tariff 
There is a further option to offer a fixed tariff, which is independent of the market 
price,176 or a premium tariff that is added to the market price of electricity.177 As seen 
in Chapter 5, fixed tariffs are offered in Germany, India and China. Indeed, most 
countries with FITs in place offer fixed tariffs.178 The REFIT also provided for fixed 
tariffs. On the other hand, Spain offers the option of premium tariffs in addition to 
fixed tariffs. Under this approach, the RES-E generated is usually traded on the spot 
market.179  
It has been argued that the premium system is a better option as it is reasonable 
to pay higher tariffs when electricity demand is higher and electricity is thus more 
expensive, and to pay lower tariffs when electricity demand is lower and electricity is 
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less expensive.180 The premium system can thus encourage RES-E generators to 
adapt their generation to demand.181 
On the other hand, premium tariffs are more risky as RES-E investors do not 
know future tariff levels in advance182 and there is no purchase guarantee.183 
Premium tariffs can also give rise to a ‘considerable risk of overcompensation’,184 
which translates into higher costs per kWh of electricity generated.185 As seen in 
Chapter 5, the premium tariff in Spain led to RES-E developers earning windfall 
profits (which led to the introduction of cap and floor prices).  
As fixed tariffs are independent of the market price for electricity, it has been 
argued that they ‘distort competitive electricity prices’186 and do not take account of 
electricity demand.187  
On the other hand, as fixed tariffs provide more certainty, RES-E generators can 
be sure of exactly how much money they will receive for electricity generated. This 
increased security (and consequently lower risk) should lead to more renewable 
energy development’.188 The reduced risk may also translate into lower capital costs, 
thereby reducing the the costs of developing renewable energy.189 It has been 
argued that fixed tariffs have generally ‘demonstrated a higher level of cost efficiency 
compared to premium-price FIT payments … and have created … more transparent 
market conditions for RE development’.190 Indeed, a study analysing premium and 
fixed tariffs in the EU found that profits earned under the premium option were about 
€0.01/kWh to €0.03/kWh higher than under the fixed tariff option.191  
                                                          
180
 J Schallenberg-Rodriguez and R Haas ‘Fixed Feed-In Tariff Versus Premium: A review of the 
current Spanish system’ 2012 (16) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 293-305, 303. See 




 Couture and Gagnon ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models’ (n120) 962. 
183
 Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n2) 118. 
184
 Schallenberg-Rodriguez and Haas ‘Fixed Feed-In Tariff Versus Premium’ (n180) 294. See also 
See Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n2) 117. 
185
 Couture and Gagnon ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models’ (n120) 962. 
186
 Ibid, 961. 
187






 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n3) 23. See also Couture and 
Gagnon ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models’ (n120) 964. 
191
 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n3) 62. 
312 
 
The increased security offered by fixed tariffs may also ‘attract a greater diversity 
of investors… [which] is reflected perhaps most clearly in the high levels of local 
ownership found in countries like Germany’.192 Fixed tariffs can also guard against 
unpredictable fossil fuel prices in contrast to premium tariffs, which would lead to 
increased electricity prices if conventional (fossil fuel-generated) electricity prices 
were to increase.193 Fixed tariffs are also less administratively complex as they 
require less regulatory oversight and involvement.194  
In light of all these factors, it is submitted that it would preferable for tariffs in 
South Africa to be fixed.  
 
e)  Adjustment of tariff levels  
As renewable energy technologies become more mature, so their costs decrease (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). It is thus important to include a mechanism to ensure that 
tariffs are decreased as the costs of generation decrease. Decreasing tariffs ‘as 
experience is gained’ would help to ensure that the FIT programme will be 
economically efficient.195 However, maintaining tariffs at appropriate levels is 
challenging inter alia due to ‘rapidly changing markets’.196  
There are several options for adjusting tariffs to ensure that the tariff levels for 
new installations reflect the decreasing costs of RES-E. In the first place it is possible 
to apply degression, which  
‘is applied because the total costs of a technology … tend to decrease in a 
relatively predictable way. This is based on the observation that for every 
doubling in output in a given industry, there tends to be a proportional decrease 
in the unit cost over time’.197  
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As discussed in Chapter 5, automatic degression is applied in Germany whereby 
tariffs for new installations are reduced by a set percentage each year. Thus, the 
tariff for a particular installation would be lower if it were to begin operation in five 
years’ time compared to in one year’s time. Degression rates are higher for RETs 
that are less mature and are evolving rapidly, such as solar PV, as opposed to more 
mature RETs such as wind and hydro power.198 
It is also possible to apply ‘flexible’ or responsive’ degression (or growth 
corridors), in terms of which the adjustment of tariffs is linked to the attainment of a 
specific level of capacity (as discussed in 8.2.3.6 above). As seen in Chapter 5, 
Germany applies responsive degression in respect of solar PV, with the basic 
degression rate of 1 per cent per month being adjustable either up or down 
depending on the amount of capacity installed in a specific period. No provision is 
made for degression in Spain, except in respect of solar PV, and tariffs may be 
revised annually. No provision is made for tariff degression in either India or China. 
Automatic adjustments are arguably ‘the most transparent option, especially if 
the adjustment schedule is known and published in advance’.199 They also provide 
more certainty to prospective IPPs than periodic tariff revisions.200 However, 
automatic degression does not take account of factors such as the increasing costs 
of labour or of the materials required to develop RETs, which could hamper the 
development of renewable energy,201 or that rapid deployment could decrease prices 
more quickly than anticipated.202  
 An advantage of responsive degression in this regard is that it introduces ‘a self-
adjusting element in the policy design’203 and allows the rate of degression to be 
determined by the market and not vice versa.204 It has also been argued that 
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responsive degression may be more appropriate with regard to RETs like solar PV 
that have ‘more dynamic cost trends’.205  
On the other hand, difficulties with the responsive degression approach include 
the fact that it may create uncertainty as to when a certain capacity level will be 
reached. It has also been found that ‘adjustments strictly assessed on quantity of 
capacity installed may fail to coincide with actual price trends’.206 As responsive 
degression introduces more complexity, it may be better suited to large renewable 
energy markets.207  
It was seen in Chapter 7 that the REFIT did not make any provision for 
degression. In light of the above, it is recommended that in South Africa there be 
automatic or fixed degression. However, as noted above, an argument could be 
made for applying responsive degression in respect of solar energy.  
There should also be scope to revise tariffs to take account of situations where 
the degression rate is not reflecting actual market developments and changes 
related to costs, and it has been noted that there is a challenge in achieving a 
balance between flexibility to respond to sudden changes in price and providing 
security to investors.208 In this regard it is possible to provide that tariffs may be 
revised either after certain time periods or with the attainment of a certain amount of 
capacity.209  
It has been argued that while time-based triggers are more transparent 
‘[c]apacity-based triggers can also be transparent if progress towards the triggers is 
actively monitored (e.g. using a project registry) and publicly available for developers 
to see’.210  
In most countries, tariffs are revised periodically. It is accordingly submitted that 
tariffs should be reviewed after certain time periods, for example, every three years. 
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This is arguably administratively simpler than using capacity-based triggers, and 
more transparent.  
 
8.2.3.8  Transparency and provision of information 
In Germany it has been seen that requirements regarding the provision of 
information are imposed on the various roleplayers, including the installation 
operators, grid system operators and transmission system operators (discussed in 
Chapter 5 above).  
Transparency and access to information are no less important in South Africa, 
especially in light of the ‘secretive and unresponsive culture in public and private 
bodies [prior to 1994] which often led to an abuse of power’.211 The Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa thus includes a right of access to information212 and the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act213 (PAIA) has been enacted to give effect to 
this right. PAIA includes amongst its objects ‘generally, to promote transparency, 
accountability and effective governance of all public and private bodies’.214 
It is submitted that in South Africa information should be provided by the relevant 
entity215 regarding the amount of RES-E that it buys from RES-E generators and 
sells to its customers. It should also be required that the responsible authority (the 
Department of Energy) provide progress reports to ensure that decision-makers 
reflect on the effectiveness of the law and consider how it might be improved.  
Such reports usually deal with the growth of RETs, any increased costs for 
consumers as well as the ecological impacts of renewable energy plants, and could 
also deal with the impact of the FIT policy on greenhouse gas emissions, job 
creation and manufacturing.216 It is submitted that progress reports should also 
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indicate how much of the increase in electricity tariffs is due to the consumption of 
RES-E.  
As noted in 8.2.3.6 it is also suggested that a project registry should be 
established by the Department of Energy, which should be made publicly accessible. 
It could also be required, as in Austria, that electricity bills show the electricity mix 
being provided.217 
 
8.2.3.9  Other elements 
 
a)  Additional payments 
It is also possible to consider the payment of bonus amounts inter alia for very 
efficient technologies, the use of specific fuels, the upgrading (or repowering) of 
older wind and hydro facilities so that they become larger and more efficient,218 local- 
or community-ownership and the use of innovative technologies.219 While such 
bonus payments could encourage various social, environmental, and economic 
benefits,220 their inclusion should be carefully considered as they can increase the 
administrative complexity and costs of the FIT programme,221 and it has been argued 
that bonus payments should only be included if this does not affect the transparency 
of the programme and if their benefits outweigh the higher administrative costs.222 
For instance, the additional costs could be outweighed by benefits such as 
promoting local content or local ownership. This is considered further below. 
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b)  Promoting localisation   
Promoting local content can assist in avoiding expensive imports223 and contribute to 
economic growth and the creation of jobs.224 In this regard it has been argued that  
‘the policy framework created by FIT policies has enabled certain countries such 
as Germany and Denmark to become incubators of RE technology and 
innovation, and create export opportunities in RE markets around the world. 
Combined with a long-term commitment to a renewable energy future, these 
countries have begun to lock in their strategic position in the energy economy of 
the 21st century’.225 
Similarly, promoting localisation could provide an opportunity for South Africa to 
become a leader in Africa in regard to the manufacture of RET infrastructure.226 This 
can be done in a number of ways, inter alia through local content requirements, local 
ownership laws, mandating international developers to transfer skills and technical 
capacity where foreign expertise are required,227 and offering additional payments 
(discussed above) for a higher percentage of local content.228 In certain countries 
RES-E generators are also required to pay a percentage of the revenue to the 
municipality in which the RES-E project is located.229 Including such requirements 
would most likely increase the administrative complexity and the costs of the 
programme.230 Requiring projects to have a certain percentage of local content may 
also create delays.231  
The current REIPPP Programme, however, includes local content requirements. 
It has been reported that, in the second round of bidding, local content of at least 25 
per cent of the total costs of projects was required for all RETs except solar PV and 
CSP without storage, for which 35 per cent was required. This was increased to 40 
per cent and 45 per cent in the third round of bidding.232 Furthermore, project 
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developers are required to pay between 1 and 1.5 per cent of project revenue to 
communities within a 50 kilometer radius to support socio-economic development.233 
Against this background, it has been concluded that  
‘[l]ocal content strategies will likely continue to be a topic of intense discussion 
internationally. Countries will need to identify appropriate strategies for balancing 
their national economic development objectives with the cost and complexity of 
local content policies and with international trade regimes’.234 
This is therefore also highlighted as an area for further consideration. 
 
c) Environmental authorisation 
As noted in Chapter 6, the regulations under the National Environmental 
Management Act235 (the NEMA) only require environmental authorisations in respect 
of the construction of power plants which are more than 10 MW. However, under the 
REIPPPP it is required that all prospective projects obtain an environmental 
authorisation. It is proposed that under a FIT policy all projects should also be 
required to obtain an environmental authorisation, which would require project 
developers to comply with the environmental assessment process provided for in the 
NEMA and its regulations.236 It would also be possible to include the construction of 
such projects as listed activities in regulations under the NEMA, for which an 
environmental assessment must be carried out.237  
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d)  Direct selling 
A further question is whether renewable energy generators should be allowed to sell 
RES-E directly to consumers under the FIT policy. In Germany, for example, it is 
possible to sell electricity directly to consumers, in which case generators may not 
claim the fixed tariffs but are paid a market premium (discussed in Chapter 5). In 
South Africa, the 2009 REFIT guidelines made provision for the direct selling of 
RES-E to consumers; however, this would have been ‘outside of the REFIT 
mechanisms’.238  
It was suggested above that it would not be appropriate for premium tariffs to be 
a feature of a FIT policy in the South African context. However, it would be possible 
to introduce direct selling subject to the usual tariffs for electricity being applied. If 
this is considered too complex at the outset, it could be introduced at a later stage.239  
 
e)  Net metering 
Net metering is distinct from, but can complement, a FIT programme240 and it has 
been argued that ‘[n]et metering and differentiated tariffs should be key 
considerations for any REFiT policy as they allow smaller, local producers to be 
involved’.241 The IRP 2010-2030 confirms that  
‘[n]et metering, which allows for consumers to feed energy they produce into the 
grid and offset this energy against consumed energy, should be considered for 
all consumers (including residential and commercial consumers) in order to 
realise the benefits of distributed generation’.242 
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It is submitted that it would be advantageous to include net metering in a South 
African FIT policy. However, municipalities have opposed net metering since it would 
reduce an important source of their income.243 This issue would therefore need to be 
resolved. 
 
f)  Cost sharing 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Germany has a sophisticated system in place to ensure 
that the increased costs of electricity due to the uptake of RES-E are borne by 
system operators across the country equally, rather than only the system operators 
that have a lot of ‘green’ electricity in their grids.244 Thus, grid system operators and 
transmission system operators are required to keep records of how much has been 
spent on tariffs for RES-E to ensure that tariff costs are equalised amongst different 
system operators.  
The situation would arguably be much simpler in South Africa. Eskom owns all of 
the transmission infrastructure and half of the distribution infrastructure, with the 
other half being owned by municipalities.245 Thus, the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure is essentially owned by government. Furthermore, all independent 
power producers sell their electricity to Eskom and municipalities purchase their 
electricity from Eskom.  
Once the ISMO is established246 it will be charged with various responsibilities 
(discussed in Chapter 6) including the buying and selling of electricity. In future it 
would therefore be the ISMO that would practically be able to monitor the amount of 
RES-E fed into the grid and distributed to customers. However, the government will 
be the only member of the ISMO.247 In either event there would thus be only one 
entity that is responsible for the purchase and sale of all electricity, whether it be 
Eskom or the ISMO. Furthermore, ‘pass through arrangements’ for independent 
power producers are already in place to ensure that the costs of electricity 
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generation are distributed to all consumers (as noted in the discussion of the REFIT 
in Chapter 7). It is therefore submitted that few problems would arise with regard to 
the distribution of costs amongst different system operators, and that there would be 
no need for the establishment of a specific scheme for the sharing of costs to the 
extent required in Germany. 
 
g)  Forecast obligation 
In some countries renewable energy generators are required to forecast ahead of 
time how much RES-E they plan to feed into the grid. In Spain, for example (as 
discussed in Chapter 5), RES-E generators are required to forecast the expected 
supply 30 hours beforehand.    
A forecast obligation may be seen as an example of best practice as it can assist 
with integrating renewable energy into the grid, promote better grid management and 
also contribute to achieving ambitious renewable energy targets.248 However, 
forecast obligations are usually imposed on larger, more intermittent resources, 
although they can be imposed on all generators above a certain size.249 Indeed, a 
forecast obligation adds complexity to the system and may be costly for smaller 
IPPs.250 It was also seen that in Spain (discussed in Chapter 5) the forecast 
obligation increased the costs of the programme. 
In the draft (standard) power purchase agreement that was attached to the 
NERSA Consultation Paper for Phase 2 of the 2009 REFIT, provision was made for 
renewable energy sellers to provide monthly and weekly generation forecasts. 
However, it does not appear that any consequences were attached to the provision 
of inaccurate information.251  
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While it would be possible to introduce a forecast obligation, in light of the 
potential disadvantage to smaller IPPs (especially if a penalty is imposed for 
submitting inaccurate information) and the increased costs attached to a forecast 
obligation, it is submitted that it would not be ideal to introduce a forecast obligation 
in South Africa, at least at the outset.  
 
h)  Financing the feed-in tariffs 
It has been argued that, while ‘many studies focus on the level of the feed-in tariffs, 
the levels themselves are irrelevant if they cannot be paid’.252 However, it has also 
been argued that it should not be assumed that FIT policies will be expensive. On 
the contrary, countries can design their FIT policies so as to ‘reflect their different 
policy goals and national circumstances [and] FIT policies can be designed to limit 
ratepayer impact and do not necessarily need to be “expensive” from the point of 
view of ratepayers’.253 It has also been noted that renewable energy may actually be 
the cheapest power option in many countries.254 Thus, a FIT policy may not actually 
require additional funding. 
To the extent that FIT policies do require additional funding, the two primary 
ways in which the cost of the tariffs can be recovered (or the costs of the FIT policy 
be financed) are from ratepayers, i.e. electricity consumers, or from the national 
budget, i.e. taxpayers.255  
In most countries that have implemented the FIT, the increased costs are 
effectively shared among all electricity customers.256 This option necessarily 
increases the price of electricity257 and there may be opposition if electricity prices 
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are increased significantly. It is, however, possible to include provisions that limit the 
impact for low-income households and energy-intensive industries.258 
An advantage of passing the costs on to taxpayers is that electricity prices need 
not be increased,259 as the costs of RES-E would be funded from the general fiscus. 
This approach also provides a transparent way to monitor costs. On the other hand, 
passing the costs on to taxpayers can be controversial and taxes are not likely to be 
popular.260 It may also result in uncertainty with regard to the availability of funding 
and create risk for RES-E generators; for example, ‘if renewable energy 
development begins to happen very quickly, the budget will be more quickly 
exhausted, dampening investment appetite as renewable energy development picks 
up’.261  
In Germany, the increased costs of electricity are spread amongst all 
consumers. The impact of the FIT policy on electricity-intensive consumers is further 
limited by the special equalisation scheme (discussed in Chapter 5) and the cost 
reductions enjoyed by electricity-intensive consumers are transferred to other 
electricity consumers.262 In China the additional costs of RES-E are also spread 
amongst consumers through the imposition of country-wide levy on the sale of 
electricity.263 
South Africa’s 2009 REFIT guidelines provided for the tariff costs to be 
recovered from electricity consumers.264 It is submitted that in terms of a future FIT 
policy the tariffs should likewise be paid by electricity consumers. 
According to some, passing on the costs of a FIT policy entirely to consumers in 
developing countries may lead to negative consequences, and undermine efforts to 
increase access to energy and alleviate poverty.265 To avoid this, social transfer 
mechanisms should be implemented so that energy-intensive users and wealthy 
households cross-subsidise low-income households. One way of doing this would be 
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to exempt certain groups, such as low-income consumers, from paying the additional 
costs due to the FIT policy.266 It would also be possible to introduce subsidies for 
low-income households.267 Furthermore, South Africa’s free basic electricity policy 
(discussed in Chapter 3) could possibly be strengthened. 
However, it was seen in Chapter 3 that the price of conventional coal-generated 
electricity in South Africa has increased considerably, and average electricity prices 
have risen from 18c/kWh in 2007 to about 65c/kWh in 2013.268 The increased costs 
are borne entirely by consumers. At the same time, the costs of renewable energy 
are continuously decreasing. This makes it likely that ‘the “gap” between 
conventional and renewable energy sources will narrow and the amount of “above 
market” FIT payments will decrease’.269 
At present, the average price of electricity in South Africa is about 65c/kWh, 
while the average cost of wind energy in the third round of bidding under the 
REIPPPP was approximately 66c/kWh.270 As noted above, it has also been reported 
that electricity generated from the new coal power plants, Medupi and Kusile, will 
cost 97c/kWh.271 It therefore appears that wind energy will cost less than new coal 
options.  
If a carbon tax is introduced in South Africa, it would also be possible to use part 
of the revenue raised to finance the FIT, which would assist in offsetting some of the 
increased costs of electricity due to the uptake of RES-E (to the extent that these 
arise).272 This means that consumers would still feel some impact of increased 
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electricity prices. However, this would result in the ‘good’, i.e. RES-E not being 
penalised and actually being subsidised, while the ‘bad’, i.e. electricity generated 
from coal would be penalised, which would sent the correct price signal to 
consumers. It would effectively amount to cross-subsidisation in line with the 
environmental fiscal reform approach that was discussed in Chapter 4.  
In Mauritius, for example, a small-scale FIT programme is in place, which is 
financed by a fund – the Maurice Ile Durable Fund – which derives its revenue from 
a carbon tax on fossil fuels. It is described as being ‘popular with citizens as it does 
not increase the financial burden on consumers, as is the case in many other 
countries’.273 
As noted already, the South African government plans to implement a carbon tax 
in 2015. It has not yet indicated how the proposed carbon tax will interact with the 
REIPPPP and the IRP 2010-2030, which sees renewable energy capacity increasing 
by 17.8 GW by 2030.  
 
8.2.3.10  Administrative aspects  
 
a)  Overview 
The imposition of a feed-in tariff in itself may not be sufficient to ensure that 
renewable energy is taken up. The entire policy framework as well as other non-
economic barriers must be considered, including grid-related and administrative 
barriers.274 It has been noted that even a well-designed FIT policy may be ineffective 
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in the face of inter alia administrative barriers such as long project approval times.275 
Furthermore, a FIT policy ‘should not be seen as an isolated policy for the energy 
sector, but as an integral part of a country’s overall development strategy’.276 It 
should also ‘be integrated with rural development and poverty eradication 
strategies’.277 While it is not possible to resolve all of these complex issues in this 
thesis, they are briefly considered below. 
 
b)  Barriers 
(i) Administrative barriers 
It is widely accepted that administrative barriers can have ‘a significant impact on the 
success of an instrument and hamper the effectiveness of technically very powerful 
policy schemes’.278 Streamlining administrative processes and regulations can lower 
costs for investors, which would ultimately assist in reducing the generation costs 
and ultimate tariffs.279  
Specific recommendations with regard to overcoming administrative barriers, 
include the setting of time limits for the approval process,280 reducing the number of 
authorities involved and establishing a ‘one-stop shop’ to coordinate the entire 
process,281 and spatial planning at the local level to ‘anticipate future renewable 
energy projects by including them when drafting or revising regulations and 
standards’.282 It is also important that the relevant policies are simple to implement 
and comply with, and any permission and administrative procedures should be clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2008 available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,15746,en.html 
[accessed 14 July 2011] 23. See also Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n2) 182-190, who set out a 
number of barriers (other than financial) that have been experienced in the European context. 
275
 Mendonça et al Powering the Green Economy (n75) 34. See also Ölz Deploying Renewables: 
Principles for Effective Policies (n274) 23, who refers to the importance of removing non-economic 
barriers first.  
276
 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 128. 
277
 Ibid, 133. 
278
 Ragwitz et al OPTRES Report (n2) 49. 
279
 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs in Developing Countries (n18) 83-84. 
280
 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n3) 23. 
281





and straightforward.283 It has also been suggested that simpler procedures be 
designed for smaller projects.284   
It has been argued that governments and state-owned utilities can help to 
reduce the project development costs by providing the necessary information on the 
country’s renewable energy potential.285 For example, solar and wind maps have 
been established for South Africa, as seen in Chapter 3, which would assist 
prospective IPPs in deciding the most appropriate areas for the establishment of 
RES-E plants.286 In Germany municipalities are required to indicate where it is viable 
to build plants in their spatial planning.287 In Germany (and in Denmark) 
municipalities are also required to  
‘reserve specific areas for wind turbines and have set restrictions on proximity to 
buildings and lakes, among other things. These policies have been extremely 
successful, reducing uncertainty about if and where turbines can be sited and 
expediting the planning process’.288 
It would certainly make it easier for prospective IPPs if it were known in advance 
where, in terms of planning laws, it is possible to establish different RES-E plants. 
It must also be decided whether a power purchase agreement with the grid 
operator is required. If a power purchase agreement (PPA) is required it should be 
specified whether this contract is standard. A standardised PPA could include 
provisions regulating aspects such as project size, technology type, ownership 
structure and expected annual generation.289 An advantage of such contracts is that 
they could ‘streamline the project development process’.290 This would also reduce 
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administrative costs, provide security and increase efficiency as well as 
transparency.291  
 
(ii)  Social barriers 
Promoting public acceptance of renewable energy and a FIT policy is highly 
important.292 In Portugal it is required that wind generators pay 2.5 per cent of the 
revenue received to the municipality in the location of the wind turbine.293 While this 
may increase public acceptance as well as public welfare in the relevant location, it 
also increases administrative complexity and increases costs for RES-E 
generators.294 However, as noted above, the REIPPPP similarly requires RES-E 
generators to pay between 1 and 1.5 per cent of project revenue to communities 
within a 50 kilometer radius to support socio-economic development.295 
In Denmark and Germany local ownership of wind turbines has assisted in 
increasing the acceptance of wind energy.296 Local content requirements, which are 
included under South Africa’s REIPPP Programme, could have a similar effect. 
In addition, it is submitted that the relevant government department, i.e. the 
Department of Energy, should be responsible for raising awareness regarding the 
benefits and importance of RES-E.  
 
(iii)  Grid-related barriers 
While insufficient grid capacity could be a cause for concern,297 it is submitted that 
this would not necessarily arise in the South African context.298 As government plans 
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to double grid capacity by 2030 in any event, this would enable the additional RES-E 
to be absorbed.  
Another important aspect, alluded to above, is the integration of RES-E into the 
grid in light of the intermittency of some RETs. This refers to ‘balancing power’, 
which can ‘be interpreted as implying that conventional power capacity has to be 
available to compensate for any missing production from renewable plants’.299 
However, it would also be possible to ‘balance’ intermittent RETs with more stable 
RETs such as biomass and hydro. Furthermore,  
‘it should be stressed that there are other ways to balance RES-E production 
than the use of conventional power plants. Strong RES-E deployment could 
push the innovation in new storage facilities for handling the intermittency of 
RES-E power production’.300 
However, integration of RES-E into the grid is a complex technical issue, which 
cannot be fully resolved here and is highlighted as another issue for further 
consideration. 
 
c)  Queuing 
The need for queuing procedures can arise especially where the FIT policy imposes 
a cap, which makes it more likely that prospective IPPs would enter speculative bids 
in order to ‘reserve’ a place in the queue, in respect of a project that may or may not 
be developed.301  
There are several ways to deal with this challenge. For example, a security 
deposit could be required, which would be repaid as specific milestones are 
achieved, or a financial commitment for the interconnection application could be 
introduced, or increased in respect of projects above a certain size.302 This is likely to 
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reduce the risk of speculative queuing and increase the likelihood that prospective 
IPPs ‘will submit honest applications and that the proposed projects will be 
developed in a timely and efficient manner’.303 However, it could also act as a barrier 
to small investors. 
It may be noted that this challenge would not arise if there were no caps in place, 
as in Germany.304 
 
d)  Programme revisions 
While the provision of certainty and security to investors is crucial, it is also important 
that the system be flexible and that governments are able to address any barriers as 
they emerge.305 This can be done by allowing for programme revisions.  
Programme revisions should be distinguished from tariff adjustments and tariff 
reviews, discussed above at 8.2.3.7. Programme revisions relate to far broader 
decisions, such as whether to impose a capacity cap or whether to impose 
restrictions with regard to eligible technologies. Programme revisions ‘typically 
involve a more detailed review of the policy’s success, while highlighting where 
changes need to be made based on both evolving policy goals and changing 
technology costs and market conditions’.306 While the REFIT Regulatory Guidelines 
provided for the review of the programme, no provision was made for programme 
revisions. 
Programme revisions may occur at predetermined dates (for example, every four 
years), or may be triggered by the attainment of specific capacity milestones.307 
Programme revisions triggered by predetermined dates can increase transparency, 
and also promote investor confidence through the provision of a stable timetable for 
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revisions, which can promote more renewable energy development.308 On the other 
hand, policy revisions triggered by the attainment of capacity milestones will increase 
the flexibility of the programme and also provide a programme that is more 
responsive to cost factors.309 However, the latter approach may create uncertainty 
for RES-E generators and investors regarding when milestones will be reached.310  
In Germany, the EEG makes provision for the Federal Government to evaluate 
the Act and submit a progress report by 31 December 2014 – i.e. within three years 
of implementation – and every four years thereafter.311 It is submitted that in South 
Africa, simplicity and transparency should be preferred and that policy revisions 
should similarly occur at predetermined dates. 
 
e)  Choice of legal instrument 
Another question relates to whether the FIT should be implemented in terms of 
legislation or regulations. It has been argued that implementing a feed-in tariff via 
legislation provides the feed-in tariff with the force of law and could increase investor 
confidence.312 On the other hand, implementing a feed-in tariff through regulations 
provides the opportunity for more participation by all stakeholders.313  
In Germany, specific legislation was enacted to establish the feed-in tariff, and it 
is recommended that the same approach be followed in South Africa. Indeed, when 
the NERSA introduced the REFIT it stated that introducing a feed-in tariff through 
legislation ‘would enable the process to be all encompassing’.314 It is submitted that 
the Department of Energy should be responsible for introducing the relevant 
legislation.  
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It was noted in Chapter 7 that the REFIT, in the view of government, did not 
comply with South Africa’s preferential procurement rules,315 but that according to 
Wim Trengove SC this was not necessarily the case. It was also reported that 
government did entertain the possibility of amending the legislation in order to allow 
for a fixed tariff.316  It is thus submitted that, if a feed-in tariff is found to breach South 
Africa’s procurement laws, amendment of the relevant legislation should be 
considered.317  
Alternatively, the Minister of Finance would be able to exercise his discretion to 
exempt the relevant organs of state from the requirements of the PPPF Act that 
relate to price competition on the basis that ‘the likely tenderers are international 
suppliers’318 and that ‘it is in the public interest’ to do so.319 
 
8.2.4  General comments  
It has been argued that a FIT policy should be designed with the goal of providing 
security to prospective RES-E investors while at the same time (which is especially 
important in South Africa) ensuring that the policy is designed with a view to cost 
containment.320  
To this end, maintaining simplicity at the outset is important. In relation to the 
REFIT it was argued that ‘[a] simple REFIT will be easy to implement quickly – the 
greater the complexity of the REFIT the more chance of delays or confusion in its 
implementation’.321 It is submitted that this would apply equally to a future FIT policy, 
especially in a developing country like South Africa. 
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The elements that have been considered necessary for an effective FIT policy 
are:  
 a binding target for RES-E;  
 the inclusion of a range of renewable energy technologies;  
 an obligation to connect RES-E generators to the grid and to purchase the 
RES-E generated as a priority;  
 the establishment of appropriate (fixed) tariffs, which are guaranteed for a 
period of approximately 20 years;  
 the differentiation of tariffs to some extent, for example, in respect of different 
RETs;  
 providing for the adjustment of tariff levels through (basic) automatic 
degression;  
 the consideration of measures to contain costs especially with regard to more 
expensive RETs such as solar energy – for example, through the use of caps 
or growth corridors;  
 the potential inclusion of bonus payments, for example, for the promotion of 
local content; and  
 providing for transparency and the provision of information.  
Other elements that could potentially be included are direct selling and net 
metering. More technical aspects such as administrative and grid-related barriers 
must also be addressed. Furthermore, it would need to be determined how the FIT 
policy would be financed. 
It is important that a FIT policy should not be implemented indefinitely since 
preferential tariffs will no longer be required once RES-E reaches grid parity (i.e. 
once RES-E costs the same as conventional electricity). In this regard, it has been 
noted that ‘feed-in tariffs are better for the interim stage of market introduction’,322 
and that when markets and RETs are more mature, instruments such as a 
renewable obligation with the option of trading, could be introduced. This could be 
accompanied by tender programmes in regard to large-scale projects, such as 
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offshore wind energy.323 While the issue is not considered further here, it is 
something that should perhaps be considered at a later stage. 
No less essential (as alluded to above) is political will. Indeed,  
‘[p]olitical will and support at the highest level is very important to overcome 
internal barriers such as vested interests of the current power producers. In 
Ethiopia, the lack of enthusiasm has kept the policy under revision in draft format 
for four years, while in Egypt and South Africa the REFiT has been sidelined in 
favour of a bidding process’.324 
In the context of wind energy specifically it has been noted that, while Germany 
has lower wind potential than a number of other European countries it has much 
more wind power due to the ‘favourable political climate’.325 In the South African 
context specifically it has been noted that  
‘[u]nlike many other developing countries, South Africa does not suffer greatly 
from lack of technological capacity or inability to raise finance, as has been 
demonstrated by large-scale and innovative projects developed in the past in the 
energy sector (for instance, the development of a large-scale synfuels 
programme in the 1970s, or the electrification programme in the 1990s). 
However, not all projects are pursued with equal political will or find a conducive 
economic environment’.326  
 
8.3   Concluding remarks  
This chapter has examined the elements of a possible feed-in tariff framework in 
South Africa, with reference to recommendations in the literature as well as 
international experience. Some reference has also been made to the REFIT that was 
introduced (but not fully implemented) in South Africa in 2009. While developed 
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countries generally provide the best practice examples, this chapter has attempted to 
consider the appropriate design of the relevant elements in a specifically South 
African context.  
Given the importance of the financial impact of a FIT policy, it has been noted 
that certain RETs may be reaching grid parity; for example, wind energy may cost 
less than new coal options in South Africa. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the 
development of all RETs will be too expensive in South Africa, and the focus should 
rather be on controlling the costs of more expensive RETs such as solar energy.  
While recommendations have been made in this chapter, certain issues have 
been highlighted as areas for further consideration, including how best to contain the 
costs of the FIT programme in the face of excessive cost increases, and how to 
effectively promote localisation with regard to RES-E projects and integrate RES-E 
into the grid. 
As noted above, a FIT programme in South Africa has not necessarily been 
ruled out, especially in light of the opacity and uncertainty surrounding the decision 
to replace the REFIT with the REIPPPP.  Furthermore, the REIPPP Programme has 
only been implemented in respect of specific amounts of RES-E capacity. It is thus 
still (arguably entirely) competent for a FIT policy to be developed and implemented 











Key recommendations and 
conclusions 
 
9.1   Overview  
The research underlying this thesis was undertaken during 2010 to 2013 – a period 
during which the legal and policy framework in South Africa for energy generally and 
renewable energy in particular was undergoing rapid and considerable transition. 
The research was broadly concerned with (a) describing and discussing the 
primary market-based instruments that have been implemented internationally to 
promote renewable energy with a view to identifying which have been the most 
effective; and (b) in light of these findings, discussing the legislative and policy 
developments that would be necessary for the successful implementation of such 
instruments in South Africa. 
These questions were approached by first considering the problem of climate 
change. It was seen that climate change has been fuelled by increased energy 
demand since the time of the Industrial Revolution. This demand has been met 
primarily by coal and has resulted in a significant increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions, primarily carbon dioxide, and a consequent rise in global temperatures.1 
In light of continuing economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions show no signs of 
abating and climate change has been described as ‘the biggest challenge of our 
time’.2 
Climate change poses considerable risks to South Africa due to its developing 
country status and its particular vulnerabilities. However, South Africa is also a 
                                                          
1
 See for example H Winkler (ed) Energy Policies for Sustainable Development in South Africa: 
Options for the Future 2006 (Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town) 1-2. 
2
 K Annan ‘A united call for action on climate change’ The Washington Post (23 January 2014) 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kofi-annan-a-united-call-for-action-on-climate-




comparatively significant contributor to climate change due to its significant reliance 
on coal to generate energy.3 Indeed, while developed countries are historically 
responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, as developing countries 
strive to attain higher levels of socio-economic development, their energy generation 
and consumption is increasing significantly. While it would not be fair to curtail the 
growth of developing countries, which has been recognised in the international 
climate change negotiations,4 the continuous growth of greenhouse gas emissions is 
projected to have disastrous consequences on a global scale, as indicated in a 
number of studies.5 In this regard, it has been argued that taking early action to 
respond to climate change should be considered an investment that could assist in 
avoiding more severe consequences and higher costs in the future.6 
This thesis has emphasised the need to rely on other energy sources, including 
renewable energy (internationally and in South Africa). It has been recognised that 
renewable energy has the potential to be ‘a major contributor in protecting our 
climate, nature, and the environment as well as providing a wide range of 
environmental, economic and social benefits that will contribute towards long term 
global sustainability’.7  
However, it was seen that a significant barrier to renewable energy is that it 
generally has higher upfront costs than conventional fossil fuel-generated energy. 
While this does not take into account various factors, such as the provision of large 
subsidies to fossil fuel industries,8 financial support for renewable energy is still 
required at least at the outset.9 
The thesis discussed the move internationally towards market-based 
instruments, due to the recognition that they can be more effective than command-
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and-control instruments in achieving environmental goals.10 Several market-based 
instruments have been introduced internationally to promote electricity generated 
from renewable energy sources (RES-E), including the feed-in tariff (FIT), the 
renewable obligation and renewables tendering. These were discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4 and it was identified that the FIT has been the most effective in promoting 
RES-E inter alia due to the ‘overall stability and continuity’ provided by the policy 
framework,11 which is necessary to encourage investment and growth in the 
renewable energy industry.12 It was seen that South Africa has implemented a 
renewables tendering programme. However, it has been noted that there is no 
internationally acknowledged tendering success story and that renewables tendering 
programmes tend to create stop-and-go cycles, which is contrary to the objective of 
providing stability and continuity.13  
In light of these findings, Chapter 5 considered the implementation of the FIT 
internationally, with the object of identifying the elements that should be present in a 
model feed-in tariff policy, which could be used to inform the design of a possible FIT 
policy in the South African context. The focus was on the German FIT, which is 
acknowledged to be a great success and was thus considered as an example of best 
practice. However, the FIT policies of other countries, namely Spain, India and China 
were also explored and discussed briefly, and some preliminary observations were 
made regarding the elements that should ideally be included in a future FIT policy in 
South Africa. 
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 This move to market-based instruments and the rationale for their implementation were discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
11
 TD Couture, K Cory, C Kreycik and E Williams A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy 
Design (for the national Renewable Energy Laboratory, US Department of Energy) 2010 available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf [accessed 24 April 2012] 11.  See also J Nganga, M 
Wohlert, M Woods, C Becker-Birck, S Jackson and W Rickerson (study for the Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
and the World Future Council) Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs: Advancing Renewable Energy 
to Meet the Continent’s Electricity Needs 2013 available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Feed_in_Tariff/Powering_Africa_throug
h_Feed-in_Tariffs.pdf [accessed 26 March 2013] 10. 
12
 J Lipp ‘Lessons for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy from Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom’ 2007 (35) Energy Policy 5481-5495, 5483. See also REFIT Regulatory Guidelines (n7) 27. 
13
 JL Sawin National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons for the Advancement & Diffusion of 
Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World (Thematic Background Paper) 2004 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRENENERGYTK/Resources/5138246-
1237906527727/59507051239290499336/National0Polic1ies0around0the0World.pdf [accessed 26 
April 2013] 9. This was discussed in 4.4.1.3. 
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Chapter 6 outlined the legislation and policy documents that have been 
implemented in South Africa that are relevant to the promotion of renewable energy 
in order to trace the development of renewable energy policy. Even though South 
Africa has considerable renewable energy resources,14 it was seen that the 
promotion of renewable energy did not receive high priority until the end of the last 
decade.15 However, government has more recently envisaged a more important role 
for renewable energy in the future, which is evidenced by the inclusion of renewable 
energy in the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-203016 (IRP 2010-2030). 
The increased importance attached to renewable energy by the South African 
government has also been evidenced by the introduction of market-based 
instruments to promote renewable energy, notably the Renewable Energy Feed-in 
Tariff (REFIT) and the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP). These were both discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7 and the reasons for the replacement of the REFIT by the REIPPPP were 
critically considered.17  
Aside from the debate regarding the legal basis of the REFIT, it appears that a 
major concern was the potential cost of the programme.18 However, it has been 
argued that ‘FIT policies can be designed to limit ratepayer impact and do not 
necessarily need to be “expensive” from the point of view of ratepayers’.19 In light of 
the international effectiveness of the FIT and the view that FITs can be successful in 
developing countries if well-designed,20 Chapter 8 considered the legislative and 
policy developments that would be necessary to implement a FIT policy in South 
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 This was discussed in 3.3.4.3. 
15
 This was seen in the discussion contained at 6.4 above. 
16
 Department of Energy Electricity Regulation Act No. 4 of 2006: Electricity Regulations on the 
Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030 GNR. 400 in Government Gazette No. 34263 dated 6 May 
2011. This has been discussed in detail in 6.4.6. In addition, the role of renewable energy has 
increased from the IRP 1 (Department of Energy Electricity Regulation Act, 2006: Determination 
regarding the Integrated Resource Plan and new generation capacity GN 25 in Government Gazette 
No. 32898 dated 29 January 2010) to the present IRP 2010-2030.  
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 In 7.3.10. 
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 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n11) 55-56. 
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 W Rickerson, C Laurent, D Jacobs, C Dietrich and C Hanley Feed-in Tariffs as a Policy Instrument 
for Promoting Renewable Energies and Green Economies in Developing Countries 2012 (United 
Nations Environment Programme) available at www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_FIT_Report_2012F.pdf 
[accessed 28 March 2013] 79. 
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 See Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n11) 10; Couture et al A Policymaker’s 
Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n11) x and M Mendonça, D Jacobs and B Sovacool Powering 
the Green Economy: The feed-in tariff handbook 2010, 67-76. 
340 
 
Africa, with a focus on the elements that should be included in such a policy. These 
are set out below.  
 
9.2   Key recommendations  
Only the key points and recommendations are highlighted here, while the full 
discussion on which these are based is contained in 8.2 above. An initial 
recommendation is that the initial form of the recommended feed-in tariff policy not 
be too complex, which is important in the developing country context.21  
 
9.2.1  Institutions 
As discussed in 8.2.2, the Department of Energy would be responsible for the 
introduction and administration of a FIT policy. The NERSA would remain 
responsible for the issuing of licences and the regulation of tariffs. RES-E generators 
would enter into power purchase agreements with Eskom or the Independent 
System and Market Operator (ISMO) once it is established. In this regard, the 
process of approving the ISMO Bill22 has been a drawn-out one and it is important 
that this process be finalised as this would provide more certainty in the sector. The 
Department of Environmental Affairs would be responsible for the consideration of 
applications for environmental authorisations. 
 
9.2.2  A binding target for renewable energy 
A binding target for RES-E and/or renewable energy should be established as this 
would signal a ‘long-term commitment to [prospective] investors’.23 In establishing an 
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 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n11) 14. 
22
 Department of Energy Independent System and Market Operator Establishment Bill in GN 290 in 
Government Gazette No. 34289 dated 13 May 2011. 
23
 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n11) 24. See also M Ragwitz, A Held, G 
Resch, T Faber, R Haas, C Huber, PE Morthorst, SG Jensen, R Coenraads, M Voogt, G Reece, I 
Konstantinaviciute and B Heyder OPTRES: Assessment and Optimisation of Renewable Energy 
Support Schemes in the European Electricity Market (Final Report) 2007 available at 
http://www.optres.fhg.de/OPTRES_FINAL_REPORT.pdf [accessed 11 July 2011] 23. Specific details 
regarding the location of such targets was discussed in 8.2.3.2. 
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appropriate target, reference should be made to the potential for renewable energy 
in South Africa, which is significant and which has been considered by the South 
African government and in various studies.24 The estimates in these studies are 
considerably more ambitious than the ‘target’ contained in the Integrated Resource 
Plan 2010-2030 of 9 per cent contribution of RES-E to electricity supply by 2030.25 
Using the words ‘at least’ to precede the target, as in Germany,26 should also be 
considered as this would ensure that the ‘target’ does not act as a cap on the uptake 
of RES-E.  
 
9.2.3  Definitions 
Certain terms, including ‘renewable energy’ and ‘purchasing entity’ must be defined 
under the FIT policy in order to avoid ambiguity. 
With regard to renewable energy, it is submitted that the definition contained in 
the National Energy Act (discussed in Chapters 6 and 8) is appropriate, and thus the 
FIT policy could provide that ‘renewable energy’ has the meaning assigned to it 
under the National Energy Act. It was noted in Chapter 3 that nuclear energy is not 
considered to be a renewable source of energy. RES-E could be defined simply in 
terms of its usual meaning as ‘electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources’.27  
The purchasing entity should be defined as Eskom, and subsequently the ISMO, 
once it is established.28 As identified in 8.2.3.3, further technical terms such as 
‘generator’, ‘transmitter’ and ‘distributor’ should also be defined, perhaps with 
reference to the definitions contained in the Electricity Regulation Act.29 
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 As discussed in 3.3.4.3 above. 
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 IRP 2010-2030 (n16). This has been discussed in detail in 6.4.6. 
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 As discussed in 8.2.3.2 above. 
27
 As discussed in 8.2.3.3. 
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 In terms of the imminent Independent System and Market Operator Act. As discussed in 8.2.3.3. 
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 Act 4 of 2006. 
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9.2.4  Eligibility criteria  
Establishing which projects should be eligible under a FIT policy is important and as 
discussed in 8.2.3.4, decisions must be made with regard to a number of elements, 
including which renewable energy technologies (RETs) should be eligible and 
regarding the size and the age of projects that may participate.  
A key recommendation is that a range of RETs is included under a FIT policy, 
namely onshore wind energy, solar photovoltaic (PV), concentrated solar power 
(CSP) (with and without storage), solid biomass, biogas, landfill gas and small 
hydro.30 This would encourage the development of a number of RETs including less 
mature RETs. In this regard, South Africa has substantial potential for solar energy, 
and it would be beneficial to develop this RET. Including a range of RETs would also 
provide the opportunity to balance intermittent RETs against more stable RETs. In 
light of the monopoly of Eskom it is also recommended that at the outset state-
owned plants should not be eligible to participate, in order to encourage the entry of 
independent power producers.31  
 
9.2.5  Obligations relating to connecting to, and upgrading of, 
 the grid 
Another key recommendation, as discussed in 8.2.3.5, is that an obligation to 
connect RES-E plants to the grid should be included. Specifying that RES-E plants 
must be ‘immediately’ connected to the grid, and ‘connected to the grid before 
conventional power generation units’32 would serve to prevent delay on the part of 
the grid operator (Eskom).  
The inclusion of a connection obligation would necessitate the upgrading of the 
grid. Thus, the FIT policy should include an obligation to upgrade the grid if 
necessary. While concerns might be raised regarding inter alia ‘the ability of the grid 
to absorb new generation and/or the technical feasibility (or necessity) of extending 
                                                          
30
 As discussed in 8.2.3.4 these are the RETs that have been included under the erstwhile REFIT and 
the current REIPPPP. 
31
 As discussed in 8.2.3.4 above. 
32
 Nganga et al Powering Africa through Feed-in Tariffs (n11) 21. 
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the grid to accommodate all available renewable resource’,33 the implementation of a 
FIT policy and the uptake of RES-E would complement the current urgent need in 
South Africa for additional electricity capacity.  
 
9.2.6  Obligation relating to the purchase of RES-E 
Another key recommendation is that the FIT policy should specify that the grid 
operator (Eskom, or the ISMO when it is established) must buy RES-E from RES-E 
generators and distribute it. This is especially important in light of Eskom’s monopoly 
and would provide security to RES-E developers that the electricity they generate 
would be purchased.34 However, allowing for unlimited renewable energy growth 
would most likely increase the costs of the FIT programme.  
There are various ways to contain costs, as discussed in 8.2.3.6, including caps 
and growth corridors. Cost containment is a complex issue and was not resolved. 
However, it was highlighted that the costs of FIT programmes have generally 
escalated due to the uptake of solar energy,35 and it has been submitted that cost 
containment measures should focus on solar technologies rather than on all of the 
RETs contained under the FIT programme.36 In this regard, it is notable that in South 
Africa the costs of renewable energy are decreasing while the costs of coal-
generated energy are increasing. 
 
9.2.7  Tariffs 
A number of decisions must be made in respect of tariffs, including with regard to the 
tariff level, duration of tariffs, whether they are differentiated (or stepped), whether 
fixed or premium tariffs should be provided and whether tariffs should be adjusted. 
All of these elements were discussed in detail in 8.2.3.7. 
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 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs  in Developing Countries (n19) 55. 
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 C Kreycik, TD Couture and KS Cory Innovative Feed-In Tariff Designs that Limit Policy Costs 
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory: Technical Report NREL/TP-6A20-50225) 2011 available at 
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A key recommendation is that appropriate tariffs should be established, which 
are neither too high nor too low, and that tariffs are based on the actual costs of 
generation. As discussed above, this is considered to be best practice37 and is 
consistent with South Africa’s legislation.38 The differentiation of tariffs including with 
regard to the type of RET or the project size, while introducing complexity, is 
important as it could increase the cost efficiency of the programme.39 Another key 
recommendation is that degression rates that ‘correspond… to the cost reduction 
due to technological learning’40 should be established. This would ensure that RES-E 
generators would not earn windfall profits and that costs for consumers would 
decrease ‘as experience is gained’.41 
 
9.2.8  Transparency and provision of information 
Transparency is important in the South African context and the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 specifically includes a right of access to information42 
and the Promotion of Access to Information Act43 has been enacted to give effect to 
this right.  
As discussed in 8.2.3.8 it is important that a FIT policy includes requirements 
regarding the provision of information, such as the publication of progress reports by 
the Department of Energy, which would inter alia deal with the growth of renewable 
energy, the ecological impact of renewable energy plants and any increases in 
electricity prices.  
It was also submitted that a project registry should be established by the 
Department of Energy to enable any interested person to check the status of the 
construction of RES-E plants. This would also be important with regard to the issue 
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 See section 15 of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. 
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 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n11) 35. 
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of cost containment as discussed in 8.2.3.6 above. Wind and solar maps should also 
be made easily accessible. 
 
9.2.9  Other elements 
Various other elements should be considered including the promotion of localisation, 
direct selling and net metering. The promotion of localisation has been identified as 
an important goal and mechanisms that could be introduced to encourage this 
include local content requirements, local ownership laws and requiring that RES-E 
generators pay a percentage of the remuneration received to the municipality in 
which the RES-E project is located.44 It was also identified that bonus payments 
could be offered with regard to local content.45  
However, such mechanisms would most likely increase the costs of the 
programme and result in higher electricity costs,46 and it would be important to 
achieve a balance between maintaining reasonable costs and promoting localisation. 
This has been identified in 8.2.3.9 as a contentious issue, which was not resolved, 
and it has been argued that countries should ‘identify appropriate strategies for 
balancing their national economic development objectives with the cost and 
complexity of local content policies and with international trade regimes’.47  
Environmental authorisations should be required for projects under a FIT 
programme. It would also be possible to include such projects in the list of activities 
(requiring environmental authorisation) in regulations made in terms of the National 
Environmental Management Act.48 Furthermore, it has been recommended that net 
metering should be included. However, the likely opposition of municipalities would 
need to be addressed.49 
A key aspect relates to the financing of the FIT policy and it has been identified 
that it is preferable for the increased costs of electricity due to the FIT programme to 
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 As discussed in 8.2.3.9 above. 
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 Couture et al A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design (n11) 49. 
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 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs  in Developing Countries (n19) 34. 
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be paid by electricity consumers rather than by taxpayers. Consideration should be 
given to introducing mechanisms to reduce the impacts of the FIT policy on poor 
households (such as the expansion of the free basic electricity policy) and on 
energy-intensive industries. It could also be considered whether part of the revenue 
raised from a carbon tax (which is planned to be implemented in 2015) could be 
used to finance the FIT programme in part.50  
However, it should not be assumed that ‘a FIT policy will incur significant 
additional costs over conventional alternatives’.51 Indeed, in Germany, overall 
electricity prices did not increase significantly until the uptake of solar energy began 
to rise drastically.52 It has been seen that in South Africa wind energy may cost less 
than new coal options.53 
 
9.2.10  Administrative aspects 
It is important that all barriers – administrative and otherwise – are addressed. With 
regard to administrative barriers, specific measures that could be implemented 
include the setting of time limits for the approval process54 and the establishment of 
a ‘one-stop shop’ to coordinate the entire process.55  
As discussed in 8.2.3.10 above, a critical decision relates to the choice of legal 
instrument and it was recommended that specific legislation be enacted to establish 
the feed-in tariff as this would allow the process to be ‘all encompassing’.56 The 
Department of Energy should be responsible for introducing this legislative 
framework, incorporating the elements outlined above. As discussed in Chapter 8, it 
would be necessary to address the alleged non-compliance of a FIT policy with 
South Africa’s preferential procurement rules, if this is found to exist. This could be 
achieved by amending the relevant legislation.57 Alternatively, the Minister could 
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 South Africa’s proposed carbon tax was discussed in detail in 7.5.1.5. 
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 Rickerson et al Feed-in Tariffs  in Developing Countries (n19) 79. 
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exercise his discretion and exempt the relevant organs of state from the provisions of 
the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act,58 specifically the provisions 
regarding competition on price on the basis that ‘the likely tenderers are international 
suppliers’59 or that ‘it is in the public interest’.60 
 
9.3   Concluding remarks 
It has been argued that in promoting energy, the concern should not simply be with 
installing capacity, but with ‘provid[ing] the conditions for [the] creation of a sustained 
and profitable industry, which, in turn, will result in increased renewable energy 
capacity and generation, and will drive down costs’.61 
Creating a sustainable renewable energy industry would have environmental 
benefits and would contribute to job creation, which is consistent with the goal of 
sustainable development contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa62 and which underpins the National Environmental Management Act.63 This 
would also be consistent with the long-term goal of government, as set out in the 
White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, 
namely  
‘the establishment of a sustainable renewable energy industry with an equitable 
BEE [black economic empowerment] share and job market that will offer in future 
years a fully sustainable, non-subsidised alternative to fossil fuel dependence’64 
(own emphasis). 
While the South African government has gone the renewables tendering route, it 
has been seen that there is no acknowledged renewables tendering success story at 
the international level. In light of the disadvantages noted with regard to renewables 
tendering programmes, it is regrettable that the South African government has gone 
this route. 
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The REIPPP Programme has been implemented in respect of specific amounts 
of RES-E capacity, which only provides an incentive to prospective RES-E 
generators to bid to supply capacity during the set bidding windows. There is no 
obligation on the grid operator (Eskom) to purchase RES-E outside of this 
mechanism. Such stop-and-go cycles would arguably not contribute to a sustainable 
renewable energy industry. Furthermore, since the REIPPPP has only been 
implemented in respect of certain amounts of capacity, this does not point to the 
indefinite implementation of the REIPPP Programme, which arguably leaves the 
door open for a FIT policy to be introduced with regard to the uptake of RES-E in the 
future. 
While feed-in tariff policies have been criticised as being expensive, it has been 
shown that this need not be the case and that they can ‘function well in both 
developed and developing countries, provided that proper care is taken in the policy 
design and accompanying policies’.65 This research has also shown that a FIT policy 
could provide security and stability to investors, which is necessary to encourage 
investment and growth in the renewable energy industry.66  
It is thus submitted that a feed-in tariff for renewable energy in South Africa 
should be revisited, and it is suggested that the proposed framework for a feed-in 
tariff policy, as outlined above, would go some way towards the creation of a 
sustainable renewable energy industry in South Africa. In addition to all of the 
benefits that this would have for South Africa, this would arguably have implications 
for the entire continent and would also provide South Africa with an opportunity to 
become a leader in the renewable energy industry in Africa. 
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